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Since the early 1990s, maritime routes have been considered to be the main method 
used by Colombian smugglers to transport illicit drugs to consumer or transhipment 
countries. Smugglers purchase off the shelf solutions to transport illicit drugs, such as 
go-fast boats and communication equipment, but also invest in developing their own 
artefacts, such as makeshift submersible and semisubmersible artefacts, 
narcosubmarines. The Colombian Navy has adopted several strategies and adapted 
several technologies in their attempt to control the flows of illicit drugs.  
 
In this research I present an overview of the ‘co-evolution’ of drug trafficking 
technologies and the techniques and technologies used by the Colombian Navy to 
counter the activities of drug smugglers, emphasizing the process of self-building 
artefacts by smugglers and local responses by the Navy personnel. The diversity of 
smugglers artefacts are analysed as a result of local knowledge and dispersed peer-
innovation. Novel uses of old technologies and practices of interdiction arise as the 
result of different forms of learning, among them a local form of knowledge ‘malicia 
indigena’ (local cunning). The procurement and use of interdiction boats and 
operational strategies by the Navy are shaped by interaction of two arenas: the arena 
of practice - the knowledge and experience of local commanders and their perceptions 
of interdiction events; and, the arena of command, which focuses on producing 
tangible results in order to reassert the Navy as a capable counterdrug agency.  
 
This thesis offers insights from Science and Technology Studies to the understanding 
of the ‘War on Drugs, and in particular the Biography of Artefacts and Practices, 
perspective that combines historical and to ethnographic methods to engage different 
moments and locales. Special attention was given to the uneven access to information 
between different settings and the consequences of this asymmetry both for the 
research and also for the actors involved in the process. The empirical findings and 
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theoretical insights contribute to understanding drug smuggling and military 
organisations and Enforcement Agencies in ways that can inform public policies 
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The captain is sure, this time they will capture a narcosub, the crew, and their cargo 
because they are receiving reliable information about the building and imminent 
sailing of a vessel. This is 2008 - the heyday of the narcosubs, or at least of the 
increasing number of their captures. Coast Guard personnel has already recognized 
the difficulties of capturing narcosubs in the open sea, thus they have put most of their 
resources toward an effort to obtain information. Previous operations have ended in 
disappointment: they had gone out to capture what they had thought was a narcosub, 
but it turned out to be something different. This time they have been receiving a 
constant stream of information, and have monitored the movement of people to an 
unsettled mangrove area. Finally, they manage to monitor the movement of the 
narcosub in real time, and now, with the high tide, they can track it leaving the 
mangrove and moving into the open sea. The captain, who is also commander of the 
base, consulting with the regional commander, gives an order to capture the narcosub. 
The team has been prepared in advance, but without knowing when or why they were 
on alert. A frigate from the surface fleet has been summoned to fulfil backup duties, 
but the bulk of the operation falls on two minor units and a helicopter.  
 
Even with information that is so detailed, finding the narcosub is a difficult task; the 
usual clues are not present, no wake, and a weak heat signature. The vessel is 
camouflaged against the waves. From afar, a member of one of the Coast Guard boats 
sees a couple of human silhouettes walking on the water. The Coast Guard boats get 
near. It is the narcosub. The captain orders the crew to approach and search the 
vessel. When they get close, the four crew members of the narcosub are already 
waiting on the deck. A lieutenant, a NCO, and two marines approach. They board the 
narcosub and request to search the vessel. They find nothing but a strong diesel smell. 
When they enquire about the cocaine, the answer is: ‘What cocaine? We are using this 
vessel just for fun. Sailing a submarine is not a criminal offence, thus the Coast Guard 
personnel have no other choice but to issue some worthless warnings and let the crew 
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of the vessel go. Later they find out that the vessel was on a trial run. Its builders 
wanted to confirm that the vessel was secure enough to make a trip to a point higher 
up on the coastal area of Central America than it had been made before.  
 
Since the early 1980s, interdiction efforts (increasing direct military presence, 
intelligence-based operations, and military operations) have been some of the main 
strategies for the control of illicit drugs. At the same time smugglers have been using 
different strategies to diminish the risk of being captured, and increase their chances 
of success. The label War on Drugs (WoD) has been used to describe the efforts of the 
U.S. Government, since Richard Nixon´s presidency, to wage war against drug 
trafficking. In 1971 a new strategy regarding the prohibition of illicit drugs based on 
the militarisation of the fight against traffickers was declared. This strategy reached a 
new level of intensity during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, by continuing the 
efforts to prevent production, distribution, and consumption of illicit drugs that had 
begun in the early 20th century.  
 
Several metaphors have been used to explain the dynamics of interdiction/evasion and 
the mobility of illicit drug markets and drug smugglers in general, from references to 
a cat and mouse games to the balloon effect, the arms race, and competitive games. As 
such, these analogies imply a linear cause/effect narrative, as a way to explain the 
dynamics of the actions on one or the other side, and assume that actions are either 
taken initiated by the state or that taken by smugglers. The same narrative can be 
observed when we analyse the fictional descriptions of drug trafficking, academic 
interpretations on the topic, and policy documents. In these narratives, it is common to 
encounter a powerful drug baron or cartel that can change and adapt at will or groups 
of people organised as networks. In both cases, the interpretations of the organisational 
arrangements of drug traffickers explain their resilience. When the concepts of cartels 
dominated the academic discussion, hierarchical organisations were deemed powerful 
precisely because of these characteristics. More recent explanations of drug trafficking 
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organisations as networks place their advantages on the distributed, horizontal 
arrangements.  
 
The illicit drug market has been extensively studied by economists, historians, 
criminologists, political science scholars, and increasingly by anthropologists. These 
studies have emphasized the economic or social impact of the drug market on the legal 
economy at different levels of the state and society. They have included attempts to 
measure and quantify the illicit activities, as well as to evaluate the results of state 
actions. Few scholars have studied the practices of smugglers and/or Law Enforcement 
Agencies (LEAs) and the military in the WoD. This omission is interesting, taking into 
account that the WoD is being waged every day, for example, in airports and ports 
where detection systems are put in place to prevent smuggling, urban centres where 
consumption is penalized, and isolated areas where farming of illicit crops is 
prosecuted. Key to this research is the open sea and coastal areas, where the Colombian 
Navy pursues go-fast boats, narcosubs, trawlers, fishing boats, and small cargo boats 
to seize any amount of illicit drugs, whether it be a few kilos or several tonnes. Similar 
stories to the one narrated at the beginning of this thesis are a common occurrence, 
that is to say, the WoD, far from a traditional war, is instead a serious ongoing struggle 
with mundane and prosaic artefacts, and that resembles policing activities.  
 
The main contributions I want to make in this thesis are: 1.) To provide evidence that 
traditional accounts based upon co-evolutionary explanations of the technologies used 
by smugglers and LEAs/the military fall short in explaining antagonistic relationships 
when actors are confronted with a high degree of uncertainty regarding the results of 
their actions, and face barriers to innovations such as the illegality of their actions; 2.) 
To provide evidence that traditional accounts regarding drug trafficking, which 
attribute smugglers’ success to smugglers´ structural organisations fall foul of what I 
call the fallacy of flexibility - a result of an asymmetrical view of the phenomena; 3.) 
That a turn to the study of the practices of the military rather than just analysing the 
technical capacities of their technologies provides a more accurate picture of the 
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antagonistic relationships that exists; and 4.) To propose that the outcome should not 
be analysed regarding the technical properties of the artefacts deployed by both sides 
but in the dispersed character of their innovation activities. 
 
As pointed out earlier, there has been plenty of work examining the illicit drug market. 
My aim is to go beyond prevalent quantitative studies and work that presents an 
asymmetrical view of the phenomena. The literature on the mobility and changes in 
the drug market are often the result of an incomplete interpretation of the seizure of 
illicit drugs, and often portray a unified view of the actions of smugglers, the LEAs 
and the military. My aim is to have a closer and more accomplished understanding of 
the dynamics of the binary interdiction/evasion and to incorporate the perceptions of 
the people in the field who are responsible for carrying out strategies that may have 
been designed elsewhere. I introduce the idea of the interdiction/evasion as a binary, 
as phenomenon composed of two elements. One side of the binary is made up of the 
practices, artefacts, plans, and actions of the LEAs working to stop the flow of illicit 
drugs, while on the other side the smugglers' plans, devices, actions, and strategies 
oriented towards evading state control. Nevertheless, as a way to achieve a critical 
account, I integrate a different view of the technologies and practices used by 
smugglers and the perceptions and technologies utilised by Navy personnel. This view 
signals that the idea of binary foregrounds a set of dispersed, contingent and 
unbounded encounters between the two sides that do not reproduce the binary 
opposition as a way to conceptualise actions. 
 
These considerations were the starting point in the formulation of the research 
questions that guided the data collection and analytical phases of this study. These 
questions arose from an understanding of the symbiotic relationships between drug 
smugglers and the strategies of control put into place by the state. They were also 
shaped by the specific forms of access I was able to secure in undertaking fieldwork 
(see Chapter 2). With some notable exceptions (Decker & Townsend Chapman, 2008; 
Kenney, 2007a) when discussing Colombian drug traffic, little research have been 
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done with smugglers. While I attempt to gain access to retired drug smugglers, the 
empirical data related practices of the smugglers are the result of the reading of LEAs, 
both in their interviews and documents. I avoid interpretations that fall into the rhetoric 
of control, such as affirming that particular developments in the smugglers' practice 
side are the result of a pattern of 'response-counter-response.' 
 
As Andreas (2003) has noted, the military approach to defence has traditionally 
centred around border concerns; nevertheless, many states have had to reconfigure 
their military apparatuses to prioritise policing. Since the early 1990s, the Colombian 
Navy has played an increasingly important role in strategies to control the smuggling 
of illicit drugs centred on the interdiction of the flows of cocaine. The militarisation of 
the efforts in the WoD is materialised in the interdiction approach, based on the idea 
that the seizure of illicit drugs and the capture of transporters will make traffickers give 
up their intention to smuggle their cargo and thus lead them to abandon the drug 
business altogether. This approach focuses on the assertion that interdiction is the most 
cost-effective of all forms of control. Transport costs for illicit smuggling, are 
calculated to be up to 40% of the total costs of the drug business and, therefore, 
accumulates most (of the) revenue (Echeverry, 2004; Kawell, 2001; Mejía & Restrepo, 
2008; Thoumi, 2005b). Nonetheless, to carry out interdiction operations, the military 
and the LEAs make claims about the need to constantly update surveillance 
infrastructure. Despite the use of different eradication and interdiction approaches and 
the steady militarisation of the WoD that started in the early 1980s, illicit drugs are 
still produced, and smugglers continue to move their illicit cargo. 
 
The creation of the Coast Guard Unit, as a response to perceptions of increased 
maritime drug traffic, implies that a traditional blue waters Navy increasingly oriented 
their resources to police brown waters, and to establish an intelligence based target-
oriented action. Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs) have become a central 
aspect of their operational and strategic aims. MIOs require coordination between 
different units and personnel, who have distinct levels of knowledge, skills, and 
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decision-making rights. Navy personnel are also bound by a series of legal and 
traditional constraints, such as different levels of authorisation for the use of force and 
for shipwreck rescue, which smugglers use in their favour. Smugglers may be bound 
by a different set of kinship relationships, family, and friendship, among others. 
Images of the enemy’s capacities play a significant role in the way local actors make 
decisions and negotiate personal goals with institutional requirements.  
 
The main role of the Colombian Navy is to stop drug smugglers departing from coastal 
areas or to capture them before they leave Colombian maritime borders. Borderlands 
on the northern Caribbean and Pacific Coasts with historical traditions of goods 
smuggling and poverty are exploited by drug traffickers to recruit locals with 
knowledge about native conditions. Locals are attracted to this work due to 
expectations of high revenues. There is a continuous interplay between the role of the 
Navy and the aims of drug traffickers. This symbiotic relationship is often expressed 
in very personal dilemmas, such as one policeman´s concerns about the need to 
perform his duty while at the same time not drawing the attention of drug traffickers 
to himself, thus putting his life at risk. Enforcement actions are paradoxical in the sense 
that by removing some players the conditions for others to exploit are created.  
 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and Innovation Studies have explored the 
process of innovation in traditional spaces, firms, sectors, among others. There is also 
a substantial body of literature in STS regarding the process of innovation in the 
military, with a focus on the traditional role of the military. In this thesis, I explore the 
role of a military institution, the Colombian Navy, in what have been called 
asymmetric wars, regarding the disparate capacities between the two sides. Andreas 
and Nadelman (2006) and Astorga (1999) have pointed out the importance of the 
technological transformation of the military to fight smuggling wars. However, to the 
best of my knowledge, there are no studies of the practices of the military in the WoD.  
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Central to the metaphors explaining change and mobility of the drug markets is the 
idea that smugglers and criminal groups have the capacities, abilities, knowledge, that 
allow them always to be ahead of enforcement agencies and military organisations, 
and that the latter are seen as bureaucratic, inflexible organisations. Clearly, military 
organisations do possess a set of fixed procedures and are restricted by budget 
constraints, role expectations, hierarchies, and decision-making problems, yet it would 
be naive to forget that criminal groups are also bound by concerns of a similar nature. 
Assuming that military organisations are a step behind or are inflexible overshadows 
several important issues regarding the involvement of the military in policing duties, 
specifically their capacity to learn and adapt quickly. This view also assumes an almost 
monolithic version of drug smuggling control, where all decisions flow from the upper 
echelons to the people in the field.  
 
As John Urry (2000) reminds us, metaphors are a central task of the social sciences. 
STS is no stranger to metaphors, and as noted above, the WoD is full of metaphors. In 
this thesis, I propose that the change and mobility in the WoD can be helpfully 
interpreted using the ´Red Queen´ metaphor. In such a scenario, derived from Lewis 
Carroll’s ‘Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There,’ both sides need 
to run as fast as they can, while they never seem to get anywhere.  
 
Since the full involvement of the Navy in the WoD, the Colombian Navy has 
implemented several plans and strategies to combat drug trafficking. The agreement 
between the Colombian Government and the U.S. Government to control maritime 
drug trafficking, signed in 1997, was instrumental in the professionalisation of Navy 
personnel. They received training and established direct contact with the U.S. Navy. 
The Plan Colombia, established in 1999, allowed the growth of the Navy regarding 
their budget. Although the existence of the Navy does not depend on their success in 
eliminating maritime drug traffic, it has clearly benefited from it at an institutional 
level, with their budget continuously increased since the late 1990s. Additionally, the 
seizure of illicit drugs and smuggler's artefacts is now an active element of both 
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institutional and individual prestige. The Colombian Navy makes a constant 
presentation of metrics as a result of their involvement in the WoD, and it makes 
symbolic displays of their results in the forms of exhibitions and ‘museums’ of 
smugglers´ artefacts. I use the concept of arenas (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 1999) to 
describe the various places in which Navy technologies and practices are shaped. The 
arena concerns to the knowledge and experience of local commanders and their 
perceptions of interdiction events and the arena of command, with a focus on 
producing tangible results to reassert the Navy as an able counterdrug agency. I use 
the bureaucratic politics model (Allison & Morton, 1972; MacKenzie & Spinardi, 
1988; MacKenzie, 1989; Spinardi, 1994), to illustrate how the development of 
strategies and technologies to stop the illicit flows of drugs are often the ‘inconsistent 
resultant of organisational routines and the conflict and compromise among political 
actors’ (MacKenzie, 1989, p. 164). This concept implies that decisions are not the 
result of a single rational strategy but instead they are the outcome of different players’ 
choices based on their conceptions, organisational, domestic, and personal interests 
(Allison & Morton, 1972).  
 
The evolution of smuggler technologies and practices has been presented by other 
authors (e.g. Group on Maritime Narcotrafficking, 2003; Ramirez & Bunker, 2014) as 
a process of progressive change or improvement, and as a direct response to the LEAs 
and the military’s efforts. In these versions, drug trafficking organisations are also 
presented as capable of producing quick responses, and most importantly, they are 
unveiled as unitary decision-making bodies. In this thesis, I propose that what is seen 
as a process of constant evolution, is rather the result of dispersed and uncoordinated 
actors, applying local solutions to the problems of drug transportation. Additionally, 
while several groups adopt traditional methods of transport, some are able to gather 
different forms of knowledge and produce complex artefacts. To sustain this claim, I 




I use the terms smugglers and drug traffickers instead of drug smuggling networks or 
drug trafficking organisations, or the like. In so doing I attempt to avoid the conceptual 
and empirical issues that these definitions carry. With this approach, I follow recent 
descriptions of drug traffic that portray, despite many allusions to formal 
organisational structures, ties between individuals in drug smuggling ventures as 
mostly of short-lived, bounded by the continuation of the transaction and without any 
commitment or permanence to a larger organisation (Decker & Townsend Chapman, 
2008). I do not discuss either the illicitness of these drugs or indeed the matter of border 
crossing (Abraham & van Schendel, 2005). In this research, the Colombian Navy and 
specifically the Coast Guard Unit are the main actors. I mention the Coast Guard Unit 
when I am dealing with affairs that are specific to that unit, such as boats, Bases, 
practices, technologies. The Coast Guard Unit is part of the Navy, and officers and 
NCOs are moved to it from different branches.  
 
Theoretical and Policy Context 
 
As an aspiring STS scholar, I framed my discussion in the academic literature on co-
evolution of technology and specifically on the role of users in the process of 
innovation. Nevertheless, in undertaking this research, I modelled my concerns taking 
into account the broader policy context, that is to say, the WoD.  
 
I argue that the current literature on co-evolution does not capture the set of antagonist 
relationships, neither a set of dispersed, contingent and unbounded encounters between 
the two sides composing the interdiction/evasion binary. I argue that the concept of 
co-evolution may be helpful to understand the broader dynamics of reciprocity 
between the two sides, but does not fully capture the nature of the innovation on each 
side. However, this research also aims to contribute to the growing literature from 
Innovation Studies and STS on the role users play in the process of innovation. I have 
specifically attempted to expand on the recent work from Hyysalo and Usenyuk 
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(2015), demonstrating the capacity of users to create complex technologies and master 
all aspects of those machines. My research contributes to the literature on unruly users 
and outlaw innovation. My research also inquiries about the nature of military 
innovation and the importance of antagonistic relationships in driving technological 
change (Dolnik, 2007; Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 1999). 
 
There are two broad policy discussions to which my research has a connection. First, 
the deployment of military forces to counter non-traditional threats and, second, 
current discussions about the logics of enforcement-based policies to control the 
production and consumption of illicit drugs. Debates about the results of the 
militarisation of the WoD have signalled the unintended consequences of this process 
expressed in the mobility of drug smugglers, and the effect it has had on the price of 
illicit drugs. Nevertheless, few studies have focused on the transformation of the 
military when it has been designated to participate in policing duties, specifically in 
the WoD. Alternatively, as illustrated in this research, most of the policy evaluations 
are framed in terms of the economic consequences of the different strategies for the 
control of narcotics. With my research, I expect to expand the discussion and to include 
in the debate the perceptions of those responsible for implementing those policies.  
 
Finally, with the results provided in this thesis, I aspire to shed light on the importance 
of local knowledge, and specifically a particular kind of local knowledge, Malicia 
Indigena, i.e. the importance of situated experiences and knowledge about the 
particular artefacts (interceptor boats) and the sea. Moreover, I wish to accentuate the 
importance of challenging the widespread interpretations of the phenomenon of the 





Outline of the Thesis 
 
In the first chapter, I present a literature review. I offer an overview of definitions of 
organised crime and criminal networks. I argue that those interpretations are the result 
of an asymmetric view of the phenomena. I present an overview of the STS literature 
regarding military innovation and discuss the gap concerning the practice of military 
organisations in asymmetrical wars, such as the WoD. I also introduce an overview of 
the user innovation literature and claim that the use of dispersed peer innovation is 
useful for understanding the process of innovation in outlaw contexts. Finally, I unveil 
the analytical framework utilised in this thesis to answer the research questions, i.e. a 
co-evolutionary interpretation of the dynamic interdiction/evasion, though I argue that 
traditional interpretations of co-evolutionary relationships are incomplete.  
 
In the second chapter, I present the data collection methods and the methodology 
followed in my research. I outline the background of this research and explain the 
theoretical and policy concerns that underpin this thesis. I also explain the main 
choices made and provide explanations of such choices. I provide an account of the 
research design and analysis; finally, I explore the main difficulties and practical 
limitations of this thesis.  
 
In the third chapter, I discuss the context of this thesis. I begin by presenting an 
overview of the history of prohibition of certain drugs. I delved into the involvement 
of Colombia in the WoD. In this chapter, I present a critique of the efforts to quantify 
the drug market; finally, I present some data regarding the cost of the WoD for the 
Colombian Government, focusing on the Navy’s budget.  
 
Chapter four presents an account of the transport of illicit drugs. I provide an overview 
of the history of those methods, and specifically on the maritime transport methods, 
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and I examine the forms of knowing and learning of the Coast Guard personnel in the 
field. Thus, I continue to stress the importance that a highly contextualised form of 
knowing, malicia indigena, plays in the day to day practices of Coast Guard personnel. 
Chapter five delves into the topic of narcosubs. I argue that despite traditional views 
about the continuous evolution of smugglers´ technologies, the narcosubs are a good 
example of how non-coordinated players can produce a complex technology. 
Therefore, the diversity of smugglers´ artefacts cannot be explained as resulting from 
a process of continuous innovation, but as a result of different approaches to solving 
the same problem, as undertaken by diverse groups producing different bricolages. 
 
Chapter six focuses on the institutional responses to the question, how to patrol the 
sea? That is the plans, strategies, and operational concepts promoted by the upper 
echelons of the Navy as solutions to the problem of the illicit flows. Chapter seven is 
devoted to the Coast Guard Unit, and specifically to the history of patrol boats. In that 
chapter I show that, during the period from 1995 to 2013, members of the Coast Guard 
actively explored alternative ways to intercept smugglers, developing their plans for 
designing and building their boats or using captured smugglers boats. The story of the 
Coast Guard patrol boats follows a similar pattern, i.e. early impressions of 
effectiveness in matching smugglers capacities, followed by detecting problems both 
with the artefact and their capacities to match smuggler vessels and, finally, discarding 
or repurposing of those vessels.  
 
The Maritime Interdiction Operations is the focus of chapter eight. In this chapter I 
show the importance of the day to day practices of the military in order to understand 
the symbiotic relationships between the two sides of the binary interdiction/evasion. I 
present evidence to back my claim that the interpretations of the military as inflexible 
and traffickers as flexible are misleading. The ninth chapter brings together the 
analysis of the different chapters. In this summative chapter I carry forward the idea 
of revising the binary interdiction/evasion and argue for a more nuanced interpretation 
of dynamics and changes in the drug market.  
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The final chapter, or conclusions, brings together the main findings of my thesis. I 
suggest several empirical findings in relationship with the history of the Colombian 
Navy in the WoD and specifically with the practices of Coast Guard personnel in their 
day-to-day activities. I indicate my contributions to knowledge and implications for 
practice, and conclude by considering the main limitations of this study and questions 



















Chapter 1. Literature Review 
 
 
In short the questions this thesis aims to address to are: Are drug smugglers a step 
ahead from Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) as portrayed in journalists’ accounts, 
and most importantly as concluded from academic literature on drug trafficking, 
organised crime, and transitional organised crime?. Is there a different way to 
characterise the dynamics of the binary interdiction/evasion? Several disciplines have 
produced an impressive body of literature on organised crime and drug trafficking 
enterprises, placing an emphasis on the economic aspect of the drug business and their 
organisational arrangements. Science and Technology Studies have produced several 
concepts that have helped to conceptualize dynamics in which change is produced as 
a result of pressures and influences from one entity over the other. The concepts of 
programs and anti-programs of actions can be suggestive (Latour, 1992), co-
evolutionary explanations can also be used to explain adaptation and change in 
scenarios in which two entities have a causal influence on each other (Mitleton-Kelly 
& Davy, 2013).  
 
The examination of the existent literature on drug trafficking and technological 
innovation in conjunction with the empirical findings of the fieldwork of this research 
reveals several pitfalls in these approaches. I argue that organisational learning 
perspectives and the focus on the advantages of the networked structural organisation 
of traffickers, have been useful to understand the smugglers’ side. In doing so, 
however, this body of literature perpetuates the asymmetric view in which agency has 
been placed on one side of the binary interdiction/evasion. Flat, horizontal 
relationships with few decision making levels are seen as characteristics that allow 
traffickers to produce quick and sudden change, forcing enforcement agencies to 
constantly adapt. An interpretation of the process as the result of program and anti-
program on the other hand, implies that there is an episodic relationship in which a 
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particular episode is determined by the outcome of a previous one (Czarniawska, 
2004). In short, that players are able to formulate responses in the face of known 
results. In this sense, such interpretation disregards the existence of a context where 
players act amid uncertainty. I situate the broad interpretation of the dynamics under 
the umbrella of co-evolutionary processes. This approach is helpful to characterise the 
wider process, but it does not completely capture the nature of the dynamics of the 
binary interdiction/evasion. I argue that theoretical lenses provided by innovation 
studies and the role of users in the process of innovation, and a focus on player’s 
practices facilitate a more nuanced interpretation of the interplay between the two sides 
of the binary.  
 
In this chapter I review the academic literature upon which I built my critique and my 
empirical and theoretical contributions. I begin exploring the academic literature on 
organised crime and specifically the study of drug networks, pointing out the 
advantages and shortcomings of these interpretations. I then turn to explore the 
contributions of STS to the study of military technologies. In the following section I 
explore academic contributions to the role of users and the concept of outlaw 
innovation. In the final section I propose the Red Queen metaphor as a plausible 
strategy to interpret the dynamics in the binary interdiction/evasion and the 
contributions of the Biography of the Artefacts and Practices (BOAP) approach and 
their significance to analyse the practices studied in this thesis.  
 
Organised Crime and Organisational Structure of Drug Traffickers 
 
Academic interest in researching Organised Crime has consistently grown in the last 
years. A quick search in any database will show that the number of articles, book 
chapters, and conferences on the topic has increased in recent years. Organised Crime 
is perceived as a main threat to security in a world post 9/11. In this new security 
environment dangerous criminal organisations are said to be strengthened by their 
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flexibility and capacity to move across borders creating constant challenges to 
enforcement, and they thus constitute the dark side of globalization.  
 
The adjective ‘transnational’ is often used, and when discussing organised crime a 
degree of border crossing is often implied. It is a global phenomenon both in the sense 
of being a by-product of globalisation and in being part of the shaping of global flows 
and movements. Organised crime groups and activities move from local and regional 
settings to the global, forming powerful networks that permeate boundaries. 
Traditionally, drug trafficking has been considered a key activity for organised crime 
groups.  
 
Some scholars (e.g. Camacho Guizado & López Restrepo, 2000) have argued that 
there is an imbalance in drug traffic studies. While most of these studies deal with the 
‘impact’ of the drug trade, just a few deal with the production. According to Vellinga 
(2004) studies of drugs have concentrated on: 1.) Policy analysis on the macro level; 
2.) The study of supply processes on the regional and sub regional levels; 3.) The 
impact on economy and politics of drug traffic, 4.)  The linkages with transnationally 
operational organised crime; and 5.) The effects of the various strategies designed to 
control the supply of drugs. On the other hand, Reuter (2004) notes the growing 
literature on ethnographic studies on retail and street markets, while there are few 
similar studies on the production side.  
 
Academic and policy analysis of drug trafficking organisations have moved from 
economic-bureaucratic descriptions about the cartels, to exploring the notion of social 
networks (Zaitch, 2004). The concept 'cartel' has been widely used in reference to drug 
trafficking organisations. This concept suggests a centralised and hierarchical 
organisations, in which a powerful boss, a ‘drug baron’, and his/her associates are able 
to control and overview all the stages of the production and distribution of drugs. To 
some authors these characteristics have been exploited by LEAs in order to disrupt 
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major groups. For example Bagley (2011, 2012, 2013) attributes success over the Cali 
and Medellin ‘cartels’ to the fact that they were hierarchically structured, while 
asserting than that their replacements, the criminal networks, are far more difficult to 
track down and dismantle.  
 
The concept of the cartel has been widely criticised, and most academic literature 
suggests a shift from a cartel era to networks as a strategical adaptation promoted by 
smugglers. Recent descriptions claim that drug trafficker groups are rarely hierarchical 
organisations as the ‘cartel’ concept suggests (Kenney, 2007a; McIntosh & Lawrence, 
2011; Morselli, Giguère, & Petit, 2007; Paoli, 2008; Vellinga, 2004b; Williams, 2001). 
As researchers interested in the social structure of drug trafficking organisations 
increasingly turn to the concept of network to describe those organisations, this in turn 
means that a growing number of scholars are using Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
as a method to describe the nature of these relationships (Bouchard & Amirault, 2013; 
Hobbs & Antonopoulos, 2014), and organisational theory in order to explain 
smugglers’ actions (Benson & Decker, 2010).  
 
Some authors have noted the limitations of the notion of social network in relationship 
with the study of criminal enterprises. According to Zaitch (2002, 2004), there is a 
tendency in these studies to present such networks as aesthetical devices, to present 
criminal networks as synonyms of criminal groups or organisations, sidelining the 
existence of different forms of organisation and how members assign meaning to their 
actions, focusing on isolated criminal relationships. Hobbs and Antonopoulos (2014) 
note the limitations of SNA studies of criminal activities. They recognize the 
limitations in the collection of information from individuals involved. They also point 
out the limitations of SNA approaches in capturing the chaos and fluidity of criminal 
groups. As most studies using SNA are based on the result of the actions of state 
agencies, relying solely on these descriptions will end up providing an image based on 
the a priori understandings of the phenomena from the perspective of state agencies, 
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which usually suggest stability rather than fluidity, and would eventually mirror the 
bureaucratic concerns of those agencies.  
 
Nevertheless, understanding trafficking groups from the perspective of the concept of 
networks has allowed organised crime scholars to delve into the strategies used by 
smugglers in order to minimize the vulnerabilities of drug trafficking (Benson & 
Decker, 2010; Galeotti, 2004; Paoli, 2008) and to stress the flexibility and speed with 
which these organisations are said to change in order to out-fox enforcement strategies. 
According to these descriptions less hierarchical organisations, where information 
flows through few channels, allow greater levels of adaptability in order to respond to 
market changes or improvements in strategies and technologies developed by LEAs 
(Kenney, 2003, 2007b). In this analysis of the 'arms race' between traffickers and 
LEAs, the latter have much more technical expertise but are bureaucratically 
inflexible, while the former possess less expertise but greater opportunity for local 
innovations. In short, studies of drug smugglers affirm that these networks show a 
flexibility and inventiveness that surpasses most attempts of control made by the 
central state.   
 
The characterization of criminal groups as networks is also present when describing 
terrorist groups. In this field some work have explored how organisational 
arrangements together with technology play a role in their success, for example 
Arquila, Ronfeldt, and Zanini (2001, p. 77) affirm that ‘Terrorists will continue 
moving from hierarchical toward information-age network designs’ and are ‘likely to 
increasingly use advanced information technologies for offensive and defensive 
purposes’. Several studies of how terrorist and smugglers are organised have stressed 
the importance of researching the principal characteristics of these organisations and 
the consequences for technology adoption and innovation (Cragin et al, 2007; Jackson 




As highlighted, literature on criminal networks and organised crime have put emphasis 
on the flexibility and adaptability of the criminal side, often pointing out this advantage 
when they face state control. To Gottschalk (2010), Morselli (2010) and Beittel (2012) 
criminal organisations are shape for flexibility, and are loosely structure, flexible, 
decentralized in ways that allows them to quickly adjust to enforcement actions. 
Thoumi (2004) signals the criminal networks as capable of continuously seeking new 
transport routes, sources of chemicals used to produce cocaine and new ways to 
influence politicians. Mejía and Posada (2008) point out that profit seeking conditions 
the smat ways in which smugglers respond to enforcement. Vellinga (2004b), Kenney 
points out their flexibility and their capacity of respond immediately to changes in 
demand or enforcement, and poses flexibility as a characteristic that smugglers seek 
when organizing their activities. Friesendorf (2005) and Dietz (2010) affirm that 
criminal networks are much more flexible than governments. To Kenney (2007b) such 
flexibility represents a clear challenge to enforcement strategies based on head-
hunting. In the same line as Kenney, López Restrepo and Camacho Guizado, (2007) 
stress, the resilience of the ‘new’ and flexible organisations to state actions. To Garzón 
(2008) even traditional hierarchical organisations have shifted to a network like 
structure as a strategy to evade state control. For the Report of the High Level Panel 
on Threats Challenges and Changes of the UNODC (2004, p. 53; 2010, p. 27) 
Organised crime is ‘increasingly operating through fluid networks rather than more 
formal hierarchies. This form of organisation provides criminals with diversity, 
flexibility, low visibility, and longevity.’ 
 
Within the academic literature on organised crime or criminal networks, there are, 
nevertheless, few works discussing transport methods used by drug smugglers or 
discussing technological innovation in the WoD in general. While Thoumi (2004) 
mentions ‘important technological advances’ by growers and in laboratories he does 
not specify which ones. Reuter (2004) when describing transport methods used by 
smugglers affirms that while during the 1980s drugs were smuggled using dedicated 
small vessels and small aircrafts, in the 1990s smugglers used commercial vessels. His 
reading of these patterns are derived from seizures. Kenney (2007) mentions the ease 
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with which smugglers could procure technology and the move to ‘exotic’ smuggling 
transport methods. 
 
The work of Caulkins, Burnett, and Leslie (2009) and the book by Decker and 
Towsend (2008) are important first hand empirical insights into the descriptions of the 
methods used by smugglers to transport illicit drugs to consumer countries. Decker 
and Towsend describe the methods and structure of specialized groups ‘selling’ 
smuggling services to Colombian ‘cartels’ for wholesome transport. In this model the 
transporters do not own the drugs and receive payment when shipment is delivered. 
Caulkins, Burnett, and Leslie describe two different models. One in which individuals 
receive payment per journey and the other in which transporters also own the drugs. 
In this respect the work of Decker and Towsend is more relevant in terms of their 
focus. Decker and Towsend interviewed mostly Colombian drug smugglers 
transporting drugs to the U.S. via maritime routes, and they present an overview of 
their decision making and risk making strategies. Nevertheless, they do not delve into 
the theoretical implications of their results.  
 
When dealing with smugglers’ artefacts, the literature focuses on the technical aspects 
of these artefact or on the strategic goals of smugglers. In a piece for Homeland 
Security Affairs, Lichtenwald, Mara, and Perri (2012) made a characterization of the 
different submarine artefacts used by Colombian drug smugglers using open sources 
and focusing on the possible terrorist uses of the narcosubs. They concluded that the 
nature of smuggling organisations indicates little risk for those uses and stressing the 
leap ahead that the use of these artefacts represent for drug trafficking organisations. 
Bunker and Ramirez (2014) compiled a series of essays in relationship with the 





Scholars on organised crime and drug networks recognize the complex relationships 
between smugglers and state agencies. Thoumi (1997) and Bibes (2001) point out the 
existence of parasitic, symbiotic, or predatory relationships between state and drug 
traffickers. These authors only focus on relationships in which state agents directly 
benefit from establishing direct or covert contact with smugglers in order to receive 
monetary benefits, as well as the overlaps between drug traffickers and right wing 
paramilitary groups or left wing guerrillas. Reuter (2004) points out the interactions 
between drug smugglers and LEAs, specifically in relationship with routes and 
transport methods. Krebs, Costelloe, and Jenks (2003, p. 151) explore those 
relationships from a game theory approach and conclude that ‘a major reason that drug 
smuggling persists in the face of intense interdiction and prohibition efforts is that 
those who choose to indulge in such behaviour respond to anti-drug strategies with 
equally intense and innovative tactics’.  
 
I agree with Zaitch (2004) in his consideration of the merits of approaching the study 
of criminal groups and activities from the networks approach. In a sense than this 
approach helps to capture the flexibility and dynamic nature of illegal enterprises, 
especially on the micro-level. Nevertheless, I argue, that in focusing on these 
characteristics, that body of literature has neglected some important issues. First, even 
if recognizing the complex environment, change is often interpreted as response and 
counter response pattern. Second, the literature has often stereotyped versions of 
enforcement agencies. Third, it has not theorized the character of smugglers 
innovation.  
 
Science and Technology Studies and the Military 
 
Science and Technology Studies have explored the relationship between knowledge 
and military technology. Several scholars have explored the processes of innovation 
in the construction and procurement of military technologies; recently researchers 
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from this framework have approached the study of surveillance technologies (Lyon, 
2003; Rappert & Croft, 2007), weapons of mass destruction and issues of security, and 
security governance in a broader sense (Rappert, 2007), stressing the role of military 
and technology in security (Rappert, et al, 2008).  
 
Seminal work by MacKenzie and Spinardi (1998, 1993, 1988) explores issues of 
missile accuracy and nuclear weapons and shows that despite the overwhelming 
sophistication and the socio-technical complexity of the systems in which they are 
embedded, the development is always surrounded by uncertainty. They demonstrate 
how political interest and bureaucratic factors helped to shape inter-continental 
ballistic missile guidance systems. Collins & Pinch (1998), on the other hand, studied 
how definitions of ‘effective’ and ‘useful’ were negotiated in the case of the U.S. 
Patriot missiles during the first Gulf War.  
 
Salient issues showed by STS studies on the military is that military innovation is the 
result of a complex process affected by political decisions and one that should be 
analysed in the context of the political function of military forces (Greenwood, 1990). 
The process of innovation can be affected by issues of competition and collaboration 
within and between different branches of the military (Grissom, 2006), and the 
coevolving characteristics of military technology (Constant, 2000).  
 
Constant (2000) points to the co-evolving nature of military innovation and notes that 
military organisations are considered to possess strong institutional memory, which 
ought to be guided by the best technological choices. However, he also points out that 
‘the military is not noticeably better at choosing technology or predicting its 
consequences than any other institution’ (2000, p. 297). Regarding the co-evolutionary 
character of military technology Constant notes, ‘Almost all discrete innovation in 
military technology require corresponding systematic adaptations in other elements of 
military technology, with which they coevolve over time’ (2000, p. 288).  
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Surveillance Studies have stressed ‘the interplay of contemporary security cultures and 
surveillance infrastructures’ (Monahan, 2010b). Surveillance technologies can be 
addressed not as the result of necessary and inevitable technological choices but as 
embedded in a set of values that societies privilege over others (Lyon, 2003; Monahan, 
2010b). Surveillance Studies have shown how issues of security are actively 
constructed, and while states deploy surveillance as a ‘symbol of national’ security 
(Monahan, 2010a), military technologies are the results of particular sets of relations 
and are bound to the particularities in which they are developed. The WoD and the 
War on Terror (WoT) offer new sets of conditions on which military technologies are 
shaped, making it integral to understand both the transformation of the military and 
the processes of military innovation.  
 
I found in MacKenzie’s critic of neoclassic economics theory (1996), two interesting 
ideas that I have used to interpret the actions of the Colombian Navy in the WoD. The 
first is the idea of uncertainty as a result of technological change. The second is the 
contrast between satisfying and maximizing. The first points towards a critique of the 
traditional view of the capacity of economics to be able to accurately quantify risks, 
and stresses the creation of uncertainty as a result of technological change. As 
mentioned earlier, the military is not necessarily superior to other organisations at 
predicting the outcomes of their choices (Constant, 2000). While neo-classical 
economics use the notion of profit maximization as rationale for actors, MacKenzie 
(1996, p. 51), points out that constant profit maximization activities are not practical 
and that instead:  
 
Actors follow routines, recipes, and rules of thumb while monitoring a small 
number of feedback variables. As long as the values of these variables are 
satisfactory ("satisfying" is Simon's famous replacement for "maximizing''), 
the routines continue to be followed. Only if they become unsatisfactory will 
they be reviewed.  
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Furthermore, Mackenzie argues that within a firm different heuristics of search may 
exist, and as a result ‘the actual behaviour of a firm may represent a compromise 
between different and potentially contending courses of action’ (1996, p. 53). This 
interpretation can be expanded using the bureaucratic politics model.  
 
Spinardi (1994) lays out three theoretical models for the development of military 
technology. A first strand was inspired by ideas akin to Technological Determinism in 
which weapons develop as a result of their own logic. A second view puts rational 
decision making of politicians and the military to the fore, which coincides with 
‘realist’ studies in International Relations theory in which the process of procurement 
of technology is the result of a rational assessments of the threats and solutions. Last 
Spinardi discusses an approach that considers that weapon development is the result 
of competing factions of interest within a state, the bureaucratic politics' model. In this 
thesis, I use the concept of arenas (Jorgensen & Sorensen, 1999) to describe the various 
factions within the Navy, the arena of practice and the arena of command. 
 
Jorgensen and Sorensen introduce the concept of arena of development to characterise 
‘the cognitive space that can contain these processes analytically as well as enable 
change management’ (1999, p. 409-10). One interesting element of the concept of 
arena of development in the work of Jorgensen and Sorensen is their claims with 
regards to ‘references to objects and situations having a locality and a material 
reference’ (1999, p. 410). In their definition arenas are open ended spaces, that include 
‘both the static elements of locations, knowledge and artefacts, while it also frames a 
space for continuous action (1999, p. 411). In the arenas, different political, social, and 
technical performances related to a technological problem take place. Important for 
my research is the characterization of the arena as a multi-staged scenario, where 
several ‘shows are going at the same time’ and in doing neither the space or the 
activities performed can be settled, an arena is a moving and ‘the ground is thus 
eternally reshaped’ (1999, 412). As showed in this research, the movement on both 
sides of the binary interdiction/evasion are non-linear, with opposition and continuum 
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coexisting. As such, the concept of arenas and its invocation to flux and changes in 
morphology, capture these dynamics.  
 
STS offers a series of concepts and explanations of military technologies, exposing 
their contingency and, as expressed by Constant, ‘there is no reason to believe, and 
virtually no evidence to suggest, that the underlying process of technological evolution 
for military technology are in any way different from those for any other technology’ 
(2000, p. 298). While on the other hand, Surveillance Studies offers concepts such as 
security culture, is particularly important if the aim is to understand current responses 
to threats and risks (Monahan, 2010b). This is in close relation with the concept of 
Surveillance infrastructures define by Monahan as ‘the many technological systems 
used to mitigate risks and regulate populations’ (2010b, p. 4). 
 
Understanding the challenges faced by the armed forces in fighting the WoT and the 
WoD offers an invaluable entry point to explicate the process of technological 
innovation which avoids the shortcomings of the traditional explanations. Fighting this 
new type of war demand changes in military organisation, i.e. classic strategies of 
warfare cannot be easily deployed against drug and terrorist networks (Desouza, Koh, 
& Ouksel, 2007; Desouza & Wang, 2007). Social researchers have the chance to 
analyse how the process of technological innovation is affected in this complex cycle 
of ‘competition’. If during the Cold War, technological competition fulfilled a 
symbolic function, in the WoD and WoT the need to forecast adversary’s action 
increases (Franck & Pierce, 2006). Due to their form of organisation and the aims that 
they pursue, they can remain almost invisible, and they aim to do so. Drug smugglers 
and terrorists try to minimize their exposure by improving technologies, while LEAs 
and the military try to seize the highest amount of drugs possible so that smugglers 
give up on their enterprise, and they try to stop terrorists before they carry out their 




In short, much of what has been analysed concerning military innovation, both from a 
STS perspective and from other disciplines, has been developed in what can be called 
the traditional role of the military. There is a growing concern about the role of the 
military in the WoT, pointing out the transformation of the military in order to face 
asymmetrical enemies, while still focusing on the technical capacities of the military. 
On the other hand, there has been a tendency to privilege the artefactual and technical 
components of military technologies, and to analyse the technologies as separate from 
their context and practices. The privileging of the artefact and technical aspects of 
these maybe the result of both lack of access to and lack of theoretical lenses to analyse 
the less durable aspects of the technology. As a result only the most visible and durable 
aspects of technology are described, if described at all, in the words of Fleck and 
Howells, ‘This tendency is aggravated by most observers and users of artefacts being 
outside the organisation and location where the “soft” components of a technology 
exist’ (Fleck & Howells, 2001, p. 526).  
 
Users, Outlaw Innovation, and Dispersed Peer Innovation 
 
Science and Technology Studies (STS), Innovation Studies (IS), and Innovation 
Management (IM) have stressed the importance of users in developing an  
understanding the process of technological innovation (Bogers, Afuah, & Bastian, 
2010). These disciplines have emphasized ‘the creative capacity of users to shape 
technological development in all phases of technological innovation’ (Oudshoorn & 
Pinch, 2008, p. 554). These different fields have stressed particular aspects or 
perspectives of user involvement with technology (Flowers & Hendwood, 2010), 
developing different conceptual vocabularies (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003b). Due to the 
complexity of such processes, complementarity between different perspectives can 




Evidence on the importance of users in the process of technological innovation were 
firstly described in the 1960s (Bogers et al., 2010). Nevertheless, traditional 
approaches, have stressed the linearity of the process of user involvement, locating the 
need for information from the user’s side and for solutions on the producers. This 
allows some cross boundary of information on behalf of improving existing products 
or developing new ones (Bogers et al., 2010). This neglects the importance of users, 
and user-led R&D policies (Flowers, 2011).  
 
Innovation studies have focused on the study of technological innovation by product 
manufacturers (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008). Nevertheless, an important strand of the 
literature within IS has deeply researched the role of users in the process of 
technological innovation; the pioneer of this strand of inquiry was Eric Von Hippel. 
These studies have ‘focused on verifying the extent of invention by users, identifying 
the users that are likely to innovate, why and where users innovate and the composition 
of user-innovation communities’ (Hyysalo, 2009, p. 248). In the early stages these 
studies were concerned with how users’ innovation presented challenges to 
manufacturers (Voss, 2010), and more recently have moved to scenario in which firms 
can harness the developments made by users (Flowers & Hendwood, 2010). These 
studies have introduced an array of concepts and data collection methods, such as, 
innovation user, user/self-manufacturer, or user-as-innovator (Bogers et al., 2010; 
Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2008; Voss, 2010). 
 
Scholars within Science and Technology Studies (STS), and especially approaches 
related with Social Construction and Social Shaping of Technology (SST) have 
stressed the active role of user in shaping and re-shaping particular artefacts, moving 
from manufacturer centric perspectives to a more user-centric approach of the role of 
users in the process of innovation and the diffusion of technologies (Flowers & 
Hendwood, 2010; Kline & Pinch, 1996; Russell & Williams, 2002). The relationship 
between users and technologies and technological change within STS was first 
exposed by the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) perspective, and since then 
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the active role of users has become one of the key concepts for the SCOT approach. 
SCOT scholars rightly criticize the passive role of users in the linear model of 
innovation (Pinch & Bijker, 1987).  
 
According to the SST users actively shape, appropriate, and configure technologies in 
different settings and domains according to their needs and individual styles 
(Rammert, 2002; Stewart Russell & Williams, 2002). Within STS various approaches 
can be differentiated regarding the role of users in shaping technologies: Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT), Feminist approaches, Semiotic approaches and, 
Cultural and Media Studies (Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003b).  
 
Feminist approaches to technology have reflected on the conceptualization of the role 
of users as passive recipients of science and technology, and particularly on the 
consequences of these explanations for women. Within semiotic approaches there are 
two distinguishable strands. In the first one the concept of ‘configuration of user’ is 
central. This approach has been criticized for stressing the process of the shaping of 
users as the result of a one-way process, in which designers have the capacity to shape 
users. This approach does not take into account questions of who is doing the 
configuration work. In the second strand the concept of ‘script’ plays a central role in 
explaining user-technology relationships. According to this approach users have an 
active role in shaping and re-shaping technologies. They develop their own agenda 
‘anti-program’ usually conflicting with the designer’s pre-established ‘script’ (Flowers 
& Hendwood, 2010; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003a). Cultural and media studies approach 
to the role of users differs from the later approaches, at least in two senses. The first is 
that they stress the necessity of studying users from the very beginning, and that rather 
than focusing on technologies they have chosen to research users and consumers. The 
domestication framework attempts to explain the integration of technology into the 




Studies on users have focused on studying how manufacturers commercialise user-
driven innovations that users freely share. Some literature has dealt with user 
innovation amid illegal activities, or spaces where innovations and knowledge is not 
freely shared, or at least not as in the traditional settings, such as in pornography 
(Coopersmith, 1998, 2006; Voss, 2007).  
 
Hackers’ activities have been researched by scholars from Innovation Studies (Choi & 
Perez, 2007; Flowers, 2008) and from approaches close to STS perspectives (Jordan 
& Taylor, 1998; Söderberg, 2010; Taylor, 1999). While IS focuses on the possibilities 
of harnessing knowledge produced by hackers and on the consequences for 
establishing business models, STS have paid attention to the process of co-
construction of the identities of participants. Studies on outdoor sports show how user 
innovations have been successfully commercialized. STS have studied how the actions 
of ‘unruly users’, the hackers, underpin collective imagination, the process of labelling 
activities as deviant, and the configuration of their intra group identities. These studies 
have shown that identities within these groups are extremely heterogeneous and fluid, 
such as their relationships with enforcement agencies and security personnel. They 
have also shown the importance of antagonistic relations in driving technological 
change. That is to say, the competitive relationship between hackers and the security 
industry, They have recognized the potential contribution of studying the process of 
innovation in analysing both ‘lay expertise’ and outlaw innovation (Jordan & Taylor, 
1998; Söderberg, 2010; Taylor, 1999). 
 
The role or users in the process of technological innovation in outdoor sports have 
received attention from technology studies. Especially IS studies have focus on 
equipment in extreme sports (Lüthje, 2004; Lüthje, Herstatt, & von Hippel, 2005; 
Shah, 2006; Voss, 2010), but also scholars closer to the SST perspective (Hyysalo, 
2009). Despite the different methodologies and emphases of each of those fields, both 
highlight the capacity of users in outdoor sports in shaping habits, technologies, 
organisations, cultural values, regulations, the behaviour of other practitioners, as well 
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as modifying the initial purpose of the equipment. Innovative users in extreme sports 
are often members of ‘communities of practice’ (Bogers et al., 2010; Voss, 2010).  
 
The concept of outlaw innovation was developed for scholars from the Innovation 
Studies perspective to describe innovation in hacking activities and online piracy and 
their relations with Intellectual Property Rights (Schulz & Wagner, 2008). This 
concept is highly influenced by the idea of ‘harnessing’ these types of user innovators 
to firms, and the economic consequences of such. However, it has also drawn on 
concepts from the STS perspective in order to explicate outlaw innovation, particularly 
the concept of ‘user resistance’ as a key element in the process of technological 
innovation (Flowers, 2008).  Flowers defines outlaw users as ‘users who, either 
individually or as part of a group, actively oppose or ignore the limitations imposed on 
them by proposed or established technical standards, products, systems or legal 
frameworks” (Flowers, 2008, p. 180). Case studies on outlaw innovation utilizing the 
innovation studies perspective have recognized the existence of an ‘outlaw 
community’, defined as ‘groups of users, who create and disseminate innovations that 
not only conflict with manufacturers’ intentions of the usage of the original product 
but also violate firms’ IPR’ (Schulz & Wagner, 2008, p. 402), composed of both, 
innovative outlaw users and those who adopt those innovations. A thorough 
characterization of outlaw innovation is still pending.  
 
Finally, an important development in the involvement of users in the process of 
technological innovation is the recent work by Hyysalo and Usenyuk (2015). In their 
study of the Karakat, they propose the concept of dispersed peer innovation as a way 
to understand how non-coordinated actors without the presence of arenas of interaction 
can produce complex pieces of technology. They demonstrate the capacity of users to 
create complex technologies and to dominate all aspects of the machines, despite 
attempts by manufactures to take over (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015).  
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A Co-evolutionary Analysis Approach 
 
‘A co-evolutionary process is at work here, simultaneously blind and seeing, wanting to 
foresee the consequences and yet having to accept the unforeseeable’. (Nowotny, 2008) 
 
As highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, I place the broad interpretation of 
the phenomena under study under the umbrella of co-evolution. Specifically, the 
understanding that there is a reciprocal influence between the two sides of the binary 
interdiction/evasion, and that the change in the Navy’s and smugglers’ practices can 
be interpreted as the result of an interweaved, symbiotic relationship. As a result of 
this it can be said that both socio-technical systems co-evolve. As Ziman (2000) points 
out, it is possible to describe mutualistic relationships as an ecological systems of 
coevolving artefacts.  
 
Frank Geels (2005) has stressed the co-evolutionary relationship between markets, 
users practices, regulations, culture, and science. STS have explored several 
dimensions of the co-evolutionary process, among them the relationships between 
technology and users, between science and technology, between technologies and 
markets, between technology, industry, and policy, between technology and culture, 
between technology and society (Geels, 2005b; Rip & Kemp, 1998), and between 
technology and organisational styles (Fairtlough, 2000). Geels acknowledges the 
contribution of co-evolutionary analysis between three different levels: the level of 
emerging innovations, the level of established socio-technical configurations, and a 
macro level. The multilevel perspective championed by Geels, argues for an 
understanding of transitions of technology as a result of the dynamics at niche, regime, 
and landscape levels. Geels points out that ‘although the different regimes are linked 




As noted earlier the concept of co-evolution has been adapted to different fields to 
explain interdependent relationships between elements. In the words of Geels co-
evolution is often used as ‘a reminder to disciplinary scholars that more aspects are 
important than they actually study’ (Geels, 2005b, p. 61). The co-evolutionary 
dynamics have been extended from evolutionary biology to the social sciences as a 
metaphor, as an interpretative frame or broad characterization of co-developed or 
mutual shaping relationships (Eve Mitleton-Kelly & Davy, 2013; Rip, 2002). 
According to Shove (2003) co-evolution has been used to describe: 1.) Relationships 
between technologies and social relations and practices, 2.) Relationships between 
specific technologies and complex socio-technical systems, and 3.) And the 
relationships between sociotechnical systems or landscapes, on the one hand, and 
social arrangements, practices, and expectations on the other. Constant (2000, p. 288) 
recognizes co-evolution when, ‘Two species (or technologies) constitute a paramount 
feature of each other’s environment, that is, when they are strongly interdependent, 
and when they evolve vis à vis the rest of their ecology virtually as a linked unit’.  
 
McKelvey (2002) distinguishes between six types of co-evolution relationships and 
provides examples of these relationships in the social world. As noted by Jablonka and 
Ziman (2000) some of these forms of co-evolution may imply antagonistic interactions 
or cooperative interactions. Antagonist interactions often lead to a dynamic arms race 
in which all the sides have to keep evolving in relation to their natural enemy, invoking 
what is known as the Red Queen Hypothesis. Characteristic of those antagonist 
prey/predator types of interaction is the death/replacement process (Andriani, 2003).  
 
As flagged in the introduction, several metaphors have been used to explain mobility 
and change in the illicit drug market, I argue that the Red Queen Hypothesis serves as 
a better metaphor to explain complex evolutionary interplays between smugglers and 
LEAs. The Red Queen Hypothesis has been explored by several authors in relationship 
to innovation at firms and competition between firms (Barnett, 2008; Barnett & 
Hansen, 1996; Baumol, 2004). In summary this literature stresses the potential 
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benefits, and the possibility of harnessing the effect of the Red Queen competition, in 
the sense that competition is seen as a main driver of innovation.  
 
The Red Queen Hypothesis assumes co-evolution and a general tendency for 
microevolution to speed up competitive advantage results from being able to speed up 
microevolution (Kauffman, 1995). In such conditions different sides need to speed up 
co-evolution in order to stand still, to stay in competition. Taken from Lewis Carroll's 
Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There the hypothesis claims that 
it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place, describing a situation in 
which the success of different players is based on the premise that in order to match or 
exceed the other, all participants have to constantly move in a continuous arms races 
of defence and counter-defence (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Baumol, 2004). This in turn 
implies a constant change to the ecosystem as a result of the evolution of the entities 
(Kauffman, 1995; Kauffman & Macready, 1995).  
 
‘Now, here, you see, it takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place. If 
you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that! Reminds 
the Red Queen to Alice in 'Through the Looking-Glass.' (Carroll, 1872, p. 145). This 
story, which gave the name to the ‘Red Queen effect’ or ‘Red Queen Hypothesis’ 
serves as a metaphor for the understanding of certain behaviours. The Biologist Leigh 
Van Valen was the first to use the metaphor to describe and analyse the way species 
adapt to their environment by constantly evolving to face their competitors, which are 
also in constant evolution (Durrani & Forbes, 2010). According to the Red Queen 
effect, the choice is simple, to do nothing and be overtaken or struggle to remain alive. 
 
Following examples from biological entities is it possible to find similar behaviours in 
the way organizations behave in competitive environments. I use the metaphor to 
describe, situations in which rivals deal with the need to continuously change their 
strategies as a way to maintaining their place in the game. In the WoD environment 
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rivals are different smugglers groups competing both with each other and LEAs and 
military and in some cases rivalry between the various LEAs and military. Although, 
I focus my attention on the competition between smugglers and state players. 
Smugglers must, in this case, create strategies to maintain their position in the business, 
while at the same time the implementation of those strategies does not guarantee that 
position. For example, while some smugglers adopt or invest in new transport methods 
and new technologies, in an attempt to evade state control, those innovations can be 
quickly adopted by competitors and discovered by state actors, creating a new scenario 
with new technologies but in which the competitive relationship continues.  
 
The Red Queen effect presupposes a link between organizational learning and their 
ecology, understood as the relationship between the organism and their environment.  
Barnett and Sorenson (2002) state that competition between organizations triggers 
processes organizational learning and that learning increases the strength of 
competition generated by an organization. Learning and competition reinforce each 
other, thus giving rise to the process of self-reinforcement of the Red Queen Effect. 
 
To explain the Red Queen Effect, Barnett and Hansen (1996) consider two distinct and 
simultaneous effects: on the one hand, the experience of the competition of the focal 
organization and the way it acts, and on the other hand, the experience of its 
competitors and how they react. Furthermore, Barnett (Barnett, 2008, p. 12) states, that 
‘organizations may not know what logics of competition are operating when they first 
enter a context, but they learn by experiencing competition,' this is, learning by doing 
(Fleck, 1994). The answers provided by the organizations will tend to make it appear 
more competitive than its competitors (Barnett & Hansen, 1996). This improvement 
will result in the reaction of its competitors who will, in turn, seek to learn and so on. 
In the dynamic explored under the metaphor of the 'Red Queen' learning and 




The Red Queen effect indicates that, in front of the competition, an organization will 
seek to stand out and create competitive advantages by developing new ways of doing 
things. In doing so, it will create an environmental imbalance and its rivals will find 
themselves confronted with a more efficient competitor than them. Competitors will 
try, in turn, to propose a new solution to match their rivals and gain an advantage, thus 
improving their performance (Barnett, 2008). 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the Red Queen metaphor is helpful to explain the dynamics 
of interdiction/evasion. Previous metaphors that place agency on one side of the 
binary, with the Red Queen metaphor it is possible to stress the symbiotic relationship 
between both sides, recognizing that the two sides of the binary are constantly updating 
their strategies, not only as a response to the other side’s actions but as a way to remain 
in the game. In short, the Red Queen hypothesis captures better the dynamics of the 
WoD, than other metaphors, as states that in the presence of a turbulent, chaotic 
environment, where the dynamics are particularly aggressive, it is not possible for any 
of the sides to hold and to maintain a competitive advantage over time. 
 
In doing so, I argue that while changes in host or parasite may confer temporary 
advantages, and do create variations in the backdrop, those changes are not 
significantly enough as to escape the dynamic. Players in the War on Drugs (WoD) 
perceive opportunities to move and act. However, knowledge asymmetry, 
communication failures, and the actions and strategies of several uncoordinated actors 
results in situations in which the players end up no better off or perhaps worse than 
initially. Creating a scenario where both sides of the binary interdiction/evasion a run 
'as fast as (they) can' to stay in the same place. By this I mean, it creates a new situation 
where there is no real change in the dynamic.  
 
While previous metaphors imply patterns of action-reaction and coordinated action, 
the Red Queen seem to imply that both sides fall into a spiral and are incapable of 
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avoiding the negative consequences of the dynamic, process that may appear as 
automatic. Another limitation of the metaphor is the lack of empirical data that 
possibilities the identification of both learning and imitation phenomena at the 
smugglers' side, and therefore provide the opportunity to identify mechanisms 
underpinning the motivations and intentions with regard to the production of 
innovations and perceptions of its competitors. 
 
The empirical chapters of this thesis delve into describing Maritime Interdiction 
Operations as interpreted by personnel in the field and envisioned by the upper 
echelons of the Navy, the arena of practice and the arena of command, and how 
smugglers produce complex pieces of technology in order to smuggle drugs. These 
two arenas reveal how local knowledge of technical requirements interplay with global 
policies of illicit drug prevention. That is to say, how technology in the WoD is socially 
shaped by several factors. In the remaining of this chapter I present an overview of 
several concepts emerging from the Social Shaping of Technology (SST) framework 
that serve as theoretical and methodological guides for this research, specially two 
concerns, the role of different forms of knowledge, social learning, and the concept of 
configurational technologies. These ideas have been advanced by the work of Stewart, 
Williams, and Slack under the banner of social learning (Williams, Stewart, & Slack, 
2005) and Pollock, Williams, and Hyysalo as the ‘Biography of Artefacts and 
Practices’ (BOAP) (Hyysalo, 2010; Hyysalo, Williams, & Pollock, 2016; Pollock & 
Williams, 2008, 2011). A main concern for the social learning perspective and 
biography of artefacts and practices is ‘the complex and dispersed processes of 
learning and struggling as new technological capabilities are adapted to and 
incorporated within the detailed fabric of social life’ (Pollock & Williams, 2008, p. 
77).  
 
Social shaping of technology is ‘a generic approach to the study of technology that 
remains anti-determinist and anti-linear, but less concerned with the issue of 
“materialisation” of social interests’ (Sørensen, 2002, p. 21). Important insight from 
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the social learning perspective for my research of the role of technology in the WoD 
are, the recognition that the process of procurement of technology is much more 
complex than customarily understood, and that ‘purchasing technology for 
organisations, are guided and constrained by complex mixes of acknowledged 
objectives, priorities, criteria and perhaps regulatory constraints, as well as values, 
pressures, images and associations’ (Russell & Williams, 2002, p. 66-67). The idea 
that artefacts may be reworked and that when an artefact is incorporated into a local 
setting it opens up new possibilities; this  social shaping process occurs across multiple 
locales and timeframes (Pollock & Williams, 2008; Stewart & Williams, 2005). 
Another important element of the SST approach is the development of a useful 
conceptual vocabulary to denote different categories of knowledge used in innovation 
(Stewart Russell & Williams, 2002). As characterised by Pollock and Williams 
(Pollock & Williams, 2008, p. 103) the BOAP approach:  
 
Seek[s] to explore how local actions and outcomes depend upon a context of 
knowledge and beliefs which, in contrast to a narrowly semiotic interpretation 
of power, provides material as well as intellectual resources that generate 
incentives and penalties for local players and pattern the conduct and outcome 
of local actions by framing discussions. We are also seeking to explain the 
ways in which local actions collectively react back on to and 
produce/reproduce social structures. 
 
Distinctions are made between explicit/formal knowledge as embodied in codified 
theories, as noted by Fleck ‘in general, the possession of formal knowledge confers 
status and consequently a measure of power or influence within organizations’ (Fleck, 
1997, p. 384) and tacit knowledge as embodied in individuals as skills and intellectual 
compatibilities that is firmly based on practice and experience, can be transmitted by 
apprenticeship and training, and through 'watching and doing' forms of learning (Fleck, 
1997). These distinctions have been useful for understanding practices and forms of 
learning. In short these are defined as:  
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Explicit knowledge is information or instructions that can be formulated in 
words or symbols and, therefore, can be stored, copied, and transferred by 
impersonal means, such as in written documents or computer files. Tacit 
knowledge, on the other hand, is knowledge that has not been (and perhaps 
cannot be) formulated explicitly and, therefore, cannot effectively be stored or 
transferred entirely by impersonal means. (MacKenzie & Spinardi, 1995, p. 
45) 
 
Fleck (1997) expand these categories to include knowledge embodied in tool use or 
instrumentalities, informal knowledge as embodied in verbal interactions, rules of 
thumb, tricks of the trade. Meta knowledge is knowledge that is embodied in 
organisation in the form of values and assumptions about the nature of reality. 
Contingent knowledge is distributed and apparently trivial information specific to a 
particular environment. This highlights the importance of local knowledge that can be 
‘looked up’. As characteristics of this form of knowledge Fleck points out that it is 1,) 
distributed, distributed throughout an organisation, often at the lower levels of the 
hierarchy, 2.) apparently trivial, the difference from informal knowledge lies in being 
more accidental and less systematically build around particular tasks or technologies, 
and 3.) highly specific to the particular application domain, it is concrete rather than 
theoretical, tends to remains tied to the context (Fleck, 1997, p. 390). Scholars from 
the social learning approach have emphasised the importance of local tacit knowledge 
and the difficulties of capturing and disseminating such ‘sticky knowledge’ (Pollock 
& Williams, 2008).  
 
With few exceptions issues of learning and knowledge have not been explored by 
scholars in organised crime or drug studies. Using the distinction made by James Scott 
in Seeing Like a State, between mētis and techne, Kenney (2003, 2007, 2007a, 2010) 
attempts to demonstrate the competitive advantages of traffickers. Mētis is 
experimental and intuitive kind of knowledge. This kind of knowledge can only be 
developed through engagement in the activities and it resists any form of codification. 
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While techne is abstract technical knowledge that can be codified and transmitted 
through formal instruction. Therefore techne is acquired by abstraction while mētis by 
doing. 
 
When describing smugglers and enforcement technologies the form of the 
technologies is important. I use the concepts of configurational and generic 
technologies. The concept of ‘configurational technologies’ help to characterise how 
different smuggling groups assimilate different technologies and develop capabilities 
in order to design, build, and use their own artefacts. A configurational technology is 
built by selecting and configuring a range of available components (often exploiting 
cheap and tried and tested standard solutions) coupled with some customized elements 
to meet the particular requirements. This involves a process of recombination in which 
existing components are adopted, modified, and/or recombined to create new forms 
which are adapted to the outlaw users requirements, or bricolage (Büscher, Gill, 
Mogensen, & Shapiro, 2001; Fleck, 1988, 1994) and ‘are largely shaped in each 
application by user requirements and the specific circumstances in which they are to 
be used’. (McLoughlin & Harris, 1997, p. 5).  generic technologies, however,  are those 
who given their generic qualities ‘allow[ing] them to be applied with only minor 
adjustments’ (McLoughlin & Harris, 1997, p. 5). 
 
In this chapter I have explored several themes and concepts in relationships with the 
dynamics of innovation in the WoD. I explored the organised crime and ‘drug studies’ 
literature, which currently stresses the networked and fluid nature of criminal 
organisations. I built my understanding and analysis on two thematic building block, 
the importance of users in producing both mundane and complex artefacts, and the co-
evolutionary nature of the innovation process in the WoD. Since the phenomena 
studied here touches on the issue of ‘organised crime’ I devoted one section to present 
how literature in this field and the ‘drug studies’ field make sense of the dynamics of 
interdiction/evasion, which have usually been the tools used by policy makers when 
promoting policies and interpreting the phenomena.  
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I identified several gaps in the understanding of the dynamics of interdiction/evasion 
as emerging from the literature on organised crime and drug studies. In general, the 
ideas of network and flexibility are used, both by academics and state agencies, to 
characterise the different spectrums of criminal actions. I argue that these 
interpretations are the result of an asymmetrical view of the phenomena, in which the 
dynamics of the binary interdiction/evasion are analysed only as a result of the players 
that attempt to evade. Leaving aside the multiple relational aspects of the relationship, 
and even when recognizing the symbiotic relationship between the two sides, this 
narrow understanding of the phenomena prevails. In order to close these gaps and 
provide a more symmetrical overview of the dynamics of the binary 
interdiction/evasion I apply a qualitative inquiry to the practices of catching smugglers 
from different points of view and focus the research questions in order to fulfil these 
aims, stressing the importance of localized knowledge and antagonist interactions.  
 
This literature review has aimed to provide the theoretical foundation and general 
orientation to answer the research questions by complementing current research on 
drug smugglers with approaches that complement traditional approaches that usually 
focus on the smugglers side, and explain the advantages that traffickers have in 
comparison with state agencies. This is rooted in the idea that the dynamics of the drug 
market can be interpreted as a pattern of responses and counter responses. I enrich this 
view by including approaches from the BOAP, user innovation, and a co-evolutionary 
interpretation in order to stress the ambiguous, complex, and uncertain essence of the 
process of innovation in outlaw contexts. I pay crucial attention to the role of Navy 
practices in order to demonstrate that the dichotomy of flexibility/inflexibility is not 
necessarily present at the local level. This literature review provides the necessary 
theoretical and analytical tools in order to propose a different view of the binary 
interdiction/evasion and to propose a different narrative based on the analysis of the 




In light of these theoretical concerns, I analyse the data and present a discussion of the 
major findings. I have found that generic approaches to the dynamics of the illicit 
market can be enhanced by paying particular attention to the practices of the people in 
the field and the highly localized knowledge they deploy, and by integrating into the 
debate not only results of their actions but also how the main players make sense of 



















Chapter 2. Methods and Research Design 
 
 
This is qualitative research aimed at developing an understanding of the process of 
technological innovation in the War on Drugs (WoD) in Colombia. For this research I 
have drawn on the broader STS theory as a guide to the methodological approach and 
to formulate and to provide answers to the research questions. As a qualitative study 
the methods used focus on the capture of data in the field from key actors. I conducted 
interviews and performed documentary analysis of public documents as well as did 
fieldwork in four Navy bases in Colombia. By adopting a qualitative view I argue that 
STS and qualitative methods can provide a richer view of the phenomena, beyond the 
traditional quantitative assessments from an economic perspectives provided for many 
of the sties of drug trafficking. I argue that a turn to an in-depth study of the practices 
of the Navy personnel in the field from a qualitative stance is important in order to 
capture the ways technologies, perceptions about enemies’ technological capacities, 
and forms of organisation affects the way different players interpret their actions.  
 
The early stages of data collection were oriented as an exploratory study of smugglers´ 
forms of transport, performing interviews with public servants in several state agencies 
in Colombia. Later I orientated the data collection to understand the practices of the 
Navy personnel in the field. I simultaneously selected and secured fieldwork with the 
Colombian Antinarcotic Police and the Colombian Navy. After finalizing data 
collection, I decided to concentrate my analysis on the data from the Navy and to use 
the information provided by the Colombian Antinarcotic Police to support some 
arguments. The research questions also evolved from being centred on smugglers´ 
artefacts to a set of questions aimed at understanding the practices of Maritime 
Interdiction Operations (MIO) in relation with those artefacts. These adjustments 
emerged as a result of both difficulties in access and as a response to some views 
apprehended during the initial fieldwork that provided me with a view of the intricate 
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symbiotic relationships between the two sides and the evident lack of studies in these 
sort of relationships. In what follows I will explore the research design process I 
adhered to at the beginning of this investigation. I will state the aims of the study, the 
theoretical and policy context in which the research is set, the design and conduct of 
the study, and the nature of the evidence collected. I will provide a personal account 
of the difficulties faced in carrying out this research. I will demonstrate how that may 
have affected the research aims. In this chapter I will also explain how data collection 
was accomplished and how the data was analysed in order provide answers to the 
research questions.  
 
Beginning of the Research Journey 
 
This research began as a Master’s degree project focused solely on the question of how 
drug smugglers designed, built and used the artefacts commonly known as 
narcosubmarines or narcosubs. With this initial interest in mind I started assembling 
news articles and academic literature on the topic. I soon realized the lack of academic 
literature on several levels of the study of illicit drug smuggling and enforcement, or 
what I call in this thesis the binary interdiction/evasion phenomenon. Thus, my focus 
shifted from initially comprehending merely the smugglers´ side of the story to 
providing a more complete understanding of the set of relationship of that binary. The 
provisional literature review, exploratory data collection, a literature review for my 
Master´s thesis, and the paper for my first year progression board review provided me 
with the initial set of categories of interviewees and analytical themes to be discussed.  
 
After the initial review of both academic literature and popular accounts of drug traffic 
enterprises it was clear that the existent literature on both drug smuggling and 
innovation in non-traditional spaces had not considered the questions I was raising. In 
summary. I encountered a lack of symmetrical studies in which the symbiotic 
relationship between smugglers and enforcement agencies was studied. As I 
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established in the previous chapter, the work of Kenney (2003, 2007) and Andreas 
1999, 2003) raised some of those concerns. The work of Kenney explores the way in 
which both smugglers and state agencies learn, yet he leaves aside the technologies 
and the study of the practices. Alternatively, despite the extensive literature on the 
impact of policies, there is little literature exploring the way enforcement agencies 
have performed their actions in the field. The initial review also uncovered a 
prevalence of what can be summarized by Tosh´s (2002, p. 146) explanation of the 
post hoc propter hoc: ‘Because B came after A does not mean that A caused B, but 
the flow of the narrative may easily convey the impression that it did’. I consider the 
issue of causation particularly important because, as argued in this thesis, the 
metaphors utilized to explain the mobility of smugglers and changes in the drug market 
is a cause and effect relationship. The many accounts of drug traffickers’ strategies 
also present responses as situated in a broader context of evolution of the smugglers´ 
technologies. It should be added that although STS scholars have fruitfully studied 
military technologies and surveillance in everyday life, to the best of my knowledge 
there is little in the STS literature regarding the prosaic and mundane technologies 
which the WoD is concerned with.  
 
From an initial interest in smugglers´ artefacts and narcosubs this research evolved to 
cover not only the process of design and building of narcosubs, but also to an 
understanding of the practices of LEAs and specifically the Navy in the WoD. The 
early choices of sites and interviews were made in order to explore the origin of the 
narcosubs. Confronted with the richness of experience of the Navy personnel 







Aims and Research Questions 
 
The aim of this research was to gain insights into the ways the binary 
interdiction/evasion phenomenon has unfolded, and the transformations it encounters 
and conveys, including an understanding of how the Colombian Navy and specifically 
the Coast Guard personnel make decisions in the field and understand smugglers´ 
capacities. Additionally, the aim was to provide an understanding of how smugglers´ 
technologies were produced. As flagged earlier, neither the literature on organised 
crime, nor drug trafficking, or security studies, have delved into smugglers´ artefacts 
or the socio-technical systems used to confront them. When technology appears in 
those studies, it does so in a traditional deterministic fashion.  
 
One important element in the many accounts of the WoD is the prevalence of statistics. 
To a certain extent statistics are the de facto method to explain the actions of the main 
players in the WoD. As a secondary aim in this research I want to communicate the 
need of qualitative studies of the phenomenon. I wanted to examine how the players 
interact in the field and to understand their learning process. All of the previous 
considerations where helpful in order to formulate the research questions.  
 
The Colombian Navy is in its own an emblematic case of how a traditional military 
force faces the challenge of non-symmetrical threats. This offers the possibility of 
some degree of generalization of the results of my research. I am aware of the 
discussions regarding the possibilities and limits of generalization as result of 
qualitative studies. I do not make claims regarding the representational or theoretical 
generalization, but I do consider that it is feasible to establish strategies in order to 
make use of some degree of generalization. In choosing to study the practices and 
strategies of the Colombian Navy in order to understand some of the aspects of 
technological innovation in the WoD in Colombia I am further defining my strategy 
for generalization of my results, i.e. that other Navies and military are faced with 
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similar problems. In this perspective I agree with Lewis and Ritchie (2003, p. 267), 
regarding the possibilities of qualitative research in the sense ‘that qualitative research 
studies can contribute to social theories where they have something to tell us about the 
underlying social processes and structures that form part of the context of, and the  
explanation for, individual behaviours or beliefs.’ 
 
In formulating the research questions I have attempted to fulfil the set of criteria 
summarized by Lewis (2003, p. 48) and the classification of research questions offered 
by Blaikie (2010). According to the former the research questions need to be: clear, 
intelligible and unambiguous, focused, but not too narrow, capable of being researched 
through data collection, not too abstract, or questions which require the application of 
philosophy rather than of data, relevant and useful, whether to policy, practice or the 
development of social theory, informed by and connected to existing research or 
theory, but with the potential to make an original contribution or to fill a gap, feasible, 
given the resources available, of at least some interest to the researcher. 
 
According to Blaikie there are three types of research questions for a qualitative study: 
what questions, aimed at providing descriptions and revealing patterns in a social 
phenomenon; the why questions, that search for causes or reasons for the existence of 
a phenomenon. Those questions seek to explain relationships between events, social 
activities or processes. The principal purpose of the how questions  is to provide 
connections between the results of the research and strategies and mechanisms to 
produce change, practical outcomes and intervention (Blaikie, 2010). 
 
Even though some of my research questions start with the how, my main concerns are 
the what and the why. My research aims are divided into two main themes, (1) to 
understand the nature of innovation on the smugglers´ side and (2) to comprehend the 
practices of the Navy in facing drug smugglers. I gained access to both the Colombian 
Navy and Colombian Antinarcotics Police, as well as to several other officers involved 
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in the WoD in Colombia. Although both the Colombian Navy and the Colombian 
Antinarcotics Police have responsibilities in controlling maritime drug traffic, I 
decided to focus my research on the role of the Navy  
 
The year 1994, the initial date of my research was marked by three key events: first, 
the recent death of Pablo Escobar in December the previous year, which raised the 
possibility of ending drug trafficking in Colombia, but one that is currently widely 
considered as the beginning of the ‘democratization’ of the drug market in Colombia; 
second, in 1994 the first of what can be considered as a narcosub was found, and 
finally, the Colombian government incentive to boost the Coast Guard Unit in order to 
control what was perceived as an increment in the use of maritime transport methods 
by drug traffickers.  
 
The research questions that guided data collection and data analysis are presented here. 
They arose from confronting the early research questions with the preliminary analysis 
and choices for data collection.  
 
1. How the Colombian Navy makes decisions leading to definitions of the best ways to 
patrol the sea? 
 
This question involves a descriptive account of the Maritime Interdiction Operation 
(MIO) and of the definition of the strategic plans. This question includes two 
subsidiary questions: 
 
 What changes can be perceived in the MIO during the period 1994-2014 and what is 
presented as explanation for those changes? 
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 How are the strategic plans and strategic concepts defined? 
 
After the preliminary exploratory analysis of the research data, I found that MIO 
played an important role in the day to day activities of the Navy personnel. This 
discovery helped me narrow down the list of questions regarding the planning and the 
performance of MIO. With the two subsidiary questions I focus my attention on the 
set of practices and technologies concerning MIO and on how success and failure is 
explained. Responses to these questions are set out in chapter 8.  
2. Is the process of technological innovation within the LEAs affected by intra- or inter-
organisational competition?  
Academic literature on military innovation has highlighted the roles of intra and inter 
organisational competition in shaping innovation. As different LEAs and Military have 
responsibilities over control of illicit drugs, the aim of those questions was broadly 
intended to identify the existence of competition as a motivation for change in the 
WoD. Answers to these questions are presented in chapter 4.  
 
3. How does the Colombian Navy make sense of the threats and then construct the 
solutions and how do those threats affect the technological choices? 
 
This analytical question seeks to understand how the Colombian Navy makes sense of 
its non-conventional enemy, how those images are constructed, and what role they 
play in the choices made by the Navy personnel. In order to orientate the analysis of 
that question not only was the emerging field of ignorance studies important (Proctor, 
2008; Rappert & Balmer, 2015), but also a closer look into Navy personnel practices 
was necessary, as well as discovering how they describe their jobs and confront change 




4. How do smugglers and the Colombian Navy acquire their knowledge and how do they 
learn?  
 
With this analytical question I examine the process of learning and different forums in 
which the Navy personal acquire, produce and exploit knowledge. On the one hand, I 
examined the relationship between the upper command, officers and NCOs in 
reference to the way they produce the knowledge needed for the MIO. On the other 
hand, I explored the nature of smugglers innovation. In considering these themes the 
concept of dispersed peer innovation (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015) was instrumental in 
providing a critical stance in the process of innovation in an outlaw context.  
 
Research Design, Data Collection and Analysis 
 
There is impressive media coverage of drug traffic related issues. Navy operations and 
smugglers artefacts when captured are highly reported in the media. As pointed out by 
Bechhofer & Paterson, (2000), a social scientist can use journalism as a source of data 
and as a recorder of social reality, but s(he) makes a mistake if the data is relied on 
uncritically. To include media reports in a research process implies a theoretical 
reflection on media representation of the artefact and how this inclusion contributes to 
the construction of the phenomenon. Following this advice, I made use of media 
reports as a guide for my interviews and in order to highlight some specific aspects of 
the process under study. Interviews are, nonetheless, the main method of data 
collection utilized in this thesis. However, this is not solely an interview study. I 
combined interviews with documentary research. During 2014, I conducted seventeen 
interviews in the spectrum between unstructured, non-standardized in-depth 
interviews and semi-structured, semi-standardized interviews with Navy officials and 
NCOs. Additionally, I was allowed to perform guided visits to four of the Navy bases 
in both the Caribbean Sea (1) and the Pacific Ocean (3) where interdiction operations 
are planned and carried out. I was also allowed to take photos under supervision. In 
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this sense, I aimed to combine structure and flexibility (Legard, Keegan, & Ward, 
2003). The interviews were carried out in different settings1. The time available for the 
interviews varied from 45 minutes to 3 hours. 
 
While I use the interviews and the interview data as a main source for this research, 
the three main models for data analysis of interview material - positivism, 
emotionalism, constructionism (Silverman, 2011) - are far from satisfactory when 
researching phenomena in which secrecy and asymmetry of knowledge is palpable. A 
constructivist interpretation of the interview data could provide a sense of how the 
Navy personnel present themselves and how the definition of several aspects of their 
actions shape their identity. I was not interested in identifying any clues regarding their 
talks or non-verbal actions. That said, evidently smugglers artefacts and the vessels 
used by the Navy during interdiction operations are material objects ‘out there’, I was 
not looking for a descriptive report of the ‘reality’ of smugglers artefacts and 
countermeasures. I sought an understanding on how those different sets of artefacts 
would come into being. A purely positivistic analysis of the interview data can 
certainly provide with data and ‘facts’ that goes underreported in media or even in 
security, but some interpretations about smugglers by the Navy personnel were not 
remarkably different from media portraits of drug traffickers.  
 
I use the interview data between an understanding of the perceptions of the informers 
and how those perceptions are shaped and shape the phenomena, and as providing cues 
to pursue leads on recorded events relevant to my research. Interviews were then 
utilized as a way to access inside information and data about facts in the form of 
occurrences, procurement of technology, development of new strategies, and in order 
to ‘map out´ other key players coming into a relationship with the Navy´s task of 
thwarting smugglers efforts. I analyse the interviews in a manner that surpasses the 
                                                          
1 One of those was carried out in the waiting room of an airport, the only time that the respondent 
had free time.  
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mere ‘factual’ data, establishing links between what my informers talk about and 
broader issues, such as their visions and perceptions, strategic goals, etc.  
 
The interviews that I use to support my arguments were analysed as a whole. Some of 
my claims are derived from the interpretation of the entire interview, others from a 
group of interviews. When my aim is to clarify a particular phenomenon, the interplay 
of security ideals, smuggling practices and the evolution of particular technologies in 
the interdiction/evasion binary, parts of the conversations are used as evidence to 
highlight particular issues. Having had the opportunity to converse with or to interview 
a wider range of people would have allowed for making a more overarching 
interpretation of the phenomena. Nevertheless, the group of interviews I examined 
demonstrated a critical mass of consistent data regarding central aspects of the Navy 
personnel´s perceptions on the phenomena and on specific occurrences (Mason, 2010).  
 
Recruitment of the participants was seldom in the hands of the researcher. While I had 
the opportunity to speak freely with NCOs in several instances, those occasions were 
not planned, and those conversations always occurred in between discussions with the 
officials. Sometimes I was left alone because the officials needed to attend to urgent 
requirements. Conversations with officials were the result of suggestions made by my 
gatekeepers who stressed that those were the people who ‘knew’ about the topic. My 
initial intent was to interview people within three main categories: (1) the Navy 
personnel with operational experience in carrying out interdiction operations; (2) the 
Navy personnel with experience in commanding interdiction operations; and (3) 
officials in charge of designing strategies and operational concepts. I was often 
redirected to officials in current position of command. In short, from a targeted 
sampling, I moved to a Stratified purposive sampling, defined by Patton (2002) as a 
hybrid approach, in which the aim is to select groups that display variation in a 
particular phenomenon. Each group is fairly homogeneous, thus subgroups can be 
compared. Given the constraints of access I consider that this opportunistic sampling 
52 
 
(Lewis, 2003; Rapley, 2014) could provide useful data for the phenomena I had 
intended to research.  
 
I informed the interviewees about the goals of my research and explained the reasons 
I was directed to them by my gatekeepers. Additionally, I informed my interviewees 
how the interviews would proceed, requested permission to take notes and to audio 
record. I prepared a topic guide and a detailed questionnaire. The topic guide consisted 
of simple lists of key topics to be covered as a broad agenda during the interview. The 
questionnaire was built from the template offered by the topic guide and contained 
specific questions covering issues related to the main categories in the area of expertise 
of the interviewees. Both the topic guide and the questionnaires were organised 
following the same sequence. Introductory questions were about: years of service, 
early experiences in counter drug operations, current job positions; questions regarding 
specifics on their current and past roles, the main questions concerned: maritime 
interdiction operations, procurement, challenges; questions regarding their views on 
smugglers artefacts, changes, current challenges; I finished my interviews by asking 
all my informers about their views about future challenges. By observing this order 
my aim was, first, to demonstrate interest in their personal experiences and generate 
data on the undocumented early years of the coast guard operations. The following 
section allowed a more detailed account of Navy personnel regarding the two sides of 
the binary, while the concluding remarks were useful to discuss the perceptions on the 
efforts of the Navy, their identity, and perceptions regarding the future of the Navy.  
 
Questionnaires were read and commented on by my gatekeeper in order to safeguard 
that no sensitive information was inquired about. In several instances the questioners 
were pre-approved by the informant or one of their assistants, i.e. some questions were 
not asked to some of the informers. In most cases the questionnaire was sent days in 
advance of the interview. Only on one occasion was it possible for the researcher to 
ask all the questions in the questionnaire. Most respondents, once given the initial 
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clues, were more likely to speak freely about their own experiences. I took advantage 
of their silence to ask a new question or to introduce a new topic.  
 
Much of the documentation regarding reorganisation, operational and strategical 
documents of the Navy are in principle publicly available. Unfortunately, several 
public documents that are important to understand the changes in operational 
arrangements and decisions are lost. Despite claims about their existence and 
continuous promises to gain access, it was impossible to obtain Navy Strategic Plans 
prior to 2003. A document entitled Navy Plan Science and Technology - mentioned in 
several documents and by a couple of interviewees - was never found by the officer in 
charge of the Navy archive.  
 
The realization of the difficulties in finding several documents led me to adopt the 
anything-you-can lay-your-hands-on approach (Linders, 2007), asking my 
interviewees about possible sources, names of documents, etc. . This means that series 
of documents are not always sequential, for example, the official magazine of the 
Navy, the Armada.  
 
Validity and Reliability  
 
In her book Interpreting Qualitative Data, Silverman (2011) poses two significant 
questions for qualitative studies. 1. Does it matter whether qualitative research findings 
are credible? 2. If so, how might that credibility be sustained and recognised? I believe 
that these two questions and their responses are important, even highly significant for 
a research involving any aspect of illicit drug business. The answers to these questions 
are important in order to position a constructivist, qualitative based study among 
realist studies of drug policies and security studies (both historical and economical), 
which attempt to build their arguments from the existence of facts.  
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I use triangulation - a process of observing the research object from at least two 
different angles (Flick, 2000) - as the main tool to ensure validity. In the words of 
Denzin (2012), triangulation appears to be a useful resource in order to add rigor, 
breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to any inquiry (Ibid.). In this research I pursue 
triangulation of sources, i.e. comparing data from different qualitative methods, e.g. 
observations, interviews, documented accounts. Furthermore, I consult my 
interviewees about the perceptions and data provided by other interviewees. I am 
aware of the difficulties in following this advice to a full extent when carrying out 
research in social spaces dominated by the idea of secrecy.  
 
As for reliability, my aim is to describe the process that led me from data collection to 
the conclusions, and to show how the conceptual tools I used helped me illuminate the 
data and reach such conclusions. One particular problem was the already established 
narrative of the illicit drug market, with depictions of ‘barons’ and powerful and wily 
cartels. I have, thus, adopted what Hammersley (Cited in Silverman, 2011) defines as 
a ‘subtle form of realism’, which implies that (1) validity is identified with confidence 
in one’s knowledge, but not as a certainty of its truth, (2) reality is assumed to be 
independent of the claims that researchers make about it, and (3) reality is always 
viewed through particular perspectives, hence, our accounts represent reality they do 
not reproduce.  
 
The approach to transcription was based on Aufenanger's recommendation (2006, p. 
111 cited in Kowal & O’Connell, 2014)) that the choice of transcription methods be 
‘appropriate for the specific purposes of a given research project’. I transcribed my 
interviews verbatim, including fillers, such as um, uh, eh, and repetitions of words, 
such as the the, and other varieties of repetitions and halting, such as eh we were eh, 
but, and a variety of local interjections. I also included pauses. As the interviews were 
held in Spanish, some of the nuances or emphases in the transcriptions unfortunately 
got lost in the translation. Transcriptions and the analysis of the interviews were carried 
out using the Software for qualitative analysis Maxqda®.  
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The first stage of the analysis consisted of identifying general themes in both the 
documents and the interviews, i.e. indexing their recurrence. Those indices highlighted 
which theme or concept was being referred to within a particular section of the data; 
in that sense the first round of my analysis was composed of sorting the data in 
‘organisational categories’ or ‘topics’ (Maxwell & Chmiel, 2014). I identified four 
broader themes, covering two principal topics. First, the Navy strategies, answering 
questions, such as who we are and what we do. Second, questions concerning the 
smugglers´ strategies, namely who they are and what they do. The three broad themes 
were selected based on their recurrence and in relationship with the research questions. 
Then I identified different levels of generality, indexing subthemes in that broad 
hierarchy, i.e. from the three main substantive themes I derived six categories: (1) The 
Navy strategies, in which the many activities performed by the Navy were attached; 
(2) Smugglers’ strategies, includes the visions of the Navy personnel about smugglers’ 
activities;  (3) Interdiction, the importance of the MIO in the day to day actions of the 
Navy; (4) Navy boats and innovation; (5) the understanding of smugglers’ 
technologies; and (6) Learning and knowledge about smugglers and smugglers’ 
artefacts. These categories were constructed with the initial idea of comparing the 
perceptions, visions, and experiences of Navy men in the field and to understand how, 
and if, those perceptions, visions, experiences had any connection with the 
construction of broad policies, strategies, etc. Additionally, it was essential to 
understand how those ideas were transported from the field to the board rooms and 
back.  
 
Using those topics I proceeded to compare the concepts in order to generate the 
explanations provided in this thesis. In this I follow Richards and Richards (1994) 
when they remind that, contrary to most grounded theory approaches to building 
explanations, those explanations do not spontaneously emerge from data, but are 
‘actively constructed (Miles and Huberman, 1983). They will continue to be 
constructed by human researchers. Explanations are 'mental maps' and abstracted webs 
of meaning; the analyst lays over bits of data to give them shape without doing violence 
to them’ (Miles and Huberman, 1983 cited in: Richards & Richards, 1994). 
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During my analysis I use several tables and graphs showing seizures of drugs or 
smugglers artefacts. I utilize them for several reasons: first, to highlight the social 
context in which those statistics are produced, as well as the process of production of 
those data; second, to demonstrate how those data shape the views of the players 
regarding the phenomena; and third, to show how the data is used by the Navy. 
 
Challenges in Researching the War on Drugs 
 
Researching military organisations is challenging in many ways. The constant change 
of personnel and the need to establish rapport with new people was a challenge. 
Military organisations are traditionally bounded by cultures of secrecy, where 
outsiders are clearly and easily identified. While carrying out fieldwork in the Navy 
bases access to specific areas was sometimes restricted. Where granted, the 
researcher’s identification papers were constantly reviewed. Once the security check 
was cleared, there was, nonetheless, another challenge to find the right person to talk 
to, in a context in which the researcher had little control over choosing who to converse 
with. The Office Against Drugs and the gatekeeper suggested a list of Navy officers, 
all of whom were in their late thirties and early forties, who were considered to have 
knowledge on the topic I wanted to research, because as was explained to me, ‘they 
know about technology’. To all of them I was presented as a researcher taking part in 
a public relations program designed to improve the relationships between the Navy 
and the civilians. The idea of someone who ‘knows’ proved to be an interesting one. 
For my gatekeeper and subsequent interviewees, people who ‘know’ are automatically 
seen to be those occupying key spots within the Navy hierarchy, namely the 
commanders, chiefs, etc.; therefore, my continuous suggestion of talking with NCOs 
or with officials not necessarily in command posts appeared strange to my gatekeepers.  
 
I have no grounds to doubt the sincerity and honesty of the information and the data 
that the interviewees provided to me. Nevertheless, during several moments during the 
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interviews, interviewees withheld some information or suggested that I should not 
report a particular aspect of what they had said, or they abstained from responding due 
to the ‘classified’ character of their potential answers to my questions. At some point, 
either during or after the interview, most of my respondents explicitly informed me 
that they were not able to provide some data due to issues of confidentiality or security. 
This happened despite the fact that it had been clearly stated at the beginning of the 
conversations that I was not looking for any data that might cause any damage to 
current operations.  
 
I attempted to gain access to inmates serving their sentences in the United States and 
Colombian jails, but the entry to the United States Bureau of Prisons facilities was 
denied on grounds of security issues and the lack of ‘impact’ of this research to their 
institutional goals. Alternatively, a contact with four inmates in Colombian jails was 
guaranteed, yet the bureaucracy delayed any access to the Colombian Institute of 
Penitentiaries Control (INPEC) because the entry had to be negotiated with three 
different press chiefs. I had, nervertheles, the chance to conduct interviews with four 
retired drug smugglers with knowledge of maritime routes from the North Caribbean 
Coast of Colombia.  
 
The lack of first hand data from current smugglers limited the collection of evidence 
about the resources, visions and knowledge of those actors in the WoD. The absence 
of this data necessitated a reformulation of some of the research questions, in this case, 
from looking at the mutual shaping of smuggling and interdiction technologies and 
practices to a focus on how the images of the smugglers capacities are constructed and 
how those images help shape technological choices by the smugglers and the Navy.  
 
There are some ethical considerations that have an impact on my research. Issues of 
confidentiality and anonymity were addressed through a continuous reflection on the 
set of questions posed by Uwe Flick (2014): How can the analysis do justice to the 
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participants and their perspective? How does the presentation of the research and its 
findings maintain their privacy as much as possible? How can feedback on insights 
from the analysis take the participants' perspective into account and do justice to their 
expectations and feelings? Regarding the first question, I do not provide any 
information that might help link the interviewees with particular events. Most 
importantly I abstain from reporting on material or comments that my respondents 

















Chapter 3. A Brief History and an Overview of the War 
on Drugs in Colombia 
 
 
In 2015 SIMCI or Sistema Integrado de Monitorio de Cultivos Illicitos (Integrated 
Illicit Crops Monitoring System), a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) project, and a source authorized by the Colombian government, announced 
a new increase in the growth of coca field plantations, from 69,132 ha in 2013 to 
96,084 ha in 2014. This growth represented the possibility of producing up to 442 tons 
of pure cocaine compared to the potential 290 tons in 20132. This happened despite a 
reported decrease of consumption of cocaine in some markets and stabilization in some 
others (UNODC, 2015), and notwithstanding Law Enforcement Agencies’ (LEAs) 
claims that interdiction efforts were reducing the size of the market (Drug Enforcement 
Administration, 2013). According to the UNODC the value of the cocaine retail sales 
in 2008 was higher than the GDP of 123 countries (UNODC, 2010b). 
 
During the same period, The Colombian Observatory of Drugs reported a displacement 
of the traditional cultivation places to new ones. These coca fields were even more 
difficult to control. Moreover, a decrease in size of the coca fields made measuring 
and eradication harder. At the same time, Colombian LEAs routinely displayed new 
methods of transporting cocaine, reported seizure of cocaine with old methods, and 
announced the regular capture of the new boss or the new cartel or network. However, 
the familiar headline ‘The New Route of The Narcotraffic’ or ‘A New Route Is 
Discovered’ could be read in1993, 2001 or 2015 (El Tiempo), or indeed almost any 
other year. All these snapshots allow us to understand the complexities of the so-called 
War on Drugs and its vicissitudes. In this chapter, I present an overview of the history 
of the WoD.  
                                                          
2 It is worth pointing out that there is no market for pure cocaine. According to the UNODC those 
figures are produced in order to be used as a guide to compare production between countries.  
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The popular history of the War on Drugs consists of narratives in which 
sensationalization of violence is merged with stories of clichéd drug barons. As Boyd 
(2002, p. 397) states, ‘Today’s war on drugs is characterised by the “routinisation of 
caricature” which promotes worst case scenarios as the norm, sensationalises, and 
distorts drug issues in the media’. Perhaps the name Pablo Escobar - the top leader of 
the so-called Medellin Cartel - is the figure that most fully consolidates all the 
demonization present in the narrative of the WoD. However, far from being dominated 
by the competition between powerful cartels, who exert control using indiscriminate 
violence, the history of the WoD can be better seen as result of the failure of 
enforcement-led strategies.   
 
Early Uses and Early Prohibitions  
 
Coca is a native American plant. It has been used since pre-colonial times as food, 
stimulant, and analgesic by natives. Spanish conquerors noted its widespread use. 
Native populations not only chewed the coca leaves as a supplement to their diet, but 
also utilized it on ceremonial grounds, as part of rites of passages and for medical 
purposes. Coca use in what today is Colombia was not as prevalent there as it was in 
other Andean regions, and it was used mainly by groups subjected to Inca influences 
before the Spanish conquest in what today is the south Andean region of Colombia 
(Thoumi, 1995).  
 
Initially the Spanish conquistadors, and especially the Catholic Church, opposed the 
use of hallucinogenic substances. Later, the recognition that coca chewing allowed 
natives to work for longer hours without eating or resting was instrumental in a change 
of perceptions regarding the use of the alkaloid. In 1573 the viceroy Francisco de 
Toledo lifted the prohibition on the farming and consumption of coca, which was 
instead taxed.  
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During the 1740s Joseph de Jussieu, a French botanist, provided the first leaves to Jean 
Baptiste Lamarck who classified the genus Erythroxylon. There are more than 200 
species classified under this genus, but only a handful – e.g. Erythroxilum coca and 
novogranatense - are used to commercially produce cocaine. In 1859 an Italian 
physician, Paolo Mantegazza published a paper on the properties of coca leaf extract 
(Wielenga & Gilchrist, 2013). In 1860 the German doctoral student in chemistry at 
Göttingen University, Albert Niemmann, was able to isolate the alkaloid from coca 
leaves. Also, in 1884 the Peruvian scientist Alfredo Bignon developed a fairly simple 
formula adapted to local conditions of the jungle of Peru (Gootenberg, 2008).  
 
In 1863 Angelo Marini produced and launched the successful Vin Mariani, a mix of 
Bourdeux wine and coca extract, soon followed by an elixir, pills and finally the tea 
Marini3. In fact after 1863 Mariani became the largest buyer of Andean coca 
(Gootenberg, 2008). The late nineteenth century also saw the use of the anaesthetic 
properties of cocaine during surgery, and between 1884 and 1887 Sigmund Freud 
published a series of papers concerning his experimental results on the use of cocaine 
and its anaesthetic properties.  
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, consumption of cocaine was a socially accepted 
practice in most European countries. Cocaine was used for recreational purposes, and, 
together with heroine, as a medical ingredient. However, as early as 1887, moral, 
religious, and medical arguments concerns led to increasingly prohibitionist policies 
taking shape. Boville (2004, p. 18) argues that ‘Measures against opium, cocaine and 
alcohol were part of a social environment marked by a growing rejection of any degree 
of drunkenness or drug dependence.’ At a federal level the U.S first established a 
restriction of the use of hallucinogens, with the 1906 "Food and Drug Act" that 
required the labelling of products in order to inform consumers of any opiates, cocaine, 
                                                          
3 Mariani products were widely used by the public and the elite, including Queen Victoria, Thomas 




cannabis, alcohol or other psychoactive ingredients. The Poisons and Pharmacy Act of 
1908 posed similar restrictions in the United Kingdom. While in February 1909 the 
Shanghai convention, the gathering of thirteen countries summoned by the U.S. since 
1906, discussed the regulation of the traffic and control of opium consumption. This 
forum was known as the Opium Commission. The bishop of the Philippines, Reverend 
Charles H. Brent, was elected President of the Commission (UNODC, 2008a). In 1914, 
the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act conferred government power and authority over states 
on drug issues, and imposed a drug tracking tax. In this document the word narcotics 
was first used to refer to marihuana, cocaine, and opium. In 1919, an amendment to 
this law was passed increasing the restrictions on cocaine imports, and in 1922, the 
Jones-Miller Act finally closed U.S. borders to cocaine and strictly regulated coca 
imports. In the meantime, in 1916 The Defence of the Realm Act was instituted in the 
UK as an attempt to deter illegal possession of cocaine. In 1920 the Dangerous Drugs 
Act limited the production, import, export, possession, sale or distribution of cocaine 
(Wielenga & Gilchrist, 2013).  
 
The Shanghai convention and the prohibition of morphine and opium that the U.S. 
promoted laid ground for the first international treaty, The Hague Convention (1912). 
The International Opium Convention of The Hague attempted to control narcotic 
drugs, including cocaine, and to limit their use for medical purposes. In 1920 the 
League of Nations adopted the control of drugs as part of its functions and established 
the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs usually 
referred to as the “Opium Advisory Committee”. It was in charge of, among other 
things, compiling information about imports, exports, re-exports, consumption, and 
reserve stocks of narcotics (UNODC, 2008a). Efforts to control the flows of illicit 
narcotics, specifically opium, continued with the second agreement, the new 
International Opium Convention, or “1925 Convention”, entering into force in 1928, 
and later the 1931 Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the 
Distribution of Narcotic Drugs. In 1936 the League of Nations held the Convention 
for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs. As noted by Gootenberg 
(2008) the practical effects of the 1936 convention were severely limited by the 
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absence of several important producers from the League of Nations and by the refusal 
of several countries to sign and ratify it.  
 
After the Second World War in 1946 the United Nations continued the efforts of 
previous commissions and created the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND). During 
the 1950s the CND produced a series of reports on the control of farming of coca plants 
in Peru and Bolivia, leading to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which 
aimed to control the farming and production of narcotics, and required the absolute 
elimination of coca fields, even for traditional use. The 1961 Convention was amended 
by the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and then by the 1988 United 
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances - also known as the Vienna Convention - with the main focus on cocaine. 
Delegations from 106 states participated and eventually adopted a new Convention 
Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (UNODC, 
2008). Aside from the efforts of controlling the production of narcotics, the 1988 
convention focused on law enforcement matters. The convention aimed to disrupt drug 
trafficking by: (1) targeting drug traffickers’ revenues, (2) establishing strategies that 
would prevent money laundering, (3) freezing and confiscation of assets resulting from 
the illegal trade of narcotics, (4) setting up provisions for extradition of major drug 
traffickers.  
 
Gootenberg (2012) presents a chronology of the historical process of what he calls the 
‘making of a global drug’. To him the history of cocaine traffic can be divided in four 
periods: the rise and fall of legal cocaine (1885-1947), the birth of illicit coke (1947-
1973), the rise and demise of Colombian cartels (1973-1995), and Mexican 
Opportunities seized (1985-2000). Criminalization of the production and traffic of the 
Andean cocaine started in the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example in 1948 in Peru 
and in 1952 in Bolivia. Before that period Andean cocaine, mostly Peruvian, enjoyed 
a prominent position in the world trade of the product (Gootenberg, 2012). After the 
prohibition, since the early 1950s and up to the 1960s, Peruvian and Bolivian 
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smugglers dominated the illegal trade by exploiting the expertise in the making of legal 
cocaine sulphate, gained during the late decades of the nineteenth century and the first 
half of the twentieth century. During the 1950s Andean Cocaine was mostly exported 
to Cuba, which was both arrival point for local consumption and a node on route to the 
U.S. This privileged position ended with the Cuban revolution and with the arrival of 
the socialist party to power. The latter heavily criminalized the consumption and traffic 
of illegal drugs. Chileans, who served mostly as couriers during this period, abandoned 
their courier role and became empresarios4 until 1973, the year in which the Allende 
coup ended the age of Chilean narcos, pushing the traffic toward a new region, thus, 
initiating the rise of the Colombian cartels (Gootenberg, 2008). The majority of 
historians of drug trafficking in Colombia agree that during the 1960s and 1970s 
Colombian drug smugglers occupied a prominent role in the smuggling of drugs to the 
U.S. and that before then Colombians only played a minority role, almost always as 
drug mules, couriers, and due to the use of Colombia as a transit point (Gootenberg, 
2008, 2012).  
 
The Colombian War on Drugs: From Early Prohibitions to the Plan 
Colombia 
 
An important moment in the recent history of Colombia was the killing of Pablo 
Escobar. While hiding from prosecution the last days of the world renowned drug 
baron occurred far from his vast estates and luxurious houses. December 2, 1993 is no 
doubt a landmark in the history of the War on Drugs (WoD). Almost 20 years later 
several of the so-called ‘cartels’ have been dismantled, harvesting has been moved 
several times, cocaine plants have been modified to augment the alkaloid production, 
transport methods of cocaine have shown to be beyond imagination, and overall the 
consumption, the production and flows of illicit drugs continues. The consequences of 
                                                          
4 Entrepreneurs.  
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drug traffic in Colombia have not been bound to the economic cycle, but have been 
felt in the whole fabric of society (Gómez, 1995).  
 
The production of cocaine is a relatively simple agricultural and chemical process. The 
coca plants do not require special care, irrigation systems or fertilization. The plant 
sprouts easily in poor quality soil in large areas of Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Colombia and 
Ecuador, with an estimated time of growth between six to nine months from sowing 
to harvesting, depending on the variety of the plant and the farming practices. The 
harvesting is done manually; the leaves are dried in the sun. The production of cocaine 
is not capital intensive, nor are specialized labour skills employed, and it can done with 
widely available raw materials, such as cement or gasoline, and every day tools, such 
as heat lamps, fans, and microwaves. As highlighted earlier, since the boom of cocaine 
production in the late decades of the 19th century a process well suited to the jungle 
conditions existed.  
 
The farmers who cultivate the crops usually undertake the initial stages of the 
production of the alkaloid. This process involves the production of the non-perishable 
pasta basica (coca paste), which is produced by mixing the dry coca leaves with a 
reactive to release the alkaloid from them. A ‘cook’ or a ‘chemist’ performs the next 
stage of manufacturing the cocaine. It is done in a makeshift laboratory, usually in the 
jungle, although such laboratories have also been found in urban centres. Despite 
restrictions on the import of several of the chemicals and other supplies needed to 
produce the cocaine, producers have been able to modify the formulas by replacing 
those substances with other similar compounds and still produce hydrochloride of 
cocaine of a purity close to 90%. The outcome depends on the skills of the ‘cook’, but 
with a formula simple enough that it could be followed without previous expertise. In 
the early 1980s, Colombian drug traffickers dominated the illicit market of Andean 




The beginning of attempts to control narcotics in Colombian legislation can be dated 
to 1920 with the creation of the first regulations, establishing the rule that the 
prescriptions of narcotics could only be written by physicians or pharmacies (Law 11, 
September 15). In 1928, the Colombian congress enacted the bill 118 instituting minor 
punishments for the ‘misuse of drugs’. In 1936, the criminal code initiated prohibitions 
on elaboration and distribution of narcotics, without making any reference to cocaine. 
In 1938, the sale of coca leaves was limited to medically prescribed doses filled by 
authorized drug stores. In 1941 all new plantations of coca were prohibited. In 19475 
new legislation was enacted, prohibiting not only the farming, the distribution and the 
sale of coca leaves, but also the practice of paying salaries in coca leaves either 
partially or in full. Additionally, the destruction of existing plantations was ordered 
and jails for those guilty of infractions were set up. There was no relevant internal 
legislation until 1974, with the Decree 1188, which established the production and 
traffic of marihuana, morphine, cocaine or any other hallucinogenic substance as a 
crime. The Estatuto Nacional de Estupefacientes (National Narcotics Statute) later 
replaced this decree in 1986. This statute created penalties between 12 and 30 years of 
jail time for production and traffic of illegal drugs.  
 
Over time the supply approach has become central to the WoD anti-drug policy, and 
it has combined various approaches, among them eradication and interdiction. 
Eradication has sometimes been done manually but mostly by aerial aspersion of 
chemical products (Felbab-Brown, 2010). Eradication policies have created a whole 
different range of problems, from controversies among the Colombian government, 
NGOs and local communities about the environmental and health related issues of 
fumigation (Oldham & Massey, 2002) to social mobilization and resentment from poor 
farmers who are dependent on coca cultivation (Felbab-Brown, 2010).  
 
                                                          
5 Due to internal power struggles this decree was initially delayed by one year and later never reissued 
or enforced.  
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The interdiction approach is based on the idea that increasing the cost of transport will 
make traffickers give up on their intention to smuggle their cargo and to abandon the 
business altogether (Echeverry, 2004; Kawell, 2001). Those in favour of interdiction 
base their arguments for the approach in calculating that transport accounts for up to 
40% of the total cost for traffickers. It is seen as ‘the most vulnerable phase in the 
business’ (Echeverry, 2004, p. 8). They assert that interdiction is more cost effective 
than other forms of control (Mejía & Restrepo, 2008) and that those in charge of 
transport also earn an important proportion of drug revenues (Thoumi, 2005a). 
Nevertheless, in order to carry out interdiction the LEAs’ surveillance infrastructure 
needs to be constantly updated (Echeverry, 2004). Despite the use of different 
eradication and interdiction approaches and the constant militarisation of the WoD, 
that started in the early 1980s (Chepesiuk, 1999; Moloeznik, 2003), cocaine is still 
produced, and smugglers continue to move their illicit cargo. 
 
The term War on Drugs has been used to describe the efforts of the U.S. government 
to enforce counter drug policies, i.e., an enforcement-focused approach, in which 
controlling the supply of illicit drugs is the main goal. This has led to an increasing 
participation of the military in the interdiction of illicit flows of drugs and in the 
capture of drug traffickers. In June 1971 president Richard Nixon declared the WoD 
with the reorganisation of drug policy around repression of consumption by creating 
The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) (Boville, 2004). However, the modern era of the WoD began 
with the presidency of Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s. Reagan’s anti-drug crusade 
is the closest historical antecedent of the current policies around the flows of illicit 
drugs. During the Reagan presidency, the production and traffic - mainly in the Andean 
region - were considered a threat to U.S. national security. Initiating the process of 
militarisation of the WoD meant that the authorizing members of the U.S Armed 
service would participate in the interdiction of illegal cargo, and in the apprehension 
of drug traffickers. The armed services were deployed in foreign countries with the 
aim of stopping the production of illicit drugs in the source countries (Bagley, 1991). 
An early example of the process was the deployment of the U.S. Army in Bolivia in 
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what was known as Blast Furnace Operation. The aim of the operation was the 
destruction of the makeshift laboratories and coca refineries (Reuter, 1992). The 
enforcement-focused approach was continued during the subsequent presidencies of 
George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton.  
 
The Bush administration asked the military to play a major role in interdiction of illicit 
drugs, and increased military help to source countries and prioritized training both 
military and police forces (Bagley, 1991). Enforcement of supply strategies were 
continued during the presidency of Bill Clinton (1993-2000). It was during the second 
term of Clinton that the Plan Colombia was designed. The Clinton government, as well 
as his predecessors, considered drug trafficking as a threat to the U.S. national security. 
Relationships between the U.S. government and the Colombian government during the 
presidency of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) were hampered by the decision of the U.S. 
not to provide financial aid to Colombia because President Samper faced impeachment 
charges for receiving money from the ‘Cali cartel’ to fund his presidency campaign. 
During Samper’s government the circumstantial alliance between the left wing 
guerrillas and the drug market deepened. In the areas or recent settlements where the 
central state was absent, the guerrillas acted as a government, settling disputes and 
introducing taxes to producers and buyers (Boville, 2004). Samper’s successor Andres 
Pastrana (1998-2002) became more aligned to the strategy outlined out by the U.S. 
government. The strategy was clearly expressed in the Plan Colombia, launched in 
July 20006. When being proposed, both the Colombian and the U.S. government had 
different versions of what the Plan Colombia would entail. While the Colombian 
government sought the Plan Colombia to be a counterinsurgency plan, the main goal 
of the U.S. government was to prevent the flows of illicit drugs towards that country 
(Veillette, 2005). During the Samper Government the FARC-EP, one of the main 
guerrilla groups, was able to mobilize the cocaleros (coca farmers) to carry out military 
strikes against the central government in an effort to stop the fumigation of coca crops 
                                                          
6 Initially called Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the also known as Alianza Act. The 
part of the Plan Colombian funded by the U.S. government received mainly the funding from the 
American program called Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and assistance from the Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) of the Department of Defense’s Central Counternarcotics Account.  
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and with their attacks imposed severe loses on the Army. Pastrana initiated peace talks 
with The FARC and conceded a territory of 42.000 square kilometres. The peace talks 
ended abruptly in 2002 after the FARC kidnapped several local politicians.  
 
The central goal of the Plan Colombia was to reduce the cultivation, processing, and 
distribution of illegal narcotics by 50 percent over a period of six years, starting in 
2000. The Plan Colombia contemplated an initial investment of 1.2 billon USD in 
counterdrug operations, but resulted in a package of 7.5 billion USD in aid, of which 
at least 75 percent was destined for the military and police forces (Rochlin, 2011). 
According to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the United 
States funding for the military component of Plan Colombia was on average 540 
million USD per year between 2000 and 2008. The Colombian government invested 
in the Plan Colombia approximately 812 million USD per year during the same period 
(Mejia, 2016). The reduction in the  illicit drug trade, according to the Plan Colombia, 
was to be achieved with a combination of different instruments, among others the 
strengthening of the judicial system of Colombia and improving the living conditions 
of farmers. The main strategies contemplated in the Plan Colombia for the reduction 
of the flows of illicit drugs were: (1) manual and aerial eradication, with a strong 
emphasis on aerial fumigation, (2) interdiction of drugs, (3) identification and 
destruction of processing laboratories, and (4) the control of products used in the 
elaboration of cocaine.  
 
According to several evaluations of the results of the Plan Colombia, a number of goals 
were not met, especially regarding the size of coca plantations. While poppy and 
heroin were reduced by 50% between 2000 and 2006, during the same period coca 
fields grew almost by 15% and cocaine production was reported to be up by 4% (Mejia, 




The Plan Colombia can be considered as an example of the merging of security 
discourses against crime and the securization logic promoted by the United States 
(Arteaga Botello, 2011). This logic was designed to counter ‘narco-terrorism’, and to 
unite the discourses against drugs and terrorism. The Plan Colombia links both the 
concept of ‘national security’ to that of ‘public peace’. A further consolidation of this 
trend comes with the connection between the concepts expressed in the Plan Colombia 
- a concept of ‘hemispheric security’ developed by the Organisation of American 
States - (OAS) and the presumption that the complex threat of ‘narco-terrorism’ should 
be faced with transnational solutions, involving mainly an enforcement solution and 
the military.  
 
The Colombian internal conflict, in which a multitude of players, such as two main 
left wing groups the FARC-EP and ELN and the right wing paramilitaries, along with 
brokers, drug smugglers, and emerging bands all have benefited from the drug market, 
thus created further complexities when determining the role of the different military 
organisations and LEAs in the WoD. Three different branches of the military have 
been carrying out counterdrug operations against the guerrillas and left wing groups 
and other criminal groups. The Army, The Navy and the National Police have 
specialized as counterdrug units, yet they have further been deploying resources from 
other units in counterdrug operations.  
 
From the 1970s and until the mid-1980s the Colombian Police was the main player in 
the control of illicit drugs. During the 1970s the Colombian Police mainly focused on 
the control of marihuana crops in the Caribbean coast and on thwarting maritime traffic 
of marihuana from its source, that is to say, by seizing suspicious vessels in the North 
Caribbean Coast. In order to fulfil its mission the Colombian Police deployed two 
units, the Air Service and the Specialized Antinarcotic Police Service, which merged 
in 1987 to become the Antinarcotic Police. Later with the support of the UK 
Government, the Colombian Police received training in intelligence operations. 
71 
 
Furthermore, it was granted training in commando operations from the Special Air 
Service (SAS).  
 
The National Army of Colombia created the Antidrug Brigade in 2000 with the double 
function of carrying out counter guerrilla operations and destroying cocaine processing 
laboratories. Meanwhile the Air Force was key in deterring smugglers both from 
transporting coca and pasta basica from Peru and Bolivia, in thwarting airplanes en 
route to consumer countries, and in destroying air strips where those airplanes 
departed. Finally, the Central Intelligence Agency, known as DAS (Departamento 
Administrativo de Seguridad)7 and the Colombian Attorney Office both created units 
with the sole purpose of capturing and prosecuting people involved in the different 
stages of the illicit drug market. In summary, the Colombian military and LEAs 
expanded their traditional roles in order to participate in dismantling and thwarting the 
production or transport of illicit drugs. 
 
Moreover, the declaration of the WoD implied that the production and transport of 
illicit drugs was no longer merely a criminal activity, but also a threat to state security; 
a scenario confirmed with later attempts to tie illicit drug smuggling with terrorist 
activities (Björnehed, 2004). This enabled the legitimization of the use of the Armed 
Forces and the deployment of military technology in thwarting the supply of illicit 
drugs. According to Gootenberg (2008) and Kenney (2007) strategies in the WoD 
follow the same pattern as the United States military intervention in South and Central 
America in the past. Furthermore, it has been argued that there is a continuity between 
1960s and 1970s law enforcement campaigns against drug trafficking by the United 
States Government and the modern era of international crime control, and that the 
evolution of the latter has been shaped by the efforts of the U.S Government against 
illicit drugs (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006). A typical argument for the use of military 
forces and for the militarisation of the police in the WoD claims that the possession of 
                                                          
7 Dissolved in 2011 and replaced by the National Directory of Intelligence.  
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weapons by drug traffickers is beyond the capacity of regular police units (e.g. Garzón, 
2008) 
 
According to Griffith (1994, 2004), the end of Cold War geo-strategic goals opened 
up the way to what he conceptualized as Geonarcotics, that is to say, the complex 
dynamics behind the drug problem in the Caribbean, in which issues of power and 
geography are intertwined, and in which countless state and non-state actors interplay, 
and the existence of measures and countermeasures in order to control the several 
threats and security challenges created by the drug traffic market.  
 
In addition to this argument, the WoD, which requires the policization of the Military, 
in which military apparatus is deployed both as surveillance and control efforts, in 
order to regulate the unruly illegal flows, can be described as a ‘Securocratic War’ 
(Feldman, 2004). In these type of wars, the objective is not necessarily territorial 
conquest and the enemy is not easily localizable and identifiable. The aim is to counter 
territorial contamination and transgression by multiple illegal flows, the ‘terrorist’ and 
other forms or demographic and biological infiltration. The day to day activities in the 
WoD, as well as the War on Terror (WoT), then, despite the label ‘War’, have more 
relation with crime fighting than war activities (Andreas, 2003). To a certain extent 
the case of the WoD in Colombia can be interpreted in the light of the concept of new 
wars, coined by Kaldor (1999) who considers that the new wars involve the blurring 
between war, organised crime, and large-scale violations of human rights.  
 
Since states have imposed border controls there have been groups that have attempted 
to challenge state control and have sought to take advantage of disparities in 
commodity prices across borders. What has changed is ‘their methods and speed of 
cross-border movement; state laws and the form, intensity, and focus of their 
enforcement; and the level of public anxiety and policy attention’ (Andreas, 2003, p. 
79). Moreover, Andreas (1999, 2003) demonstrates that the end of the Cold War led 
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many states to reshape their military apparatuses to cope with border regulatory 
policing, targeting different illicit flows, and the multitude of groups that attempt to 
avoid border controls. The involvement of the United States Military predates the end 
the Cold War and goes back to the authorization given by then president Ronald 
Reagan in December 1981 allowing civil authorities to use military technology, 
intelligence resources, and a sophisticated network of Navy E-2C, the so-called mini 
AWACKs, radar planes operating out of Jacksonville, Florida, in the WoD, while the 
U.S Navy participated in the interdiction of drug smugglers in international waters 
(Chepesiuk, 1999).  
 
Those illicit flows are intense in borderlands. It is on the borders in which the contrast 
between visibility and invisibility is likewise key. While border crossers and 
smugglers attempt to remain invisible, the state makes efforts to highlight their 
visibility and their territorial sovereignty (Van Schendel, 2005). The efforts of 
Colombian Military, and especially the interdiction operations, and Maritime 
Interdiction Operations by the Colombian Navy are aimed at preventing illicit flows 
from abandoning the territory.  
 
From Peripheral Producer to Main Players: Colombian Drug 
Traffickers 
 
About 60% of the cocaine now consumed in the world is produced in Colombia (Mejia, 
2016) - a country that in 1980 was producing roughly 3.7% of the world’s cocaine. 
The increase in coca cultivation in Colombia can be traced back to the late seventies, 
but the rapid growing of the plant did not appear until mid-1980s. By 1990 Colombia 
was producing 13.7% of the world wide available coca leaf, with an area of 
approximately 40.000 hectares (Thoumi, 1995) of coca cultivations. This amount of 
hectares increased up to more than 162.000 at the turn of the century. By 2000 
Colombia was the country with the highest amount of coca fields and had become the 
main producer of cocaine.  
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It was also during the eighties that Colombians traffickers integrated their participation 
in the manufacturing, transporting and marketing of cocaine. Since the 1950s a 
multitude of smuggling enterprises involving nationals of several Latin and Caribbean 
countries - Peru, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina - were involved 
in the smuggling of cocaine and heroin from South America to the markets of Europe 
and U.S., and illegal cocaine laboratories were routinely reported in the Andean 
countries (Camacho Guizado & López Restrepo, 2000). The first laboratory for 
cocaine production ever seized in Colombia was found in 1957 in Medellin. By the 
standards of the time it was reported as large. Allegedly this laboratory refined 
cocaine, heroin and morphine both for the local market and to be exported to Havana, 
where it was marketed by American ‘Mafias’ (Camacho Guizado & López Restrepo, 
2000; Thoumi, 2003). Cocaine traffic from Colombia to U.S. via Cuba was reported 
throughout the 1960s. It is during that decade that the traffic of marijuana from 
Colombia to U.S., reached a new level, the so called marijuana boom. This initiated 
what Thoumi (2014) considers to be the beginning of a serious participation of 
Colombian traffickers in the illicit drug business. The traffic or marijuana from 
Colombia to U.S. was extensive, especially in the north of Colombia, where the plant 
was grown in the slopes of the Sierra Nevada, an isolated mountain range. By the late 
1970s the marijuana boom had subsided, in part because of interdiction efforts, 
fumigation and eradication, as well as changes in consumption pattern and supply, and 
therefore profitability for smugglers (Reuter, 1992; Thoumi, 1995). By the early 1990s 
Colombian smugglers’ participation in the marijuana trade was marginal.  
 
During the 1970s Colombian traffickers obtained the coca leaves or coca paste from 
Peru and Bolivia and transported them to Colombia to be processed (Felbab-Brown, 
2010). Yet, as highlighted earlier, domestic coca farming grew since the early 1980s, 
especially in the poor southern plains and jungles in the south of Colombia.  
 
According to Camacho & López (2000) the drug smuggling phenomenon in Colombia 
is the result of a long history of violence and other smuggling activities that go back 
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as far as colonial times. The reasons why the illegal business was developed in 
Colombia at such a high pace and has proven to be difficult to manage have been 
explored by quite a few academics. According to Thoumi (2005, p. 20) there are a set 
of ‘structural and institutional weaknesses of the Colombian society that attracted the 
illegal industry’, such the traditional disregard for norms and law, corruption, and high 
levels of inequality. At the same time drug traffic money has deepened those 
weaknesses. Drug business has had an enormous impact in the recent history of 
Colombia (Camacho Guizado & López Restrepo, 2000). The amount of money that 
entered Colombia as result of drug traffic has precipitated changes in economy, 
political and cultural institutions, as well as fuelled the internal conflict, providing the 
principal source of finance for left-wing guerrillas and right wing paramilitary groups. 
Drug dealing from Colombia has generated a worldwide stigma, which has affected 
the sense of national identity in that country (Camacho Guizado & López Restrepo, 
2000; Felbab-Brown, 2010; Thoumi, 2005a).  
 
The history of drug smuggling in Colombia has usually been narrated as divided into 
three phases. The first one stretches from 1955 to the late 1970s. This phase involved 
the farming of marihuana. As was highlighted earlier, marijuana was cultivated mostly 
on the slopes of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and transported to the U.S. in small 
airplanes and fishing boats using Atlantic coast routes (Felbab-Brown, 2010; López 
Restrepo & Camacho Guizado, 2007). The second phase was the generation of the 
‘capos’ or drug lords, who managed to turn Colombia into the biggest producer of 
cocaine in the world within a decade. The third generation is said to be composed of 
low profile traffickers with an entrepreneurial style of dealing, following the demise 
of the Medellin and Cali ‘cartels’ (Thoumi, 2005a; Vellinga, 2004). In three decades 
Colombia turned into an important marihuana producer and exporter, the main 
producer and exporter of cocaine, and by the 1990s it was harvesting around 50% of 




It is widely considered that Colombians played a fairly peripheral role in the traffic of 
Andean cocaine during the 1950s and 1960s, with Colombian nationals mostly 
fulfilling the role of couriers carrying small amounts of cocaine in the suitcases and 
shoe heels for Peruvian or Chilean traffickers (Chepesiuk, 1999; Gootenberg, 2012). 
It was in the early 1970s when Colombian traffickers occupied the void left by the 
Chilean narcos, whose networks were disrupted by the political turmoil in that country. 
Between 1970 and 1972 Colombian LEAs started to carry out action against the 
presence of cocaine traffickers in the country (López Restrepo & Camacho Guizado, 
2007; Roldán, 1999). It is the second generation of drug smugglers that gained 
attention and transformed the drug businesses into a well know enterprise. The history 
of the rise of Colombian traffickers has been well documented, nevertheless, the 
origins of the so called ‘cartels’ are less known (Gootenberg, 2012). 
 
Colombian traffickers managed to transform and expand the business in less than a 
decade. Initially they obtained the coca leaf and paste ‘pasta básica de cocaina’ from 
Peru and Bolivia, using the route of the Huallaga Valley (near the south of Colombia). 
They utilized a small aircraft to transport the coca base, which then was transformed 
into cocaine hydrochloride in refineries in Colombia, later to be transported to its final 
destination (Felbab-Brown, 2010; Gootenberg, 2008, 2012). By 1976 Colombian 
capos had already organised and centralized the production, distribution, and 
commercialization of cocaine, and they were able to use large-scale smuggling 
methods (Roldán, 1999). In 1996, the U.S. government claimed victory over the ‘air 
bridge’ that transported cocaine from Peru to Colombia. The official data of the DEA 
pointed out that while in 1995, 39 suspicious airplanes were detected and thwarted, 
none were detected in 1996. These results were, according to the DEA, a possible 
consequence of  the establishment of a radar system in the north of Peru, and the 
cooperation between the Peruvian Air Force and the United States government (Ahart 
& Stiles, 1991; Fialka, 1996). As a result of this, and despite the lack of indigenous 
coca leaf tradition, Colombian traffickers introduced extensive plantations of coca 
plants in tropical areas of Putumayo and Caquetá. They were sustaining and generating 
processes of colonization in unpoliced areas of the country and thus created a new coca 
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culture (Gootenberg, 2012), and eventually integrated the whole chain of production 
of cocaine within the country (Echeverry, 2004).  
 
The golden era of the ‘cartels’ ended in the mid-1990s with the killing or capture of 
the relevant members of the Medellin, Cali, and Bogotá ‘cartels’. The stages version 
of the history of Colombia’s drug traffic in due course assumed the demise of the so-
called cartels and the democratization of the drug business. The void was rapidly filled 
with a multitude of smaller groups; those groups have been described with an 
abundance of terms, such as the self-contradictory, baby cartels or boutique cartels. 
Possible existing organisations that were already acting in the shadow of the previous 
more powerful ones. Important considerations made about those new organisations are 
their structural arrangement and characteristics. The new trafficking organisations are 
considered to possess a less hierarchal structure in order to be more flexible than the 
so-called cartels, and to have a high degree of expertise, with some of them 
specializing in only one or more aspects of the process. It has also been said that those 
new smugglers have diversified their routes and markets, and invested money in 
improving technologies for facilitating their business (Bagley, 2013; Gootenberg, 
2012; Kenney, 2007b; McCarthy, 2011; Vellinga, 2004a). This new set of 
characteristics is also said to make it harder for LEAs to obtain intelligence in order to 
thwart their illegal activities (McCarthy, 2011). Another important change is that 
Colombian smugglers no longer control the whole cocaine supply chain; as they now 
fulfil a more subordinate role to Mexican Cartels (Andrés López Restrepo & Camacho 
Guizado, 2007; Medel & Thoumi, 2014). As highlighted earlier, both cartels and drug 
smuggling networks are considered to possess specific characteristics that contribute 
to their success. I consider that those set of explanations are the result of an asymmetric 
view of the drug market that places the agency on smugglers and does not consider the 
dynamic ecosystem of the drug market.  
 
By 1997 enforcement agencies in Colombia, Mexico and U.S. considered that with the 
disintegration of the major Colombian trafficking organisations, Colombians no longer 
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dominated the cocaine traffic, which was by then controlled by Mexican ‘cartels’. A 
collaborative relationship was formed between the Colombian traffickers and the 
Mexican ‘cartels’, with Colombian groups controlling production and routes to the 
Caribbean, but with the Mexicans as the owners of the drugs and in charge or their 
transport to consumer countries (Astorga & Shirk, 2010).  
 
Quantifying Illegality: The Use of Numbers and the War on Drugs  
 
Despite many criticisms made of statistics over crime related issues and the difficulties 
of measuring the drug market (Andreas, 2010; Thoumi, 2005), figures produced by 
state agencies and multilateral organisations play a central role in defining the ‘illicit 
drug traffic’ problem. Several scholars have pointed out the impossibility of producing 
accurate measurements of the drug market (Andreas, 2010; Andreas & Greenhill, 
2010; Buxton, 2006; Gootenberg, 2009; Thoumi, 2005b). The challenge, as expressed 
by Andreas (2010, p. 23), is that illegal actors are ‘actively attempting to avoid being 
noticed, reported, and quantified’.  
 
One indicator with important policy consequences is any reduction or growth in the 
quantity of drugs seized in a specific region or over a period of time. As seen with the 
air transport example earlier, decreases of seizures are often taken as an index of 
success in controlling a particular method, strategy, or route. Success in seizures in 
one area often mean a subsequent change of routes or smugglers’ methods, but 
independent of the ultimate impact, seizure statistics are often displayed as an indicator 
of success. Statistics on drug seizure are at the core of the process of shaping the 
enforcement agencies; they use those data in constructing the drug traffic narratives, 
and allocating budgets, resources or rewards. That is not to say that the data is cynically 
forged or fabricated, but that the very process of collecting, displaying, and using these 




Measurement of the success of law enforcement and military organisations in the WoD 
is validated by statistics. Policy reports at different levels of aggregation provide 
readers with graphs, charts and figures about the ‘behaviour’ of the drug market. Those 
figures are used to define strategies and policies, and to provide arguments through 
which institutions prove their value as important players in the WoD. Statistics are the 
de facto tools for constructing evidence about illicit drug traffic. Each step of cocaine 
traffic - production, transport, and distribution - has been subject to quantification. 
Seizures of cocaine are considered as a reliable indicator of military and law 
enforcement performance; they influence the allocation of budgets and the definition 
of strategic and operational resources. Statistics are central in producing accounts of 
smugglers actions and choices. Global evaluations of the efficiency of the efforts in 
the WoD are also presented in the form of statistics. Since 1997, the UNODC has 
produced the World Drug Report (WDR). The Colombian Government publishes the 
White Book on drugs. As a combined effort, the UNODC and the Colombian 
Government present the annual Colombian Coca Survey.  
 
Before 2000 Colombian LEAs routinely gave an account of results in the form of 
statistics in their own publications (e.g. the Navy Magazine: Revista Armada and the 
Colombian Police Magazine), as well as reporting statistics as press releases, 
highlighting the effectivity of the LEAs and the results of the different approaches, in 
which interdiction and drug seizures have been central. The UNODC started 
publishing the WDR in 1997, compiling and analysing illicit drug market trends. 
Estimates of drug traffic using maritime routes have focused not only on the different 
transport routes, but also have aimed to provide a high level of accuracy on the 
amounts of illicit drugs transported e.g. by providing the amounts of illicit drugs 
departing from the Pacific or Caribbean shores. In 2004, the Colombian Navy 
considered that 72% of the cocaine was transported using maritime routes sailing from 
the Colombian Pacific coast, while 27% travelled from the Colombian Caribbean 
coast. The Colombian Navy asserted that it was the ‘national institution that captured 




The data presented by the UNODC since 1997 in the WDR relies on the responses to 
questionnaires submitted to state members of the United Nations. The Colombian 
government has attempted to centralize the statistics on the different stages of the drug 
market since the 2000s. Since 2001 the Colombian Observatory on Drugs, an office of 
the Ministry of Justice, is in charge of compiling and presenting data from the different 
enforcement agencies and of publishing the available results of the different stages of 
the drug market. Both can be considered as attempts to respond to a demand for 
numbers to be used as policy tools, and as efforts to clearly fix what is in essence 
mobile - the flows of illicit drugs (Van Schendel, 2005). 
 
Statistics, numbers and figures then play an important role in the WoD. Additionally, 
there is clearly a demand for numbers in different forms for both global views of the 
phenomena and for the evaluation of institutional and individual efficiency. Statistics 
are thus key from the policy point of view. Despite the criticisms mentioned earlier 
statistics provide some information about the scale of certain phenomena, and are used 
as a rationale for action (Reuter & Greenfield, 2001). In what follows I will highlight 
some of the most important statistics regarding the drug market in Colombia. My 
intention is to accentuate, as is elegantly pointed out by Reuter & Greenfield (2001), 
the ‘scale’ of the phenomenon.  
 
The extent of the coca plants farming and the potential production of cocaine are key 
figures for measuring the results of eradication practices and, indirectly, of interdiction 
efforts. In this sense, providing accurate measures of coca farming is central in 
discussing not only the prevalence of coca plants in particular areas or countries, but 
also these measures are used to evaluate specific efforts at different levels, such as the 
effectivity of aerial fumigation versus manual eradication. Different measuring 
methodologies and interests produce different figures. While Colombian data are 
presented in the white book based on SIMCI reports as an official measurement, the 
U.S. government relies on the U.S. Department of State figures. There are often 
significant differences between them. Figure 1 shows the comparison of the 
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measurement of coca plantations between 2010 and 2013 made both by SIMCI and by 
the U.S. Department of State.  
 
As result of this difference in data, there are also different versions of the amount of 
coca fields and various figures regarding the potential production of cocaine. As 
mentioned earlier, the potential production of cocaine is the amount that could be 
produced if every coca leave planted were to be harvested and transformed in pure 
cocaine, that is to say cocaine at 100 percent of purity, despite the fact that no such 
market exists and the purity of the cocaine depends of several factors, among them, 
expertise of the cook, plantation techniques, local soil, etc. The potential production of 
cocaine is utilized to make comparisons between the cocaine entering the illicit market 
and the seizures of cocaine. As presented in the Figure 2 the values of potential 
production are also radically different between the ones produced by the SIMCI in 
Colombia and those of the U.S. Department of State.  
 
 
Figure 1. Coca field hectares in Colombia. Comparison between SIMCI and U.S. 
Department of State measurements; 2005-2011. 
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Figure 2. Comparison between SIMCI and U.S Department of State measurements; potential 
production of cocaine, tons, 2005-2011. 
Source: Author with data from SIMCI and U.S. Department of State. 
Interestingly, the values of farming and potential production are inverted. While 
according to the U.S. State Department data there are more cultivations of coca plants, 
the potential production of cocaine is higher for SIMCI, even if there are considerably 
less8 coca plantations. Those figures are even more relevant when taken as the 
backdrop to measure effectivity of interdiction practices. On the one hand, Mejia 
(2016, p. 10)  affirms that ‘since 2000, 1,842 metric tons of cocaine have been seized, 
with an average seizure rate of 27 percent of potential cocaine production’. The Office 
of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) of the U.S. Government, on the other hand, 
calculated that the cocaine ‘available to depart’ as a result of the estimated amount of 
cocaine available for export after deducting local consumption and seizures. The 
ONDCP also attempts to present a detailed overview of the flows of cocaine to the 
                                                          
8 Apart from the methodological difficulties of measuring illicit market, after reviewing data on 
production, potential production and interdiction, several observations are to be made. Reports often 
round up the measurement without clear indication of the methodology employed for such 
measurements. While carrying out fieldwork in a Colombian institution, I was able to observe how 
officials in the practice of compiling data, that far from the result of a standardized process, it is up to 
the official to decide how the round up will be performed, and sometimes with brief discussion with 
colleagues. Official reports claiming use of the same sources often vary in the presentation of the 
measurements, and most importantly, official reports within the same institutions often present 
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U.S., without offering a detailed methodology of how those estimates are compiled. 
During my fieldwork, Colombian Navy and Antinarcotic officials often referred to 
potential production of cocaine in order to compare their performance in front of other 
Colombian LEAs or the U.S. LEAs. In short, measurements and estimates are utilized 
as an evidence of a problem to be solved and also as a confirmation of its successful 
resolution. Figures produced around illicit flows are in most cases guesstimates of a 
process that is not only difficult to see, but also one that actively attempts to hide from 
the gaze of the state.  
 
In what follows, in order to highlight the scale of the problem, I present some figures 
produced by multilateral agencies and the Colombian government regarding 
production and seizure of cocaine. These measurements are not without any of the 
problems mentioned earlier, such as several agencies applying different methodologies 
in order to provide measurements, and the adjustments of those methodologies, for 
example, SIMCI including guesstimates of small plots to their measurements since 
2010 9. Seizure data, however, present several problems. The collection of data is 
usually carried out by NCOs without proper training in basic statistics.10 LEAs put 
little effort in discriminating seizures as outcomes of interagency operations, and as 
result double counts are inevitable. Rounding up figures is a common occurrence, 
without a clear indication of how that process may/will impact the ending figures.  
 
Since 2001 data about coca cultivation in Colombia has been produced by the Sistema 
Integrado de Monitorio de Cultivos Illicitos, SIMCI (Integrated Illicit Crops 
Monitoring System) a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) project. 
Before 2001 data about coca crops was mainly produced by the Department of Justice 
and National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC) and The 
                                                          
9 SIMCI use satellite photos complemented with fieldwork and interviews in farming areas. Photos are 
usually affected by cloudiness and farmers strategies to hide coca fields, and are less reliable in 
capturing small plots.  




Department of State of the U.S. Government, or the United States General Accounting 
Office. Since the early 2000s data from SIMCI was officially accepted by Colombian 
LEAs and is currently in use, although the Colombian Police continue to use ONDCP 
or NNICC data. Later in 2008, the Uribe government was disagreed with 2008 results 
that showed a growth of 27 percent of coca fields compared to 2007. The government 
attempted to replace SIMCI data and sought to hire a private firm for this task (El 
Tiempo, 2008a)11.  
 
Figure 3 presents an overview of the amount of coca cultivations in Colombia from 
1992 until 2015. The graphs show an increase in cultivation since the early 1990s with 
a peak at the turn of the century, followed by a decline of hectares of coca plants in 
Colombia, and again a relatively mild increase in 2014. 
 
According to the 2015 WDR, the cocaine that is moved from the Andean countries of 
South America to North America travels with the familiar routes of the Caribbean and 
the Pacific, while the illicit cocaine route to Europe travels via the Atlantic or via 
Africa. In both cases a variety of means of transportation are used. As interpreted from 
annual seizures, maritime transport is considered to be the main means of transporting 
large amounts of cocaine. According to the report this form of transportation accounts 
for more than 50 percent of the seizures of cocaine, followed by air transport method, 
which is used for moving both large amounts of the product, and increasingly in order 
to transport small quantities, on average 6 kg for the period of 2009-2014. Cocaine 
seizures remained stable between 2012 (687 tons) and 2013 (684 tons). The biggest 
seizures of cocaine occurred en route from South America to North America or Europe 
(UNODC, 2015).  
                                                          




Figure 3. Coca plant field in Colombia, hectares, 1992-2015, Source: 1992-1998 U.S 
Department of State, 1999-2015 SIMCI. 
Source: Author with data from SIMCI. 
Figure 4 summarizes the amount of cocaine (pasta and salts) seized by the Colombian 
LEAs between 1994 and 2014. Seizures of cocaine reported by Colombian LEAs are 
relatively stable since 2004. As highlighted in Chapter 6, the maritime agreement 













































































































above, resources from the Plan Colombia were available since in 2000. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the amount of cocaine reported by the Colombian Navy as result of 
interdiction operations. The data reported by the Navy clearly demonstrates the 
increase of participation of the Navy in terms of percentage of cocaine seizure. While 
in 1994 the percentage of seizures was approximately 2%, between 1999 and 2014 the 
average participation of the Colombian Navy was of approximately 40% of the total 
seizures. In 2001 the Navy was able to seize up to 62% of the total cocaine seized in 
the country. This figure is, nevertheless, a result of a total decrease of seizures in the 
country to 75,087kg of which the Navy seized 46,610kg. It is the lowest amount seized 
between 2000 and 2014. In 2014 the Colombian Navy reported 105 ‘events’ or 
successful interdiction operations, leading to the interdiction of forty one go-fast boats, 





Figure 4. Seizure of Cocaine, pasta base and salts reported by Colombian LEAs 1994-2014. 





Figure 5. Seizure of cocaine, pasta base and salt by the Colombian Navy 1994-2014. Kilos. 
Source: Author with data from Armada Nacional de Colombia 1994-2007, ODC 2008, 
Armada Nacional de Colombia 2009-2014. 
Between 1994 and 2014 Colombian LEAs reported the seizure of 3,204 tons of cocaine 
or pasta básica, while in the same period more than two million hectares of coca 
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plantations have been sprayed with glyphosate, 413,000 manually eradicated and 
28,344 coca leaf processing laboratories destroyed (Mejia, 2016).  
 
Some Costs of the War on Drugs  
 
Perhaps the most striking indicator of the cost of the War on Drug in Colombia is 
represented by more than 57,000 Colombians estimated killed between 1994 and 2008 
as a consequence of their involvement in any of the different stages of the drug market, 
counting both deaths a result of vendettas among traffickers and of members of stage 
agencies killed during counter drug operations (Mejia, 2016).  
 
In terms of financial expenditure the Colombian government has also made great 
investments in order to control the flows of illicit drugs, mostly in supporting strategies 
aimed to reduce the supply of illegal drugs. It is not until the second part of 1990s that 
some preliminary analysis of the expenses of Colombia in the WOD was carried out. 
In 1997 López wrote an essay entitled: Costos del Combate a la Producción, 
Comercialización y Consumo de Drogas y a la Violencia generada por el Narcotráfico 
(Expenditure of the Combat on Production, Commercialization and Consumption of 
Drugs and Violence Generated by Drug Trafficking). López undertook archival work 
in an attempt to compile the expenditure of the major agencies in the WoD from 1978 
until 1996. The first official report on the Colombian expenditure on the WoD was in 
in 2002 by the Departamento de Planeacion Nacional-DNP (National Deparment of 
Planning) Comportamiento e Impacto del gasto en la Lucha contra las Drogas:1995-
1999 (Behaviour and Impact of the Expenditure of the Fight Against Drugs: 1995-
1999), which attempted to complement the series presented by Lopez, together with a 
methodology to calculate the expenses of the Colombian state in the WoD, to be used 
in subsequent reports.  
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Those initial studies show the difficulties of assessing the expenditure in absence of 
specialized data bases of the agencies involved. López (1997) found little evidence of 
centralized accounting regarding expenditure in the WoD, as well as a lack of 
consistency in the data bases. He pointed out that in many cases it was to the discretion 
of the person in charge of the accounting department to provide a review of the 
expenditures. Both studies under discussion point out the absence of clear categories 
for the accountability of expenses. In the case of the military, many of the costs 
accounted for both interdiction operations and counterinsurgency operations, as they 
were assumed to be the same by the military.  
 
Taking into account the caveats mentioned above, the reports by Lopez (1997) and the 
DNP (2002, 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2012) provide an overview of the expenses of the 
Colombian State on the WoD. Supply control strategies accumulate the biggest 
proportion of the total budget in the WoD between 1979 and 2010. While during the 
1980s the Colombian expenditure in the WoD was concentrated in supply reduction 
efforts, aspersion, interdiction and dismantling smugglers’ organisations, since 1990 
the efforts diversify to cover other approaches and fighting different aspects of the 
drug market chain from production to consumption, and to mitigate the impacts of 
drug traffic, such as environmental aspects and an impact of trafficking on local 
communities. The expenditure of the Colombian state in the WoD between 1995-2004 
was devoted to five different approaches in which reduction of supply accounted for 
the 54.4% of the expenditure, institutional and judicial strengthening for 30.5%, 
alternative development for 10%, demand reduction for 4.4%, environmental impact 
reduction for 0.7% and 0.5% for international collaboration.  
 
A similar distribution of the budget continues for the period of 2005-2006. 55.6% was 
spent on supply reduction efforts, 19.45% on institutional and judicial efforts, 15% on 
alternative development, 3.05% on demand reduction and there was an increase on 
environmental impact reduction, which accounted for the 5.9% of the total budget 
(Alvarado, 2008). The percentages of the total expenditure of the Colombian State for 
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the period of 2007-2008 suggest a clear focus on supply control efforts. During this 
period the increase in expenditure of the military was driven by investments made by 
the military, especially the Army and Air Force, on transport and communications 
systems (Altamar Consuegra, Baquero Quevedo, Hernández Reyes, & Parra González, 
2009). The expenditure on supply reduction efforts increased from almost 10% to 
64.1% of the total budget. 23.87% was destined to institutional and judicial efforts, 
while the other components of the overall strategy were diminished percentagewise, 
e.g. 8.86% for alternative development, 2.5% for demand reduction and 0.83% and 
0.015% for international relationships and environmental issues.  
 
The most recent reports of the Colombian expenditure in the WoD covers the period 
2009-2010. In relation with the six broad strategies of the Colombian government for 
the control of illicit drugs the percentages of the total expenditure are similar to the 
previous period, with a 2% increase in the efforts to tackle supply of drugs, which 
constituted 66.2% of the total budget. Institutional and judicial efforts composed 
23.2% of the budget expenses, 5.6% were expended on the alternative development 
strategy, and further 4.4% were invested in demand reduction (Departamento Nacional 
de Planeacion, 2012; Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2011).  
 
In summary, the Colombian government spent 2.4 billion USD 12 between 1978 and 
1999 on efforts to curfew the production and transport of illicit drugs. These figures 
increased and stabilized after 2000 with the beginning of the Plan Colombia. There are 
three clearly distinguishable periods in re Colombian expenditure on the WoD, (1) a 
period between 1978 and 1989, in which the expenditure is sustained under 100.000 
Colombian pesos annually and less than 0.15% in relation to the Colombian GDP; (2) 
between 1990 and 1999 with an increase in the expenditure but with a high variability 
in subsequent years, and an increase in the percentage up to 0.40% in relation with the 
GDP; (3) as a result of the Plan Colombia from 2000 to 2004 a stabilization of the 
                                                          
12 As in 1999 currency.  
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expenditure can be observed, and then a new increase in the expenditure is noted again 
from 2005, yet a decrease follows in terms of the GDP percentage with an average 
around 0.31%.  
 
Supply Control Expenditure: The Rising Budget of the Colombian Navy  
 
As indicated previously, the biggest proportion of resources of the Colombian state 
spent on the WoD between 1978 and 2010 were destined to efforts at reducing the 
supply of illicit drugs, in which the LEAs and the military played the main role. Of the 
total expenditure between 1995 and 1999, approximately 58.2% were destined to 
reduction of supply of illicit drugs, of which the military and Police expended 77.86%.  
 
Due to the 2005 DNP report it is possible to distinguish military expenditure in the 
WoD between 1995 and 2004, both as a total and separately (Alvarado & Lahuerta 
Percipiano, 2005). According to this document, the Air Force account for the biggest 
amount of expenditure, followed by the Navy (Figure 6). In 2008 a DNP report 
summarized the expenditure of the Colombian government between 1978 and 2006. It 
shows the continuous growth, going from 200.000 million pesos to 13.3 billion 
Colombian pesos13(Alvarado, 2008).  
 
                                                          




Figure 6. Percentage of expenditure by Military and LEAs in supply reduction efforts 1995-
2004 
Source: Author with data from DNP. 
 
In total, during the period of 2005-2006 86.4% of the budget expended on supply 
reduction policies consisted of: aspersion of illicit crops, manual eradication, 
interdiction of illicit drugs and chemicals used in their manufacture, prosecution of 
drug smugglers, as well as dismantling infrastructure used to produce and transport 
illicit drugs. This percentage accounts for 643.538 million Colombian pesos that went 
to the Military and another 69.889 million for the Colombian Police. Concerning the 
military expenditure, the Colombian Navy accounts for the biggest percentage 
destined to control the supply efforts, representing 46.75% (26% of the total budget), 
while the Air Force expenditure accounts for 33.8% (19.5% of the total), Antinarcotic 
Police makes up further 8.75% (4.5% of the total), the Army forms 5.35% (3.1% of 
the total), and the general attorney office and a multitude of state agencies involved in 
supply reduction efforts account for the final 5% (Alvarado, 2008).  
 
Resources invested in the military were mainly destined for the Navy and the Air 
Force, and mainly for interdiction efforts. For the period of 2007-2008 the Navy 









31.85% of the expenses are used for the supply reduction government efforts, 
Antinarcotic Police accounts for 22.3%, the Air Force makes up 22.15%, and the Army 
boasts 8.75% (Altamar Consuegra et al., 2009). For the 2009 and 2010 period the Navy 
consolidates as the agency with the highest expenses both as a percentage of the total 
invested in the WoD and as the percentage of the supply control strategy, with an 
increase of almost 20% in relation to the total expenses of military, and LEAs with 




Figure 7. Percentage of expenditure by Military and LEAs in supply reduction efforts 2005-
2010 
Source: Author with data from DNP. 
 
The percentages of the 2005-2010 period are summarized in Figure 7, this figure shows 
the increase of the importance of the Navy in terms of expenditure both in procurement 
and operating expenses.  
 
In summary, between 1995 and 2010 1.2 billon Colombian pesos (64.2%) of the total 
expenditure of the Colombian government in the WoD was used on strategies aimed 










with 0.4 billon Colombian pesos (25.7%), alternative development with 0.1 billons 
(5.5%) and reduction of demand with 0.08 billons (4.1%). Consistent with their 
increased participation in the WoD, the expenditure of the Navy accounts for 53.4% 
of the 1995 - 2010 budget on the security and defence entry concerning supply control 
strategies.  
 
The evidence presented in this chapter shows the persistence of the illicit drug business 
in Colombia. One of the main features is the involvement of Colombians in the 
different stages of the drug business, from couriers in the sixties and early seventies to 
leading producers and exporters in the seventies. The growth of the illicit drug business 
in Colombia, was possible, according to Thoumi (2005a) due to the existence of a set 
of structural weaknesses, high levels of corruption and high disregard for the law. 
Several policies have been put in place to control the production and flows of illicit 
drugs. Since the early eighties, the militarization of the WoD has increased, and with 
the Plan Colombia, that meant the merge of counter-terrorism activities and counter-
drug activities, the Colombian government has grown. Based on the quantification of 
drug traffic the Colombian Government has produced readings of the mobility and 
strategies of drug smugglers. According to this smugglers stopped using aerial routes, 
and that since the nineties the foremost strategy used by smugglers was maritime 
routes and methods, and that those groups are highly ingenious. The mobilization of 
this particular reading was instrumental in the increase of the budget of the Navy, and 









Chapter 4. Moving Illicit Drugs in the Sea 
 
 
Illicit drugs are moved from producers to consumer countries, but with minimal 
exceptions (Caulkins et al., 2009; Decker & Townsend Chapman, 2008), few have 
considered the role played by the set of artefacts that are used by smugglers to transport 
illicit drugs, nor the consequences of the entanglement of these illicit flows with legal 
trade (Martin, 2015). As implied by illicit drug seizures, Colombian smugglers use 
both the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean as the spaces in which those flows are 
moved, that is to say, the same spaces where legitimate commerce is moved. These 
spaces are then the scenario of ‘dispersed and heterogeneous flows of different 
categories of peoples and objects' (Urry, 2007) all of them targets of state control. This 
entanglement more and more defines the logics of border control aimed at regulating 
or stopping networks and flows criss-crossing porous borders (Hannam, Sheller, & 
Urry, 2006; Urry, 2000). 
 
As pointed out in chapter 1, the history of drug trafficking has been narrated to stress 
the organisational arrangements of drug smugglers. And it is characteristically a 
generational story in which complete new structural arrangements replace the previous 
one. A brief, standard history of Colombian drug smugglers would be one in which 
the demise of the ‘cartels’, democratized the drug industry giving space for the entry 
of new players, often organised as networks (e.g. Thoumi, 2014). The set of 
characteristics of that new structural arrangement, cell-like structures of smuggler 
groups, the flatness of their decision making, are said to explain the advantages of 
smugglers over hierarchical state structures and state agents (e.g. Kenney, 2007). In 
the same fashion, the story of drug transport methods is narrated in stages, in which 
air transport methods were thwarted and replaced by maritime transport methods. One 
of the main arguments of this thesis is that those portrayals of the drug market can lead 
to an oversimplification of the interdiction/evasion binary. As such I argue that the 
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binary opposition is an oversimplification, in which opposition hides complex, non-
dichotomous, and non-hierarchical relations. Those simplifications goes hand in hand 
with the efforts of the state agencies to reduce uncertainty about enemies’ strategies 
and strategies and displaying success, and in general those accounts place the process 
of innovation as a result of interdiction actions. To understand the thinking of the LEAs 
regarding innovation practices of the smugglers is key to delve into the production of 
images of the enemy. The reproduction of those images helps both, to navigate 
uncertainty and to promote discourses of control (Gootenberg, 2005, 2009). They are 
the result of the collusion of localized views, statistics as result of drug seizures, the 
blinders of intelligence gathering, competition with the rhetoric of other LEAs, myth-
making and media sensationalism. 
 
As my study of the narcosubs in the next chapter will show, those accounts of the 
process of smugglers’ innovation, based on the idea of interdiction as the main driver 
of that innovation, cannot explain the process of micro innovation present in the 
technologies used by drug smugglers for transporting drugs, and do not take into 
account changes in the competing smugglers’ techniques. In this thesis I aim to show 
that interdiction efforts can account for some initial motivation, but interdiction of 
transport methods does not deter smugglers from continuing to use them, nor does it 
explain why some smugglers’ innovations appear to pre-empt the developments of the 
other side of the binary. 
 
I argue that the study of the interdiction/evasion binary would benefit from a co-
evolutionary point of view, but stressing the particular dynamics of each side of the 
binary and recognizing that there is more than a fundamental opposition. The 
technologies of drug smugglers and the navy co-evolve, where the adaptive moves of 
each of the players introduces changes in the landscape of its neighbours in the 
ecosystem or technological economy (Kauffman & Macready, 1995). In this sense it 
is also possible to assert that the evolution of one of the players, the state or smugglers, 
is partially dependent on the evolution of other players. I state that the more suitable 
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form of co-evolution that may help explain this relationship is the ‘Red Queen 
hypothesis’, in which the entities are in constant competition with other entities, 
generating constant changes in the ecosystem. 
 
In this chapter, I present an analysis of smugglers’ innovation practices and 
technologies as derived from research with LEAs, (interviews, guided visits to Navy 
bases where artefacts are stored, intelligence documents and media). I also present an 
overview of the maritime transport methods used by smugglers, and emphasise the 
traditional methods of transport, especially those over which the Colombian Coast 
Guard has responsibility. A traditional war is usually a conflict between at least two 
well defined groups. The WoD is not an armed conflict between sovereign states or 
the state against politically geared rebels. It is in fact a conflict that mixes local and 
mundane artefacts with state of the art technological systems. The WoD is waged every 
day, and it occurs in the open sea or coastal waters (as well as in production areas and 
controlling consumption), where the Colombian Navy persecutes go-fast boats, 
trawlers, fisher boats, and small cargo boats in order to seize any small amount of 
cocaine, from a few kilos to several tons.  
 
Ignorance, Uncertainty, Imagination and Images of the Enemy 
 
A way of seeing is also a way of not seeing – a focus upon object A involves a neglect 
of object B. The Burke Theorem.  
 
 
Smugglers carry out their activities in secret. Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and 
the military, also perform most of their activities in secret. Even if both sides undertake 
actions in order to know beforehand the intentions of the other (such as smugglers 
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bribing Navy personnel in order to have access to patrol routes planned by the Navy,14 
and the Navy and LEAs intercepting communications and carrying out intelligence 
operations), it is clear that neither can manage to obtain perfect information about the 
intentions of the other. Therefore, both sides need mechanisms that allow them to make 
sense of the actions of the other, to make sense of how the ‘absence or presence’ of 
certain clues indicates the actions and image of the enemy, and how these can be seen 
as a call to action.  
 
Proctor (2008) points out three different ways in which ignorance is produced or 
maintained: ignorance as a native state (or resource), ignorance as a lost realm (or 
selective choice), and ignorance as deliberately engineered and as a strategic ploy 
(active construct). This last one is of importance for any research dealing with military 
organisations. Secrecy is an active part of any war: ‘The whole point of secrecy in this 
realm is to hide, to feint, to distract, to deny access, and to monopolize information’ 
(Proctor, 2008, p. 19). In this regard, Rappert notes the importance of configurations 
of absence and presence, and how ‘seeing is a way of not seeing because of what gets 
left out of the picture formed’ (Rappert, 2015, p. 10).  
 
In this chapter I deal with the ways images of the enemy are constructed by members 
of the Navy. In the second section I argue that intelligence based operations are a way 
not only to achieve results but to reduce uncertainty of the outcome and in so doing to 
continue reinforcing the previous history of success. Finally, I deal with the different 
forums through which Coasts Guard personnel acquire knowledge in order to face drug 
smugglers. I place emphasise on the Malicia Indigena, a highly localized form of 
knowledge, difficult to codify and translate.  
 
                                                          
14 While carrying out fieldwork two NCOs were sentenced to prison for providing drug smugglers with 
the Navy’s navigation plans.  
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Of Cartels and Others: Creating the Images of the Enemy 
 
I argue that there are at least two different interrelated ways in which the Coast Guard 
personnel construct (see) their image of smuggler ‘organisations’ and smuggler 
artefacts: 1.) By stressing the innovativeness of smuggler organisations, 2.) By the way 
they construct images of smugglers’ forms of organisations. The construction of these 
images plays an important role in the process of innovation in the WoD. They help to 
shape the contours of the ‘unknown’ and allow the Government and its forces to 
formulate responses. These images are an important part of the different plans and 
agreements to fight illicit drugs, and the amalgamation of security and militarisation.  
 
In the previous chapters I have shown several examples of how Coast Guard personnel 
have responded to the discovery of a new method of illicit drug transport, or a new 
strategy or technology. For example, in chapter 7 when it became clear that smugglers 
were using a new set of technologies, GPS, in order to coordinate their activities, this 
understanding allowed Coast Guard personnel to create a set of counter practices, 
buying their own GPS, requesting, capturing, and using them in order to reaffirm their 
identities as a competent enforcement agency, and competent Navy Officers. Using 
this newly acquired knowledge and artefacts and experience, Navy Officers and their 
crews changed their routines and forms of coordination, leading to an increasing sense 
of ‘effective interdiction operation’. But this also highlights that seizing smugglers’ 
artefacts and discovering ‘new’ methods has led the Coast Guards to direct their views 
to particular objects and smugglers’ practices. Following this set of encounters of the 
Coast Guard and smugglers, Coast Guard personnel constructed: 1.) Images of 
smugglers as innovative and ingenious organisations, 2.) Localized patterns of 
smugglers’ actions, and 3.) Long term patterns of smugglers’ actions.  
 
Thus, smugglers are seen as highly reactive ‘organisations’ that are able to quickly 
change and adapt to losses. ‘These organisations will continue changing tactics and 
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strategies every time a vessel is intercepted’ (Lesmes Duque, 2005). The availability 
of cash flow is understood as a key element in allowing this adaptability: ‘I think that 
they adapt quickly because of the availability of the money, sometimes to develop a 
project we can spend up to two years, and they can build a semisubmersible in three 
months’ (Interview).  
 
Local views are important in the creation of the image of smugglers as dynamic and 
innovative. For local commanders the discovery of novel methods of drug transport is 
an important moment in their careers, and this may help to accumulate enough 
evidence to create new patterns. These discoveries achieve a double result: they 
characterise smugglers as highly innovative organisations and they enable the Coast 
Guards to show abilities to thwart these highly ingenious methods and gain prestige as 
a result. For example, a local commander shared his view about discovering a ‘new’ 
method, a parasitical device that scuba divers attach to cargo ships below the water 
level:  
 
Take this modality…the tubes…it was first highlighted by the Cartagena 
Base…I was working on that case…intelligence information…and my work 
here…I knew they were working towards this…but when I finally found 
them…it was like finding the Rosetta Stone…because the first one we caught 
was a PVC tube…and then we found these…so…you can appreciate the 
evolution…from the first one we caught…and in less than half a year…you 
can see the evolution. (Interview). 
 
A second commander referred to the use of fishing boats as the main transport method 
(he had recently captured one, a canoe with a 250hp motor), and stressed the use of 
these vessels as the preferred method for smuggling, which includes a complex logistic 
of transhipments and oil refuelling in the open sea. A third commander in a different 
area believes that subaquatic transport methods might be the main threat: ‘The 
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consideration that I made is that…the dynamics…in this moment are the subaquatic 
methods…so…we have to try to raise the percentage (of drug seizures) that we have 
in aquatic methods’ (Interview). 
 
Observing smugglers’ artefacts is not necessarily a clear cut process. In the early 
1990s, when the efforts of the Navy concentrated on stopping drug smuggling using 
maritime routes by thwarting fishing boats and go-fast boats, the discovery of early 
narcosubs was not initially associated with drug smuggling. A commander recalls the 
Navy’s initial encounters with narcosubs: ‘In that time, we caught two, one in the 
Tayrona area and the other on Providencia Island. The thing is that, there was no Coast 
Guard, so the smugglers used to do their things in plain sight, but in that time, no one 
knew what those artefacts were! Who was using them and for what? That is something 
we didn’t know then, we couldn’t make it up, later we found out’ (Interview, my 
emphasis).15  
 
Local views are important because they are a part of assembling the Navy’s opinion 
on how to tackle smugglers. Locality then plays an important role in how Coast Guard 
Commanders perceive the dynamics of smuggling methods. Local relationships and 
the local context further cement these visions.  
 
As an overall guide for their actions the Coast Guard updates the main ‘threats’ 
associated with particular regions. That is to say, based on their experience of years of 
interdiction, their interpretation of the behaviour of the sea and navigability factors, 
and the ‘history’ of routes used by smugglers, the Coast Guard often present their 
interpretation of smugglers actions and capacities, and are able to match areas, 
strategies, and smugglers’ transport methods: ‘We had established some 
                                                          
15 This story reassembles several other narrated by antinarcotic police personnel in which smugglers 
were able to carry out their business in plain sight, because police personnel were not even aware of 
what the cocaine was or how it was transported.  
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differences…so…they don’t commit their crimes in the same way from the Central 
Pacific Coast to the South Pacific Coast…than they do from the Central Pacific Coast 
to the North’. The consolidation of these events, is represented graphically on maps 
(Map 1), and via images that represent the evolution of smugglers artefacts (Figure 8) 
and statistics (Figure 9) together with the experience gained by of the local commanders 
and their ‘discoveries’ and perceptions of drug smuggling methods.  
 
 
Map 1. Size and geographical localization of cocaine seizures in the Caribbean and the 





Figure 8. The evolution of smuggler artefacts according to the Navy. 
Source: III Seminar of Good Practices with Emphasis on the Control of Ports and Airports 
Against World Drug Problems, Colombia-Africa. Ceded to the author by the Navy. 
 
 
Figure 9. Seizures of cocaine between 2006 and 2013 by the Colombian Navy. 
Source: III Seminar of Good Practices with Emphasis on the Control of Ports and Airports 
Against World Drug Problems, Colombia-Africa. Ceded to researcher by the Navy. 
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In dealing with the presence and absence of information about smuggler artefacts two 
different versions of the direction of the pattern are presented, one establishing a 
‘cyclic’ version of smugglers’ uses of artefacts. In a visit to the yard of drug smuggler 
artefacts, the commander of the base, pointed out several recently captured vessels: 
 
Look what I have showed to you…the common fishing boat…look…they’re 
using them again…twenty years later…and they continue with the 
basics…yes, a lot of stuff has changed…and yes…they have changed the 
semisubmersibles…and yes…they have used go fast boats with, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
engines…but they…let me tell you…they change…but they always go back to 
the basics (Interview) 
 
This version has been represented graphically:  
 
 
Figure 10. Representation of smugglers evolution, 
Source: power point slide presented by a commander in a regional forum. 
 
The second pattern is the already mentioned idea that ‘smugglers’ always innovate and 
follow 1.) Clear trajectories of innovation and/or 2.) Are able to exploit different 
methods of transport. Based on the history of drug trafficking routes and seizures, 
LEAs reconstruct and project smuggler behaviour. This behaviour often appears as 
impersonal and is referred to as the ‘behaviour of routes’. The construction of these 
patterns allows the LEAs to diminish the uncertainty of their tasks. Using these images, 
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Coast Guard personnel develop their goals and set priorities for their targets. 
Centralized interpretations of smugglers’ actions interplay with both localized views 
of the phenomenon and the incentives set for the Coast Guards to perform their jobs. 
The different versions that appear as a result of what is seen and what is not seen are 
often complemented with versions of who the enemy is.  
 
Who is the Enemy? 
 
Illicit drug trafficking and drug traffickers are both highly mediatized and highly 
politicized phenomena. On the one hand, we have a continuous portrayal of drug 
smugglers as highly rational, hierarchical, overly powerful structures. This idea is 
summarized in the prevalent use of the words ‘cartel’ or ‘mafia’ in order to refer to 
any group of people involved in drug smuggling, or even the contradictory terms of 
‘mini-cartel’, ‘cartelitos’ or ‘baby cartels’ (e.g. Sullivan & Bunker, 2002; Thoumi, 
2014). On the other hand, the central government and the military have highlighted the 
political dimensions of drug smuggling by directly linking Colombian guerrilla groups 
to drug trafficking. For example, the FARC are said to be the biggest drug dealers in 
the country (El Tiempo, 2001b), although this allegation is constantly denied by the 
leaders of the guerrilla movement. The relationship of this multitude of players and 
non-state actors with the illicit production and transport of drugs (guerrillas, left wings 
paramilitary groups, and multiple smugglers groups) may explain the high levels of 
violence in this illicit business, especially when territorial control is at stake.  
 
Interpretations of drug smuggling activities as carried out by cartels in which a small 
group, often a handful of individuals, controls all the stages of the production, 
transport, and distribution of drugs leads to the formulation of policies and strategies 
that target cartel leaders (famously Pablo Escobar) and the creation of specialized units 
to carry out such operations. Most famous was the ‘Search Block’, a police unit in 
charge of coordinating all the efforts to bring down the heads of both the ‘Medellin 
Cartel’ and ‘Cali Cartel’ (de Francisco, 2005). This interpretation has also been used 
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in the explanations of drug trafficking by Mexican organisations, with authors 
proposing a continuum from Colombian to Mexican cartels (e.g. Bagley, 2011) 
 
State agencies have also described the FARC as a ‘cartel’, with a clear example of that 
being the Minister of Defence stating that the rebel group was involved in all levels of 
the drug trade (Siglo, 2012), and that they have close ties with other cartels, such as 
the Mexican cartels. Academic articles also claim that the FARC have filled the void 
left by the demise of the cartels (e.g. Tickner, 2004).  
 
This view of the FARC as cartels has been contested (Duncan, 2006). The involvement 
of the Guerrillas is more often understood as a symbiotic alliance with drug traffickers 
(e.g. Bibes, 2001) in which producers and traffickers are allowed to benefit from 
FARC security, while the FARC receive a percentage of the earnings. Mejia and Rico 
(2010) point out that the FARC may be involved in buying pasta basica de coca, or 
buying and selling cocaine to smugglers, who then transport it to consumer countries.  
 
In order to defeat the ‘narcoterrorism’ threat, as the merging of guerrillas and drug 
smuggling was labelled, both the Colombian and U.S. Governments implemented a 
policy known as the ‘Plan Colombia’. This plan in practice blurred the lines between 
drug trafficking and guerrillas (Otis, 2014; Tickner, 2004). The aid provided by the 
U.S. Government focused on military expenditure, which made up 80% of the total 
budget. The ‘Plan Colombia’ helped to consolidate the role of the military in the WoD. 
 
Definitions and reinterpretations of who the enemy is matter, they matter because they 
serve as the knowledge base used by policy makers, LEAs, and the military in order 
to develop their strategies. As seen, definitions of the drug market as controlled by a 
‘cartel’ was (is) used as a rationale to hunt the leaders of such groups, while the 
merging of leftist guerrillas, considered terrorist groups, and branded as 
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‘narcoterrorists’, allowed the establishment of a counter insurgence/counter drug 
program in which the military forces took the lead. The Colombian Navy adopted the 
label ‘narcoterrorism’ in their official documents (Armada República de Colombia, 
2003, 2007b), but it is possible to find a broader characterization of the enemy, which 
is associated with the local view of Coast Guard personnel. Smugglers in the eyes of 
the Navy are ‘cartels’, ‘specialized structures’, or ‘bandits’. They are smugglers that 
possess organisational structure and are able to assemble fleets on their own, a ‘fleet’ 
of narcosubs, a ‘fleet’ of go-fast boats, a ‘fleet of refuelled boats’. 
 
Formal Knowledge, Informal Forums, and the Malicia Indigena 
 
The Coast Guard carries out maritime interdiction operations in both brown waters 
(Territorial Seas) and blue waters (Economic Exclusive Zones). While most of the 
operations are carried out solely using Coast Guard capacities, some operations require 
collaboration with other branches of the Navy, other branches of the military, and 
LEAs. Carrying out operations in different spaces and in collaboration with multiple 
players means that the Coast Guard unit needs to possess and acquire knowledge: 
knowledge on how to plan and carry out an operation, knowledge on who the ‘enemy’ 
is, and knowledge on how to collaborate with other players.  
 
Illegal drugs are moved from producer to consumer countries, and they are moved 
from production centres to shipment points. This often involves further movements to 
complete the journey from ‘south to north’ (Gootenberg, 2012). In moving illicit drugs, 
smugglers acquire knowledge of logistical networks, what Martin (2012, p. 363) calls 
‘extra-logistical knowledge’ or forms of knowledge and expertise ‘that are developed 
(as a result of being excluded from legitimated corporeal flows) in order to appropriate 
and utilise the interconnectivity of commodity flows’ (original emphasis). Drug 
smugglers may also appropriate this knowledge through their structural and social 
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embeddedness in drug smuggler networks (Van de Henk & Zaitch, 2014) as they take 
advantage of existing social ties. 
 
Drug smuggling has built on continuities of the knowledge acquired during decades of 
smuggling, evolving from marihuana and illegal goods to the most recent forms of 
smuggling (López Restrepo & Camacho Guizado, 2007). One important component 
of this is the traditional knowledge of the sea and the use of traditional smuggling and 
fishing routes in the north of the Colombian Caribbean. A retired drug smuggler, when 
talking about the transition between marihuana smuggling and cocaine traffic, 
explained: ‘There was a lot of people who moved from smuggling illegal goods, the 
old guys, they had to, they had everything and they had the routes, the ships’ 
(Interview).  
 
The process of the military and LEAs acquiring knowledge is subject to a variety of 
limitations: changes in the chain of command, the influx of new personnel, 
promotions, early retirements, the introduction of new practices and strategies, new 
collaboration agreements with other LEAs, and perceptions of new threats and 
smugglers’ artefacts. This complex panorama implies that training personnel in 
counter drug operations, and at the same time maintaining relationships of 
collaboration with other agencies, requires the constant updating of one’s knowledge 
of the different processes of the institutions: communications, methods of detections, 
intelligence, new technologies, new artefacts, as well as new adaptations, practices, 
and ‘knowledge’ of the enemy.  
 
As mentioned, the Colombian Navy participated in counter drug operations during the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s using traditional military 
vessels (frigates), which provided knowledge about ‘corridors’ and smugglers’ 
practices. Early operations of the Coast Guard Unit were marked by a learning-by-
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doing approach to the operations, as a Coast Guard base commander, who entered the 
Coast Guard Unit as a fresh lieutenant, narrates: 
 
Those who initiated this…let’s say eighteen, seventeen years ago we did it for 
art’s sake, later we changed our way of thinking. Nowadays…we don’t do 
it…so much for art’s sake…they used to just to say to us…you and you go 
there…I remember one day, I left Puerto Bolivar16…and when I realized I was 
almost at the border with the Dominican Republic (laughs)…in one of those 
boat that I tell you…were really unstable…you end up doing interdictions far 
away…on the border with the Dominic Republic…250 miles from Puerto 
Bolivar. (Interview). 
 
In going to the field with formal training in interdiction and inspection operations, 
officers possess an initial sense of the local threats, which complements the experience 
of other officers and NCOs. When that knowledge is shared officers are provided with 
a ‘better’ understanding of the local area that enables them to perform their duties. 
Officers that combine this sophisticated local knowledge/training are able to develop 
a set of routines that allows them to ‘know’ when a boat or vessel is carrying drugs 
and to order an inspection operation, minimizing the risk of being considered unlawful 
by people in the area, and generating a sense of accuracy among the Navy. Being in 
the field allows officers to gain from the knowledge acquired from NCO’s and other 
officials, and to develop knowledge about the knowledge and resources of the Navy 
and to create a vision of the threats. In other words, they become ‘experts’ on 
interdiction operations.  
 
                                                          
16 A port on the northern Colombian Caribbean Coast.  
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Formal Knowledge, Capturing Local Knowledge  
 
Training officers and NCOs in maritime interdiction operations is highly important for 
the Coast Guard. The first attempt to formalize knowledge about MIOs, again, came 
from the U.S Government in 1995 when Colombian Navy personnel received training 
from the U.S. Customs Service on how to use the Dolphin in operations. Nearly 20 
years later, in 2014 the Colombian Coast Guard led the XII international course on 
maritime interdiction. In this course Colombian officers and NCOs trained officers and 
NCOs from other countries about the different strategies, tools, and methods of 
maritime interdiction. 
 
This training course was both a way to formalize the knowledge gained by the Coast 
Guards, and to professionalize the role of the Coast Guard as an able player in 
counterdrug operations, establishing the prestige of the Colombian Navy as a role 
model for drug interdiction practices in the region. Thus, according to interviewees:  
 
Today we are training other Centre America and South America countries, 
even the U.S. is sending people to be trained about interdiction here. 
(Interview).  
 
At the regional level…the Colombian Navy…is now a reference in the fight 
against illicit drugs…we have the school in Cartagena…and we provide 
teaching capacities to the countries in the region…even countries from 
Africa…even the Americans…fifteen years ago, the Americans came here and 
taught me: do this, do that, this is an interdiction operation…now I teach them 
how it is done…because the experience, the day to day experiences have given 
us that. (Interview, original emphasis).   
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We have the Coast Guard School…and until now…24 countries from the 
region have come…even some from Africa…149 students from other 
countries…there have been some Colombians…but 80% have been 
foreign…and what’s the benefit from that? Well that you go today to Costa 
Rica, to the Dominican Republic, to Honduras, to Panama, to any of those 
countries…and we talk the same ‘language’…the same operational 
language…that we have developed here...in the Colombian Navy. (Interview). 
 
Our experience…has lead us to develop our own strategies, our own 
tactics…and the countries in the region, who work in the same operational 
theatre…have decided to take advantage of our learned lessons.(Interview).  
 
This course then also allows for the standardization of practices needed for inter-
agency operations. The chief of operations of the Coast Guard explained how training 
personnel from different countries has an impact on developing interdiction 
operations: 
 
And Colombia took over the banner…and that’s why…you go and see…those 
students from the (different) Navies…and we speak the same language…you 
go to a Maritime Coast Guard Operation…and you meet with them on the 
sea…and today we speak the same language…and for the same language I’m 
talking about…procedural operations, the lexicon we are using…and all of this 
because it is a course where…you work on teaching the proceedings for 
interdiction. (Interview).  
 
One important element of this is a demonstration by the Colombian Coast Guard Unit 
on how to carry out an interdiction operation in which ‘real life’ conditions are 
simulated. This demonstration is performed in the Cartagena Bay where the main 
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building of the Coast Guard is located. It stages the interception of a go-fast boat 
(sailed by Coast Guard personnel acting as narcotraffickers) by Coast Guard rapid 
patrol boats. This demonstration includes the deployment of all possible resources 
available to the Coast Guard, including helicopter and frigates, and is intended to 
demonstrate the tactics used to chase down smugglers as well as the strategies used by 
‘smugglers’ to evade capture.  
 
An NCO instructor affirms that 80% of the Coast Guard School course is ‘practical’, 
with an emphasis on the transfer of knowledge about tactical manoeuvres in rapid 
reaction units (patrol boats) and operating procedures. The stress placed on the 
practical aspects of MIO is confirmed by the commander of the Caribbean Coast Guard 
who states: ‘We teach what we know how to do well, that is to operate our boats in the 
sea, so they work so they could be efficient and effective’. However, even with this 
emphasis on the ‘practical’ aspects of interdiction, it is acknowledged that the course 
cannot replace the value of learning from everyday experiences:  
 
There are some things that you learn in the School, but there’s nothing like the 
everyday practice (…) a lieutenant may arrive with the best attitude, but if he 
doesn’t have the experience, he won’t catch the clues, he won’t be able to catch 
the information that smugglers unknowingly may be providing. (Interview).  
 
During interdiction operations experience may, transitorily, invert rank or seniority. 
Those who possess field experience, even if of lower rank or seniority, may command 
an operation even in the presence of a higher ranking or senior official who has just 




Informal Knowledge, Day to Day Exchanges of Information and 
Experience 
 
Officials also share their knowledge about smuggling practices, interdiction, and boat 
performance in informal forums, as a result of their embeddedness in informal 
networks with other officers or NCOs. This establishes rapport and enables new 
personnel to embed themselves in existing informal networks, thus mitigating potential 
knowledge gaps caused by the frequent changes of personnel.  
 
The researcher observed an example of how knowledge is exchanged when he was 
invited to dine with Navy officers. At a U-shaped table, officers were organised by 
rank, with senior officers occupying the centre of the table and fanning out to lower 
ranking officials. The researcher was invited to take a seat at one of the ends of the 
table. Officers shared their impressions about the performance of a newly acquired 
boat used in the Caribbean for interdiction operations, as well as the performance of 
the boats after local repairs and general updates on local boats.  
 
Day to day interactions also provide moments in which officers and NCOs can share 
experiences. While walking on a Coast Guard base, the local commander stopped to 
talk with other officers and NCOs and to give advice and instructions. During these 
types of informal meetings officers share experiences about training and recent 
operations. The informal forums also allow Navy Officers to update their knowledge 
and to acquire ideas from places and practices outside of their range of action. During 
these informal exchanges, officers do not exchange formal procedures, but rather 
personal experiences and impressions.  
 
Officers also have the opportunity to learn from the orders received from older officers 
on how to conduct MIOs. A regional commander discussed how he explains orders to 
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a local commander: ‘In an operation…I lead the operation…and I tell Lt 1, place a unit 
here, another boat here, a ship here, an airplane, etc., and as soon as it goes…we jump 
on him [referring to the smugglers]’ (Interview). This allows Lt 1 to gain knowledge 
from an experienced officer who some eight years ago was the commander of the same 
base.  
 
Other forms of knowledge are difficult to grasp even when sharing time with 
experienced officers. Some officers recognize that only experience and time can allow 
someone to turn into a ‘Sea Wolf’ to the point of recognizing the ‘behaviour’ of their 
ships only by listening to the engines, and recognize their performance by how it 
vibrates, how it feels.  
 
Informal forums also contribute to the adoption of new technologies and practices, as 
well as new awareness of enemies’ tactics. These opportunities also provide officers 
with a chance to continue reinforcing their prestige as able counterdrug officers.  
 
For the Coast Guard personnel it is important to receive training on how to interdict a 
smuggler’s boat, how to deal with the evidence, and how to comply with international 
norms on the use of firearms. Often a smuggler’s cargo is not in plain sight making it 
difficult to determine if something is actually being smuggled, but as mentioned, 
smugglers have used a wide range of concealing methods. Previous authors have 
explored the rationale used by smugglers when deciding which method to use (Decker 
& Townsend Chapman, 2008), but it is also important to take into account what 
happens when a Coast Guard officer or NCO ‘knows’ a smuggler artefact is carrying 





Local Contingent Knowledge: The Malicia Indigena 
 
Training in counterdrug operations also focuses on detention and boarding. Some 
issues regarding inspection17 of the boats are also part of the training courses. The 
inspection of vessels in the open sea or even on dry land, however, often requires a 
specific ability that is not necessarily transferable, and success is often interpreted as 
a result of being ‘wily’ or having malicia indigena. These inspections are often carried 
out without the help of any tool or detection technology, or where the most advanced 
piece of technology is a drill.  
 
In the case of inspection it is possible to affirm that officers and NCOs display a sort 
of sophisticated local/tacit/contingent knowledge, known by some as malicia 
indigena.18 The concept of tacit knowledge has an important place in STS 
studies(MacKenzie & Spinardi, 1998). Contingent knowledge is distributable and can 
include trivial information specific to a particular environment, highlighting the 
importance of local knowledge that cannot be ‘looked up’ (Fleck, 1997). Scholars from 
the social learning approach have emphasised the importance of local tacit knowledge 
and the difficulties of capturing and disseminating such ‘sticky knowledge’ (Pollock 
& Williams, 2008).  
 
The idea of malicia indigena as a form of knowing has not been widely discussed in 
the academic literature. It can be defined as a ‘local resource, inherited, non-
transferable to other nationalities by means of friendship, marriage, residence in 
                                                          
17 The search of a vessel by the competent authority of the parties for the purpose of checking the 
material, equipment, crew, personnel, and cargo, and verifying that they are not being used for illicit 
activities in accordance with the domestic legislation of each country, conventions, and international 
agreements.  
18 Although none of the officers refer on tape or during the interview to using this concept, after the 
interviews when talking freely, they sometimes use the idea of malicia Indigena to interpret the 
decisions they make. This was corroborated by the Anti-Narcotics Police NCOs who freely speak about 
the need to have malicia indigena as a tool to catch smugglers.  
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Colombia, etc. but susceptible of diminishing if a Colombian national lives long 
periods of time abroad’ (Morales, 1998). The Colombian anthropologist Morales 
traces the concept of malicia indigena to the contact of pre-colombian natives with 
Spanish colonialist. It was established as a defence mechanism in their dealings with 
them. In this sense, malicia indigena is also the capability of feigning ignorance when 
knowing what the other is talking about. Having malicia indigena allows a person to 
read the ‘true’ intentions of the other person. Malicia indigena gives a person who 
possess it the advantage of being able to understand what you would do if you were 
the other in order to take advantage of a situation. For the Coast Guard personnel 
having malicia indigena implies knowing what the other is going to do in order to 
evade state control, imaging how to act as a smuggler would, sharing the codes and 
actions needed to evade being captured, and, at the same time, legitimising having 
such knowledge, not through participation in criminal activities, but through using it 
as a tool to perform their job and outsmart smugglers.  
 
The malicia indigena has become into a national cultural attribute, applied to specific 
local or regional ways of knowing and behaving. The malicia indigena has many 
forms; particular attention is given as a form of resistance and strategy of defence used 
by subordinated in front of the powerful, here the subordinated apparently follows the 
rules imposed from above, but act against them (Ariza, 2013). In this sense, this is 
characteristics of the Colombian poor to find a way around impositions from the 
government and the powerful. However, it can also refer to unconventional and 
sometimes illegal practices, such as cutting in line, cheating on exams, unauthorized 
street vendors, altering utility meters, among others. The malicia indigena fulfils a key 
role in shaping the Individual and social attitudes towards the actions of the others, as 
one of its main features, is not to trust other people intentions. Once considered an 
attribute of the lower classes, interpretations of actions as result of having malicia 
indigena have reached the upper classes, as it also describes cunning and a certain 





The malicia indigena can be used as praise or as a derogative term, depending on the 
situation and who says it, and it is celebrated when is perceived as a tool that helps the 
poor to face the powerful and well-off. In short, those who used, praise or demote 
malicia indigena, sees it as a part of the Colombian essence, rather than an 
interpretation of the actions as result of the local knowledge, as the practices of 
everyday life.  
 
In this study, the malicia indigena is used by interviews as a positive trait, and having 
malicia indígena is seen as an important quality to balance the actions of LEAs and 
smugglers, as NCOs and Coast Guard Personnel often come from the same regions as 
smugglers and use the same sort of cultural resources. As non-compliance with the law 
is common in Colombia, those having malicia indigena but are in charge of imposing 
the rule of law, are able to 'know' and to recognize the resources used by others to 
evade the law. The malicia indigena then implies detailed knowledge of the context, 
and in the hands of LEAs is used as a tool to outmatch smugglers 'ingenuity'.  
 
Classic authors from the cultural sociology tradition, Bourdieu, and De Certeau 
suggested the need to focus on skills, tacit knowledge and embodied ways of doing 
things as they consisted of unspectacular forms of resistance. James Scott (1998) 
highlights the importance of local knowledge, which he describes under the term 
methis, to conceptualize the kind of practical embodied skills akin to the malicia 
indigena. Scott presents several examples of how local situated knowledge, is often 
superior to formalize knowledge in solving problems. To Scott, local knowledge is key 
to sustaining high modernist-designs such as the urban modernism of Le Corbusier, 
Prussian Forestry or Soviet Collectivization. To Scott 'Formal order, to be more 
explicit, is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal processes, 
which the formal scheme does not recognize, without which it could not exist, and 




To Kalb (2006, p 579-580), a characteristic of those local forms of knowledge is that 
they are 'generated and situated within complex local life-worlds; it refers to the know-
how of dealing with local complexity and exigency’. Kenney (2010) points out how 
the lack of local knowledge and poor tradecraft can be exploited by LEAs to thwart 
terrorist actions. Kenney argues that to carry out their activities, terrorist need local 
knowledge, street smarts, and a talent for clandestine operations and that training does 
not substitute local knowledge and practical experience. On the other hand, Bonelli 
and Ragazzi (2014) calls for a study of the production of practical knowledge and the 
practice of the actors, as they play a central role in practices of anticipation in the War 
on Terror. 
 
An inspection operation requires a combination of different kinds of knowledge. In the 
first place, Coast Guard personnel need to comply with laws, to not disrupt commerce, 
and to interact with other local formal and informal authorities as well as sharing 
information and coordinating with other LEAs about suspicious boats. The local 
commander, usually a captain, arrives at a Coast Guard station with a set of 
information provided by the Chief of Naval Operations. Usually he has a conversation 
with the outgoing commander. Conversations with NCOs and regular naval personnel 
account for the rest of his knowledge, providing the incoming commander with the 
initial information needed to understand threats to control in the area (e.g. how 
smugglers act, which groups and possible threats are present in the area, and what are 
the main transport methods used by smugglers in the area). 
 
Malicia indigena plays a key role in the inspection of a suspected drug transport vessel. 
The commander of the operation needs to decide whether to stop the vessel and tow it 
or accompany it to the base for further inspection. Even here, a further decision needs 
to be made as to whether and how to proceed with intrusive methods, such as using a 
drill. The next quote shows how malicia indigena is used as a tool to discover drugs, 
and how possession of that knowledge is justified:  
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I remember once we were ordered to stop a boat…near here…we were given 
the order…so the Captain goes and says…ok stop that boat…and we stopped 
the boat, and started searching for cocaine…we were told that the boat carried 
drugs…so we were searching for the cocaine and nothing…and the boat crew 
only smiled…so the captain goes and ask an NCO…what do you think? ‘I think 
it carries [cocaine]’, replied the NCO…And the captain was…‘but we already 
searched the whole boat!’ So the captain says…‘I bet you we just **** it up’. 
‘I bet there are drugs’, said the NCO, so they made a bet….don’t remember 
how much…and the NCO went and started scratching a little crack in the boat 
painting and the boat crew started to get nervous…and finally the NCO found 
a hidden compartment…so he said, ‘I told you so’…and the captain asked him, 
‘how did you know?’. ‘I just knew’, responded the NCO. (Conversation among 
officers, a Coast Guard inspector visiting the base). 
 
A rear admiral, then a fresh lieutenant, recalls a similar occurrence in the early 1990s: 
 
There was this boat…it was captured near the base where I was…and the 
people in charge had already made ten inspections…and couldn’t find 
anything…it was really well hidden…so it occurred to me to measure the 
boat…to measure it outside and to measure inside…and so I found that the boat 
was 25cm less wide inside and 25cm more outside. (Interview). 
 
As the initial extract suggests, even officers prepared for the job find it difficult to 
match the local knowledge of NCOs, even in situations where intelligence has 
provided a high degree of certainty that drugs will be found on a ship. The officers’ 
capabilities, do not necessarily match the capacities of smugglers to camouflage and 
conceal the cargo. Malicia indigena thus performs two different roles. First, it 
diminishes the distance between smugglers and the Coast Guards, because in the 
absence of detailed information about smuggler methods or the precedent of a transport 
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method, having malicia indigena is a tool that allows Coast Guard personnel, by 
‘thinking as the bad guys’, to perform their jobs effectively. Second, the display of 
malicia indigena is also a tool that helps NCOs to diminish their distance from the 
officers, by demonstrating their capacities to detect and understand smugglers’ 
rationales.  
 
This malicia indigena enables Coast Guard personnel to read and obtain clues from 
the behaviour of locals. Successful officers use this sophisticated local knowledge, not 
necessarily their own, in order to achieve results. This local knowledge can produce a 
‘profile’ of the behaviour of people in an area, which can be combined with knowledge 
about the technical capacities of smugglers’ artefacts: 
 
You start to know…this one [signalling to a boat] was captured with 4 kg of 
cocaine and 355 of marihuana…you start to know the profile of the 
people…you start to know the profile…it’s just to look the profile of the thing 
and you know…first this motor for this hull?...this is a flying machine without 
a body…and second…it has a radio!!!...and the norm says that you must have 
a radio!!! But people around here never comply with the norms! Who wants to 
comply with the norm? Well…only those who doesn’t want to be bothered. 
(Interview).  
 
This also suggests that Coast Guard personnel pick up and filter information from their 
day to day activities, and in doing so they create images of who smugglers are and how 
they behave. 
 
I have shown that in order to carry out their tasks Coast Guard personnel combine 
different forms of knowledge, acquire knowledge in both formal and informal 
manners, and that the deployment of certain forms of tacit knowledge is branded under 
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the label malicia indigena. I have also shown that Coast Guard personnel learn from 
experience and in informal forums. These different kinds of knowledge can be 
displayed in different instances of an operation. Formal training may be important in 
the initial stages of the operation in deciding speed and direction, while other, more 
local knowledge, such as malicia indigena, may be more important in searching for 
drugs hidden in compartments and for anticipating smugglers’ actions. A proficient 
Navy commander is able to combine different forms of knowledge in order to achieve 
‘events’. These ‘events’ are valuable to both the prestige of the commanders and macro 
institutional goals. 
 
Images of the enemy in the WoD play an important role in the way the Coast Guard’s 
perception of the way their role is constructed. Ideas of outsmarting overreaching 
cartels, powerful narcoterrorist organisations, and dominant drug syndicates permeate 
the official discourse of the Navy. Navy personnel envision their enemies as: fleets, 
captains, and soldiers, as often smugglers organisations are described by Navy 
personnel. These are also ways of projecting a sense of what is unknown. The 
technological trajectories of the smugglers are another topic of dispute; locality plays 
an important role in describing these trajectories. At the macro level attempts are made 
to characterise these trajectories. Fears of un-learning about how to catch some 
methods  of smuggling because of learning how to tackle new ones also plays part on 
the way members of the Navy project images of their enemy.  
 
In practice commanders can decide to order a search for illegal cargo based on simple 
details such as the disposition of the radio antennas or how old the paintwork looks. In 
areas where the non-compliance with rules is common, a commander can even decide 
to order a search if a boat is ‘trying too hard’ to comply. Many of these decisions can 
be seen as a result of malicia indigena. Malicia indigena is an important resource to 
achieve results. Malicia indigena is used by putting yourself in the shoes of the other, 
the criminal. You have to ‘put your feet in the shoes of the enemy’ to ‘think as a bad 
guy’ as summarized by a successful lieutenant: ‘In order to achieve operational results 
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you must think as a criminal, that is the only way you’re going to achieve results’ 
(Interview). However, you also have to be resourceful, to work with the tools at hand 
to compensate for the differences between the Colombian Navy and other navies, as a 
chief mechanic (equivalent to a sergeant) states: ‘We’re Colombians, we have to work 
with what we have’ (Interview). 
 
Van Schendel shows how the cartographies representing illicit movements are 
dominated by the presence of the arrows: ‘The arrow is a godsend for those wishing 
to represent illegal flows in a threatening manner because it is a discursive tool that 
conveys the notion of motion, stimulus and target as perhaps no other graphic code 
could’ (Van Schendel, 2005, p. 41). But as the same author suggests, those arrows 
‘hide more than they reveal’, arrows simplify the movements, conceal details, and 
compress time and space in a single dimension. As stated in documents and Navy 
plans, patrolling the sea is an act performed to stop those arrows from abandoning 
Colombian territory, while the story of the procurement process of the patrol boats, in 
the next chapter reveal a more localized response to what coast guard personnel is 
seeing in the field.  
 
From Air to Sea: An Overview of the Illicit Drug Smugglers’ 
Transport Methods 
 
Throughout history, drug traffickers have developed and used a wide range of 
concealing and transport methods. These include moulding cocaine into different 
shapes, such as religious symbols, or disguising the drugs in casts, crisps, diapers, hair 
extensions, dissected insects, or changing the chemical properties of cocaine in order 
to enable it to be transported in liquid form (Avendaño, 2011). Those methods 
demonstrate different levels of expertise, scientific and technical knowledge, as well 
as different levels of adaptability and change. In this part of the chapter, I will briefly 
review some of the most important transport methods identified by LEAs.  
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Globalization puts new technologies in the hands of drug smugglers, such as Global 
Position Systems (GPS), cell phones, and even competent strategies for gathering and 
collecting intelligence.19 The interplay between drug traffickers and LEAs, market 
conditions, and internal changes offer broad explanations as to why smugglers buy 
technologies and innovate. They do so in order to improve the efficiency of their 
business, which means reducing vulnerabilities to enforcement (Galeotti, 2004; 
Kenney, 2003). Even if smugglers cannot match the technologies used by LEAs, they 
seem to remain permanently one step ahead of enforcement efforts (Kenney, 2007a; 
López Restrepo & Camacho Guizado, 2007).  
 
The history focussed on the ‘cartels’ has overshadowed a subtler story. The story of 
the transport methods used by smugglers and the strategies designed to thwart 
smugglers’ efforts. The lack of both training and clear strategies on how to face illicit 
drug trafficking at the beginning of the era of the ‘cartels’ allowed drug traffickers to 
use unpoliced (and even policed) areas to carry out their activities almost without 
precautions. They could easily camouflage the illicit cargo to facilitate transporting the 
drugs from processing facilities, laboratories, to rendezvous points using little or no 
means of hiding. As was expressed by General Serrano - the head of Colombian Police 
in charge of the demise of the Medellin and Cali ‘cartels’ - ‘during that time we didn’t 
even know what cocaine was or what it looked like’. He was referring to the early 
years when the Colombian Police started facing drug trafficking, ‘we learned fast’, he 
added (Interview). The same observation is shared by members of the Antinarcotic 
Police I interviewed, and by retired drug smugglers. Since the mid-1980s, 
nevertheless, Colombian traffickers were able to develop sophisticated transport and 
distribution networks (Thoumi, 2014). They developed capacities for using more 
sophisticated logistics, including the use of different forms of camouflage for the illicit 
drugs and the development of ‘faster’ transport methods. The traffickers made new 
adaptations that allowed them to benefit from the infrastructure offered by global 
commerce, and to exploit a wide array of knowledge to produce their own logistics 
                                                          
19 During its heyday the Cali ‘cartel’ possessed a sophisticated network of informants and a central 
data information centre (Brzezinski, 2002; Kaihla, 2002). 
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and artefacts, of which the design and building of go-fast boats and narcosubs are main 
exemplars.  
 
As was mentioned earlier, the history of drug trafficking is widely narrated by 
following more or less clear stages, from ‘cartels’ to ‘cartelitos’ to ‘networks’ and from 
air transport methods to maritime transport methods, etc. I argue that this is, 
nonetheless, an oversimplification of the complexity of the interdiction/evasion binary. 
Rather than stages in which a particular transport methods are adopted to be discarded 
later, what is possible to appreciate in the field is a continuous readjustment of old and 
new artefacts, old and new practices on both sides of the binary. Most importantly, 
while I consider that it is important to characterise those different ‘moments’, it is also 
significant to try not to diminish the uncertainty of this complex dynamic. Efforts by 
the state to control the illicit drug trafficking are also efforts to reduce the uncertainty 
about the ‘enemies’ strategies, and the attempts of different state players to 
continuously reaffirm their importance to the WoD. Thus, while in the 1980s the 
Antinarcotic Police ‘successfully’ dismantled the ‘cartels’ the attempts pursued 
throughout the 1990s, and still ongoing, are varied, andthe Air Force was ‘successful’ 
in thwarting air transport routes, once maritime routes were identified as the main 
transport of illicit drugs The Navy have asserted that their strategies and capacities 
have been effective in controling drug smugglers. However, descriptions of smugglers 
as innovative, ingenious, wily, and so on, are common when characterising their 
attempts to transport drugs, both in journalists’ accounts and in academic literature and 
policy documents.  
 
In 1993 the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) prepared a document entitled 
‘The Illicit Drug Situation in Colombia’(Drug Enforcement Administration, 1993). It 
is a short intelligence report, but it shows how the involvement of Colombian 
organisations in the traffic of illicit drugs was perceived at the time. According to the 
report, Colombian organisations were ‘involve[d] in every stage of the illicit drug 
traffic process, including cultivation, production, transportation, international 
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wholesale distribution and money laundering of the resultant profits’ (p, iii). The 
cartels - Cali and Medellin - were said, in this report, to dominate the drug traffic, with 
smaller ‘cartels’ lending services, mostly transportation. Those groups, therefore, have 
also been called ‘transportation groups’. Those smaller cartels were said to mimic the 
structure of multinational corporations. They have been able to dominate the 
international wholesale distribution, and to transport the cocaine by means of general 
aviation aircraft, commercial aircraft, maritime vessels, and couriers.  
 
The aforementioned report discusses the innovative character of cocaine producers. It 
states that: ‘Cocaine traffickers are always seeking new methods and technologies for 
improving the efficiency and cost effectiveness of their laboratory operations’ (Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 1993, p. 7). The processes of chemical recycling and 
chemical recovery are pointed out as examples, chemical recovery systems being 
seized since 1991. According to this document: ‘A high percentage of the cocaine 
destined for the United States drug market is smuggled out of Colombia on board 
general aviation aircraft. Gulfstream Aero Commander, Beechcraft King Air 300, 
Cessna Conquest JI, and Piper Cheyenne aircrafts are preferred by traffickers’(Drug 
Enforcement Administration, 1993, p. 17). Those aircrafts have also been utilized for 
transhipments to Central America, where the cargo is sent to the United States by land 
or airdropped near the Bahamas. 
 
Maritime drug smuggling was considered of secondary importance, and mostly a 
Caribbean problem. Drug smugglers used the Colombian Caribbean island of San 
Andres as a transhipment point. According to this report, individual aerial couriers, 
mulas (mules),20 were a pressing problem, as they would carry the delivery both 
externally, as luggage, and internally, inside their bodies. Those methods of transport 
were still common in subsequent years, as my newspaper review and fieldwork 
demonstrated, hence the need to continuously control airports. Whereas containerised 
                                                          
20 A term that emphasises docility, exploitation and physical strength (Zaitch, 2002).  
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marine cargo traffic was considered only as an emerging problem, it was seen as such 
mostly through ports in the Caribbean (Strategic Intelligence Section, 1993). 
 
During the 1980s, the efforts of the state agencies concentrated on the control of bulk 
drug transport using different air methods. A series of newly coined words described 
smugglers’ tactics: Narcovuelos (narcoflies), Narcoaviones (narcoplanes) and 
Narcopistas (narcotrack). It was argued by the Colombian Police, that in order to 
improve air transport methods, traffickers modified gas containers and augmented the 
autonomy of the airplanes, providing the capacity to travel from Colombia to Mexico 
and back without needing to refuel (El Tiempo, 1995b). In the first half of the decade 
Colombian LEAs seized a multitude of aircrafts, among them a Boeing 727, which, 
according to the Colombian Police, belonged to the ‘Cali Cartel’ and was used to 
transport illicit drugs from Colombia to Mexico (El Tiempo, 1995c). Traditionally the 
main air transport methods were three: firstly, air droppings. Traffickers developed 
durable and impermeable packaging systems and logistics. Secondly, landing in small 
airplanes near the US borders. Thirdly, the use of commercial airlines or cargo planes 
with a range of concealing methods was practiced (Decker & Townsend Chapman, 
2008). As was mentioned earlier, one such air transport method is body packing or the 
so-called mules. This approach consists of the transportation of illicit drugs by 
swallowing small containers, or hiding the drugs in luggage. The mules would travel 
as passengers. Other transport methods have exploited the already existing 
infrastructure by transporting big or small amounts of cocaine via cargo. Different 
reports mention varied numbers concerning the weight of the shipments, from 300g up 
to 5 kilos, for which smugglers resort to a wide array of camouflage methods, some of 
which imply formal knowledge of chemistry and others of artisanal work, and quite 
often a combination of both.  
 
According to Decker and Townsend (2008), with the use of the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS), most air transport of illicit drug was thwarted. Others point 
to the implementation of operational teams such as the Operation Bahamas and the 
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Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) for reducing air traffic methods and forcing smugglers to 
use maritime routes and methods. However, claims about the results of this approach 
have been contested by Bagley (1991), who admits that the use of AWACS might have 
helped to improve the surveillance of the Caribbean drug routes, yet it did so at a high 
cost and without the expected results. In 2015 the Colombian Air Force reported a 
decreasing tendency in using air routes, yet pointed out that the use of small and 
medium size airplanes in the transportation of illicit drugs has continued, only on a 
smaller scale than in the past (Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia, 2016). 
Notwithstanding, during the 2010s, air transport continued to be among the most 
widely used strategies to smuggle illicit drugs. Smugglers have made extensive use of 
the GPS systems that (1) help them avoid the problems of the past, such as airdropping 
or landing in the wrong place and (2) increase logistic capacities, as Killbrew and 
Bernal note (2010). 
 
It is, nevertheless, generally assumed that the use of air traffic methods has been highly 
reduced and that this reduction has contributed to a shifting in smuggling methods 
from aircraft delivery to less detectable methods, e.g. maritime smuggling methods. 
For example, the Colombian Drug Observatory (2010) considered that by the late 
2000s smugglers in Colombia preferred maritime methods of transport, such as cargo 
ships, fishing ships, go-fast boats, and narcosubs. According to UNODC in 2008 most 
of the cocaine from South America to the U.S. was transported using a combination of 
terrestrial (54%) and maritime (44%) methods. Colombian authorities have estimated 
that 78% of the drugs smuggled from Colombia to the USA are transported using 
maritime methods, and 65% of those drugs are carried in go-fast boats, small ships and 
narcosubs (UNODC, 2008b). Many Navy officers consider that the intensive use of 
maritime routes makes sense to smugglers. These transportation methods give them 
better results. The difficulties that the sea has, the length of the journey, and the 
changing oceanographic situation are all contributing factors that make the detection, 




While in the Caribbean smugglers made use of traditional knowledge of goods 
smuggling routes, in the Pacific drug trafficking exploited the fact that the Pacific 
Ocean was difficult to patrol. In the early 1990s there was little presence of the 
Colombian Military and Police in the Pacific. Hence, the traffickers started to 
challenge enforcement agencies by using speedboats, fishing boats, and container 
ships in that area (Bagley, 2004; Chepesiuk, 1999). Colombian LEAs initially reported 
the use of small cargo boats or fishing boats for the transport of cocaine. Although it 
has been reported that once LEAs were able to easily identify suspicious boats, 
smugglers consequently turned to go-fast boats. Due to the widespread use of go-fast 
boats in drug smuggling, those artefacts soon came to the attention of the LEAs and 
their movement was considered suspicious (Decker & Townsend Chapman, 2008). By 
1995 Colombian LEAs and the DEA reported the use of an artefact, similar to a go-
fast boat but capable of submerging under the waves in order to hide from the radar 
(Hohnson, 1995). The capture in 1997 of a communication centre in the middle of 
Bogota’s industrial district for coordinating go-fast boats movements, and the 
discovery of a drug smugglers’ ring that combined go-fast boats, scuba divers, and 
open sea freighters in order to transport drugs to Europe provided LEAs with further 
evidence of the widespread use of maritime smuggling methods (El Tiempo, 1997).  
 
During the 1990s, smugglers used yachts and sailboats because these two forms of 
transportation allowed them to hide greater amounts of cargo, and to make longer trips. 
Smugglers started to develop considerable engineering capacities by using fibreglass 
in building compartments, often with hydraulic system between the hull and the floor 
near the gas compartments, which made it hard for the trained dogs to recognize the 
cocaine smell (Decker & Townsend Chapman, 2008). Another transport method 
operated extensively during that decade was shipping containers that enhanced cargo 
capacities and minimized risks. The strategy was to either hide the illicit cargo in false 




The Colombian Navy and Antinarcotic Police have made efforts to know and foresee 
routes and trends in maritime transport methods used by smugglers, mainly by 
producing statistics based on seizures, and by devoting efforts on intelligence activities 
and on sharing evidence. During the 1980s the perceived increased in the use of 
maritime routes by drug smugglers led the Colombian Government to the activation 
of the Coast Guard Unit in 1991, initially operating exclusively in the Caribbean Sea 
and later, in 1993, in the Colombian Pacific. Also, several state and multistate actors 
(OAS, ONUDC) attempted to highlight the rising importance of maritime routes as the 
main transport used by smugglers. The importance given to the rise of maritime drug 
trafficking as a regional security problem was crystalized by the conformation in 2003 
of a group called the ‘Group of experts on maritime narcotrafficking’ working as a 
consulting body for the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). 
The CICAD is part of the secretary of security of the Organisation of American 
States.21  
 
The first task of the ‘Group of experts on maritime narcotrafficking’ was to present 
the CICAD with a report on the issue of maritime narcotrafficking involving illicit 
drugs and related contraband in the hemisphere. The report is called Hemispheric 
Study of Maritime Narcotrafficking, and it was to be used as a blueprint for regional 
action in combating drug trafficking in two major areas: Ports; and Port and Maritime 
Interface and Interdiction.  
 
One key theme of discussion held by the ‘Group of experts on maritime 
narcotrafficing’ was how to share knowledge and intelligence among different states 
as a key element for fighting drug trafficking. Documents produced by this group show 
that cooperation in the early stages of international agreement was full of problems:  
 




Information and intelligence are not usually shared among and within countries 
in a timely, proficient manner in order to create effective and efficient 
counterdrug operations. The sharing of information and intelligence is limited 
among agencies/countries for several possible reasons. Among them are the 
fear of compromising operations or sources, no direct contact between officers 
that would foster trust, lack of communications, institutional rivalries, lack of 
bilateral or regional agreements/arrangements, lack of a secure means of 
sharing the information, limited knowledge of the operational capacity of 
others, and lack of understanding of the needs of others” (Group on Maritime 
Narcotrafficking, 2003, p. 18).   
Port security was another salient preoccupation for the Group of experts on maritime 
narcotrafficking, especially during the group’s early meetings. The increase in the use 
of containers according to the group was accompanied by increased use of containers 
in maritime narcotrafficking (Group on Maritime Narcotrafficking, 2003). Control of 
ports and the control of containers were seen as two separate issues, but for both two 
solutions were presented. They include the standardization of practices called ‘Port 
Security Standards’, and the use of technology. As stated by the document, what was 
to be protected in the case of ports was maritime commerce. Maritime commerce and 
shipping has been broadly defined as a ‘common good’, and it includes maritime 
commerce and related activities that have global implications.  
 
By 2013 regional actors, such as OAS and Colombian agencies – the Colombian Navy 
and Colombian Police – had narrowed down the maritime drug transport methods to a 
handful, including cargo containers, go-fast boats, recreational boats, fishing boats, 
and the narcosubs. The same actors and agencies have provided different accounts of 
the development of ‘narco-tecnologies’. In short, smugglers have used maritime 
transport methods since the early days of marihuana smuggling from la Guajira region 
in Colombia. The use of traditional smuggling routes was continued during the 
marijuana boom. The same routes that were intensively utilized during the era of the 
cartels, survived the demise of cartels, and passed into the era of ‘cartelitos’ and 
‘networks’.   
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Perceived changes in the seizure of illicit drugs while being transported using maritime 
routes are subject to different interpretations. To some members of the LEAs decreases 
in seizures correspond to a more effective control of the sea (as well as serving as a 
motivation for smugglers to innovate). A decrease in the amount of the cocaine 
confiscated from smugglers was also seen to be connected to changes in the patterns 
in routes and strategies. As one Colombian Navy commander explained: ‘Earlier 
smugglers used to transport one ton or more of cocaine, but recently they prefer to 
send smaller quantities. In recent months, we have captured only small shipments of 
100 kg or less and the same happens with what they dispatch in cargo containers’. For 
others, when seizures diminished it should have been interpreted as a confirmation that 
smugglers were a step ahead of state control. Thus Admiral Mike Mullen argued that: 
‘The bad guys are moving faster than us’ (Gomez Maseri, 2008). Often those localized 
perceptions of changes in transport methods, or increases and decreases of seizures, 
are, at a global level, taken as both proof of the effectivity of the strategies and the 
need to reinforce those strategies.  
 
Camouflage and Speed: Smugglers Strategies to Transport Illicit Drugs 
 
In order to succeed drug smugglers need to develop strategies in the form of 
operational stealth, and strategic and logistical flexibility and tactical-logistical 
knowledge (Basu, 2014; Martin, 2012). Colombian drug smugglers using maritime 
routes have used several methods of transport, using diverse forms of stealthness and 
knowledge of the logistic circuits. By the late 1990s seizures of illicit drugs provided 
an overview of the main key sites, forms of transport and destinations to be listed as 
‘red flags’. In 2000 a Navy report stated that: 
 
Intelligence reports indicate that more than the 90% of the cocaine that moves 
along the Pacific and Caribbean transit zones is transported using: commercial 
transport methods, constituted by cargo container ships, non-commercial boats 
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such as fishing boats and fast boats, known as go-fasts which are characterised 
by being small and fast, hardly detectable by radar and hard to detect in 
daylight, and that are currently the most difficult task for security institutions 
(Observatorio de Drogas de Colombia, 2001). 
 
The smuggling of illicit narcotics in containers was as well considered as a key issue 
for regional forums. After the creation of the ‘Group of experts on maritime 
narcotrafficking’ within the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission 
CICAD, its first task was to present the CICAD with a report on the ‘the issue of 
maritime narcotrafficking involving illicit drugs and related contraband in the 
hemisphere.’ 
 
A short report produced by the CICAD in 1997 already identified the main methods 
of maritime transport of illicit drugs (First Inter-American Cooperation Meeting On 
Antidrug Maritime, 1997), that smugglers have continuously been using: Low-Profile 
vessels, go-fast vessels, Fishing vessels/small coastal freighters, Recreational vessels, 
and Ocean going freighters.  
 
Regarding ocean going freighters (cargo-containers) LEAs have identified several 
strategies: 1) when a member of the crew decides to smuggle, without the involvement 
of any other member of the crew a small quantity of illicit drugs, usually using his/her 
own lodgings to camouflage the drugs; 2) bigger amounts of cocaine hidden inside the 
containers or inside engine rooms, according to LEAs has been done with or without 
the knowledge of the crew or the owner of the goods.22  
 
                                                          
22 It is not uncommon for traffickers to establish legal exporting firms, and to send several ‘clean’ 
shipments in order to create a good record, and when this is achieved to start testing controls by 
sending different amounts of cocaine.  
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Colombian smugglers have managed to gain tactical-logistical knowledge of the 
workings of port security and its vulnerabilities.23 They have gained knowledge about 
how to used the inherent mobility of the shipping container (Martin, 2015) as well as 
other forms of cargo shipping. In doing this, smugglers are able to modify the structure 
of containers in order to hide the illicit drugs in the floor, ceiling, or walls of the 
containers, or to disguise illicit cargo among licit cargo. This particular method of 
transport resulted, just in 2011, in an estimated 11% of all of cocaine being seized en 
route to the UK and Europe, via Spain, the Netherland and Belgium, from containers 
departing from Latin American Ports (UNODC-Studies and Threat Analysis Section, 
2011) and 15% of the total of cocaine seized in Colombian ports for the years 2013-
2014. Port security practices have resulted in the discovery of illicit drugs, such as the 
discovery of 2 tons of cocaine hidden behind steel welded sheets (El Tiempo, 2000a), 
or the discovery of one ton of cocaine mixed with tropical fruit jams shipped to 
Amsterdam (El Tiempo, 2007a) and more recently still of 2.3 tons of cocaine disguised 
among insecticides shipped to Mexico (El Tiempo, 2012).  
 
Smugglers also use multi-mode transportation shipments, with various methods of 
transport used from the source to the final destination, often using a combination of 
small fishing or passenger boats or go-fast boats and refuelling in open sea. This 
method required a complex strategic and logistical flexibility which implies the 
coordination of efforts across loosely tied individuals accomplishing specific tasks. 
Captures of smugglers using this method of transport show that smugglers manage to 
move up to 3 tons of cocaine in one shipment. In doing so smugglers use heavily 
transited areas, difficult to police without interrupting the flow of commerce. By 
utilizing this combination of means, smugglers avoid moving huge amounts of cocaine 
in solo runs, and therefore maximize security and reduce loses. 
                                                          
23 Colombian Ports have been owned by private societies since 1991. Port management is set to 
provide the security mechanisms to deter smugglers from using ports as points of departure of illicit 
cargo. Since 1995 the Colombian Antinarcotic Police has been in charge of performing security 
activities, inspections, intelligence, etc. within the main Colombian Ports, with the support of the 




As pointed out earlier, by the turn of the century go-fast boats were considered a main 
threat to the Navy concerning drug smuggling using maritime routes. Seizures of drugs 
also indicated that the Pacific Coast was increasingly used in the transport of illicit 
drugs. In 2000, the Colombian Navy declared that 54% of cocaine was transported 
from different points from the Colombian Pacific Coast (El Tiempo, 2000b). 
According to the Navy smugglers had a logistically sophisticated arrangement to move 
the cocaine from Colombia to the US. They use maritime Pacific routes and go-fast 
boats, which are faster than previous boats with a speed up to 60mph, and have 
established gas stations in the open sea to guarantee a continuous supply of petrol to 
the boats. The Navy then, facing the difficulties of competing with the speed of narco 
boats, have established as a priority thwarting the boats serving as gas stations, an 
easier target giving their size and speed.  
 
Smugglers using go-fast also have developed considerable learning of evasive 
mechanisms that allowed them to evade Coast Guard Units (Chapter 7), using speed 
as a form of stealth, moving big amounts of illicit drugs, and continuously introducing 
improvements to their boats in order to gain speed. The vast majority of the go-fast 
boats seized have been off-the-shelf boats, almost never reused. Smugglers also have 
built their own fast boats and increasingly modify them in order to protect the cargo. 
Placing a hull on top of the boats serves both purposes, shielding the cocaine from the 
water and gaining marginal aerodynamic advantage, Figure 11, speed has been 









Figure 12. In search of speed, four engine go-fast boat. 
Source: Coast Guard Tumaco Station. 
 
Go-fast boats then, are able to carry their load from coastal areas to their final 
destination, often Central American countries, by reprovisioning fuel and food. Go-
fast boats can carry between 2 and 5 tons of cocaine, and a crew of 3 to 5 people, who 
usually carry communications systems and GPS devices. As mentioned, smugglers use 
a combination of solutions, procurement of boats from manufacturers, tinkering with 
them, and building their own boats.  
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By 1994, the time in which the Coast Guard was boosted by the entry of the Dolphin 
patrol boats, achieving up to 35knots of speed (Chapter 7), smugglers were already 
using go-fast boats. It is possible then to observe a wide diversity of go-fast artefacts, 
ranging from 7.62 m and two 200hp engines, with a speed of up to 25 knots, and go-
fast boats of 10.9 m, with three to five 200hp engines, developing speeds up to 45 
knots, and some boats with internal motors (inside out) with diesel fuel, which allow 
these artefacts to reach speeds higher than 50 knots, making interdiction efforts more 
difficult. Interestingly, as I will show describing the building of narcosubs, smugglers 
were able to build makeshift workshops in the middle of the jungle and to design and 
build these artefacts using a combination of local knowledge, such as traditional 
knowledge of fiber glass handling. Both the Antinarcotic Police and the Coast Guard 
discovered several of these makeshift workshops between 2002 and 2007 both on the 
Caribbean Coast and the Pacific Coast (El Tiempo, 2007b). A captain who served in 
the Uraba area confirms this information and points out the difficulties of chasing the 
covered go-fast boats:  
 
They started having those makeshift shipyards…and to build those shipyards 
they needed good areas, areas favorable to hide those workshops…and they 
chose the jungles near the tributary areas of the rivers…and it is not a big deal 
what they did there…they just covered the boats, and with waterlike 
colours…or just placed a tent, a blue tent…and during the day they 
stopped…so the airplanes flying 5,000 or 10,000 feet couldn’t really see 
it…only a piece of something floating on the sea…(Interview). 
 
By 2005 the capture of cocaine using go-fast boats accounted for up to 50 tons of 
cocaine and by 2013-2014 confiscation of cocaine in go-fast boats accounted for 55% 




The flows of illicit drugs are then carried out using a wide variety of artefacts, with 
different levels of stealthiness that require different arrangements. The smugglers’ 
efforts demonstrate resilience to interdiction efforts and show different variants of 
‘learning by trying’, making improvements and modifications of the logistical 
arrangements and components to correct difficulties, and 'learning by using' making 
improvements to the artefacts or systems of artefacts implemented (Fleck, 1994). This 
resilience, however, can be also be found in the prey/predator dynamic of the drug 
smuggling context. Academic literature on drug smuggling, as well as LEAs and the 
Military, often portraits the availability of different methods of transport as shifts, 
generations, changes, new methods, and the novelty of the transport methods used by 
smugglers, in which the success of controlling one method of transport paved the way 
to the appearance of a new one. As highlighted in Chapter 1, smugglers are also 
attributed a high degree of ingenuity, innovativeness, and flexibility, and as 
continuously seeking what for smugglers is the best way to transport drugs, as they are 
always in search of new methods and technologies for improving the efficiency and 
cost effectiveness of their enterprise. In the words of a Coast Guard commander, ‘it is 
a demonstrable fact, narcotraffickers are constantly changing their tactics’ (Interview).  
 
I argue that one important aspect in order to understand the process of innovation in 
outlaw contexts, is to take into account the continual entry and exit of players, 
Specifically, regarding the interdiction/evasion binary, the presence of a prey/predator 
dynamic type of interaction, considering that movement and attachments are not linear 
or sequential but capable of rotating back and forth. This s non-linear occurrences are 
characterized by different groups attempting to solve problems as they are presented 
to them. The process by which smugglers are able to combine existing artefacts, 
materials, and technologies presents interesting consequences for the study of the 
diffusion of technologies. It demonstrates the possibility of complex technologies 
being generated without the intervention of a unifying policy, which is unrelated to the 




I suggest that the wide variety and the somehow unexpected combinations that the 
outlaw process of innovation produces, which I am going to illustrate with my analysis 
of the narcosubs, arise not from an iterative process in which ‘organisations’ or 
‘cartels’ innovate time and time again, but in the continuous entry and exit of smuggler 
groups, which constantly provide the drug market with new flows of ideas, and who 
are able to take risks using new (and old) transport methods. I suggest then, that is the 
actions of many players that provides the dynamism of the binary interdiction/evasion 
in the WoD.  
 
As pointed out in chapter 1, outlaw innovation can be related to what some academics 
refer to as ‘democratization of innovation’ (von Hippel, 2005) and the growing 
importance of ‘users’ for product modification and development. The case of smuggler 
technologies flags the capacities of ‘outlaw innovators’ in producing working artefacts 
across diverse geographies and constrains. Finally, smuggler technologies demonstrate 
interesting combinations of old and new technologies, e.g. a primitive ‘panga’, a 
traditional fishing boat equipped with cutting edge communication and positioning 
systems, a process resembling what Edgerton describes as creole technologies 
(Edgerton, 2007). A view from Science and Technology Studies allows us to overcome 
many of the metaphors in use to explain innovation in the interdiction/evasion binary, 
such as ‘cat and mouse’ and ‘balloon effect’, by introducing nuanced explanations of 
the process of innovation without coordinated or centralized efforts, by users at the 
fringes of society, in a continuously changing environment. In the next chapter I turn 








Chapter 5. The Evolution of the Narcosubs 
 
They say, in the Caribbean Sea, they’ve seen a submarine 
And those who tried to catch it, haven’t been able to get at it. 
It carries the purest drug and contraband it brings 
And to catch it, the sea they’re going to drain24 
 
 
After several months of intelligence gathering, The Pacific Task Force was able to 
consolidate an intelligence package regarding the approximate location of a 
semisubmersible vessel. The Commander of the force and his staff planned the 
operation and sent an experienced team to locate the narcosub. They had to arrive at 
the precise moment when the cocaine was being stocked up in the narcosub, therefore 
being able to capture not only the vessel but the drug smugglers and the cocaine. The 
captain and lieutenant in charge knew how difficult it would be to find the artefact, 
they had already participated in various successful similar operations…but after weeks 
of continuous searching in the mangroves and many mosquito bites later, still no sign 
of any illegal activity… ‘we had the intelligence information!’, says the commander, 
‘so we kept looking, but while we were there looking for it, controlling possible exit 
routs, it set sail’, the commander of the operation received information that the 
narcosub was already in the open sea, it was stranded some 60 miles from the coast 
and the crew was requesting to be rescued. ‘After that, we spent some 24 hours more 
trying to find the vessel, finally a “gringo” airplane was able to detect it’…but when 
we got there it was already empty, and they didn’t sink it, possibly because they wanted 
to rescue it and use it again…’ concludes the captain.  
 
This story summarizes some of the key issues regarding the use of submersible and 
semisubmersible artefacts by Colombian drug smugglers and the efforts of the 
                                                          
24 Song The Submarine, Grupo Nuevo Texas, October 2009, Corridos prohibidos Vol. 12.  
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Military, specifically the Colombian Navy and Coast Guard Unit and Law 
Enforcement Agencies to thwart the sailing of the narcosubs.  
 
This story, as indeed the history of the narcosubs and of other drug smuggler artefacts 
such as go-fast boats and cargo containers, clearly show how users facing barriers such 
as geographic isolation and continuous persecution are able to manufacture complex 
pieces of technology. In this chapter I will show that the history of the narcosubs 
demonstrates that in some instances, arenas of interaction and interchange of 
information are not necessary for the process of innovation. Finally, the difficulties the 
Coast Guard team encountered in the previous story also show the difficulties of 
attributing success and failure when describing technology in outlaw environments.  
 
The history of the narcosubs intersects several different theoretical discussions. First, 
the discussion on mobilities, and specifically on the issue of illicit motilities, the 
movement of undesirable things and persons as part of the large-scale movements of 
people, objects, capital, and information across the world. Second, in the study the 
process of the coevolution of technologies in antagonist interactions. The dynamics of 
the process of innovation in illicit drug smuggling have been explained as the result of 
interdiction efforts in which the agency is momentary placed on one side of the 
interdiction/evasion binary. I argue that the study of the process of designing, building, 
and using narcosubs corresponds not only to a push/pull process as interpreted by the 
academic literature so far, but may be explained as the result of dispersed peer 
innovation. I will concentrate my argument to show that the story of narcosubs 
contributes to the literature about the role of users in creating complex pieces of 
technology.  
 
In this chapter I present an overview of the theoretical themes in which the smuggler 
technologies are situated and an overview of several competing transport methods used 
by drug smugglers. Then I turn my attention to the process of design, building, and use 
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of narcosubs by Colombian drug smugglers, in short, the evolution of narcosub. I then 
present a view of the process of innovation of the narcosub from the point of view of 
the Colombian Navy, and finally I summarize the main findings that stem from the 
study of smuggler technologies, and specifically of the narcosub.  
 
The constant adaptation of both sides of the binary has resulted in high variation in 
artefacts, especially on the smugglers’ side. Hyssalo and Usenyuk (2015) introduced 
the concept of dispersed peer innovation as an alternative explanation of the process 
of evolution of a complex artefact where users retain control over invention, 
modification, diversification, building, and maintenance. I consider that this concept 
could help explain the diversity of smuggler artefacts, and specifically in this chapter 
of the narcosubs. In the case of smuggler innovations, the process is also affected by 
several constrains, such as the illegality of the activities, which limit the availability of 
materials and impose difficulties for the transport of such materials to the building 
sites. The study of the design, building, and use of submersible and semisubmersible 
artefact narcosubs feeds into the growing number of academic studies on the user’s 
capacities for innovation, but also expands this literature to cover instances where 
barriers for innovation are affected by the illegality of their activities. Faced with many 
conflicting constrains both from their internal organisation and the interaction with the 
environment (Kauffman & Macready, 1995) smugglers are left with alternative, 
locally optimal, negotiated solutions for the transport of illicit drugs.  
 
In this chapter I make use of the biography of the artefact and practices approach, 
combining an historical approach with ethnographic investigation (Pollock & 
Williams, 2008, 2011). My historical analysis is based on documentary research of the 
main Colombian newspaper (El Tiempo) and Weekly magazine (Revista Semana), I 
collected 757 entries related to Maritime interdiction operations between 1993 and 
2014 and 82 about the narcosubs, as well as a review of the Navy, Police, and CICAD 
documents. I performed ethnographic observations and conducted interviews with 
members of the Navy during visits to the main Coast Guard bases in the Caribbean 
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and the Pacific and a guided visit to the narcosub museum in the Bahia Solano Navy 
base, where I kept a fieldwork diary and visual records. 
 
Variation and Dispersion in Narcosub Design 
 
Narcosubmarines, drug subs, narco semisubmersible, Self-Propelled Semi-
Submersible, or simply narcosubs, are maritime custom-made vessels utilized 
principally by Colombian narco traffickers and developed with the purpose of 
smuggling illicit drugs into the U.S. market. The term narcosub encompasses a 
diversity of artefacts that includes semisubmersible vessels and fully submersible 
vessels that are characterised by the use of maritime diesel engines, a rudimentary 
system of refrigeration, no facilities, and a valve that is activated in case of being 
captured by Law Enforcement Agencies or Military that allows water to fill the artefact 
and sink the vessel. The narcosubs are not made to last, as smugglers, mostly discard 
such vessels after ending their one trip journey.25 Smugglers have been using 
narcosubs from at least as early as 1993, but the majority of captures have been made 
since 2005. Narcosubs are described by the Navy as artefacts that are highly difficult 
to detect and/or track, due to the lack of emissions once departed, the little wake that 
facilitates visibility from above, and a small radar signature.  
 
For over two decades narcosubs have set sail from the deserted coast on the north of 
Colombia (Map 2), from unpoliced areas in the Gulf of Urabá (Map 3), and from the 
mangroves of the south Colombian pacific coast (Map 4), while some were also found 
while in construction near populated areas. Each one of those artefacts is built to move 
between six and ten tons of cocaine, and their construction has demonstrated usability 
in the different conditions of the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The narcosubs 
are slower than other transport methods used by drug smugglers, sailing up to 12 knots 
                                                          
25 Some interpretations of the technical aspects of these machines, however, indicate their long-time 
use, such as multiple layers of painting, rust, and corrosion.  
143 
 
per hour, but they provide smugglers the capacity for traveling long distances, with 
increased cargo capacity and stealth.  
 
 
Map 2. Colombian North Caribbean coast, La Guajira. 
 
 
Map 3. Colombian Caribbean Coast, Gulf of Urabá. 
 
 
Map 4. South Colombian Pacific Coast. 
 
Navy Units and Colombian Police have made efforts to capture those artefacts while 
still in construction, and reliable information has also made it possible to intercept 
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them some miles away from the coast or in open sea. According to the Navy, each 
move away from the sea increases the possibility for smugglers to succeed in their 
journey. As these are unregistered machines, figures about how many have been built, 
used, and re-used, are difficult to obtain, and some estimate that only 14 percent of 
narcosubs are stopped (Mackey, 2010), or 20% as estimated by the U.S. Enforcement 
Agency (Diálogo, 2009), According to the State Department’s 2010 International 
Narcotics Control Strategy Report, narcosubs may have hauled 423 metric tons of 
cocaine in 2008 into the U.S., while other point out the uncertain numbers but 
continuous flux of those artefacts (e.g. Stavridis, 2008). 
 
As with other illicit activities, figures can be contested, and as several academic have 
pointed out, measurement of illicit flows have an inherently political use (Andreas, 
2010; Buxton, 2006; Thoumi, 2005b). Statistics on drug seizure are at the core of the 
process of shaping the enforcement agencies; they use data in the construction of drug 
traffic narratives, in the allocation of budgets, resources, or rewards, and as part of the 
construction of the enemy (Chapter 4). That is not to say that the data is cynically 
forged or fabricated, but that the very process of collecting, displaying, and using of 
those statistics should be taken into account when using data provided by state 
databases.  
 
There are then obvious difficulties in compiling a comprehensive list of all of the 
smugglers’ artefacts. Using seizure data can be criticized on the grounds that such 
numbers and exemplars only account for ‘unsuccessful criminals’, those who get 
caught, but this assumption lead to the interpretation that the LEAs are essentially 
inefficient. There is not a consolidated number of submersibles and semisubmersibles 
seized, and as mentioned estimates on the number of narcosubs available to smugglers 
vary widely, as also does the amount of cocaine transported in these artefacts. 
Estimates about the number of artefacts built and used by smugglers have helped to 
consolidate the image of a ‘narco-sub fleet’ and have provided the base to affirm that 
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by 2008 roughly 300 tons of illicit drugs were transported using narcosubs26 as 
estimated by the Southern Command of the U.S. Navy. While the Colombian Navy 
estimated that by 2013-2014 roughly 2% of cocaine was transported using submersible 
or semisubmersible vessels.  
 
Data from the Colombian Navy indicates that by 2013, 83 narcosubs (Figure 13) and 
98.2 tons of cocaine had been seized, as well as 22 makeshift shipyards. This number 
encompasses semisubmersible, submersible, manned, and unmanned artefacts, and 
shows the increase of the seizure of those artefacts since 2005. But we lack, and 
probably will continue to lack, the numbers of those that have sank. Most of the 
narcosubs have been found in the Pacific (approximately 78%, 64 artefacts) while 20% 
of them have been found in the Caribbean. 
 
 
Figure 13. Number of narcosubs seized between 1993 and 2013 in Colombia. 
Source: Author with data from Armada Nacional de Colombia. 
 
The narcosubs are an interesting case for STS and Innovation Studies because even if 
we only take into account those vessels captured, there are a high degree of variation 
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between them, not just in terms of categories (submersibles, semisubmersibles, towed 
versions, etc.), but in the variation of their design, and variations in their construction.  
 
Innovation Studies and STS have shown the role of users in the process of innovation, 
demonstrating the capacities of users not only to introduce minor changes and 
modifications but to shape habits, technologies, organisations, cultural values, 
regulations, the behaviour of other practitioners, or the modification of the initial 
purpose of the equipment (Hyysalo, 2009; Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015; Lüthje, 2004; 
Lüthje et al., 2005). Innovation Studies have often emphasised the mechanisms 
through which development by innovative users have made their way to the market, 
often creating new paths (Voss, 2010). Recent work from Hyysalo and Usenyuk has 
shown the capacity of users to create complex technologies and dominate all aspects 
of such machines, despite attempts by manufactures to take over (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 
2015). Unruly users have also demonstrated their capacities to innovate, adapting 
practices in the face of prosecution from Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and the 
Military, and showing the importance of antagonistic relations in driving technological 
change (Dolnik, 2007; Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 1999). 
 
In this section I will show a variety of submersible and semisubmersible artefacts that 
travel from the Colombian Coast up to the Mexican Coast, and show the different 
solutions for solving problems such as floatability, stealth, propulsion, access to 
materials, a combination of off the shelf solutions, and hull designs that have been 
adopted by builders, providing drug smugglers with very different machines. The high 
number of seizures of these artefacts provides an idea of the popularity of this transport 
method among drug smugglers, whose use continue despite the sanctioning of the 
‘anti-submersible’ law in 2009. In the first three months of 2016, three new artefacts 
were seized in the open sea, one in a makeshift shipyard ready to be bound, and another 
in Brazil.  
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In terms of cargo capacity there is a wide variation in these artefacts. Some can 
transport 2 tons, while others are designed to carry up to 10 tons of illicit drugs, clearly 
marking different solutions in their design. Figures 11 to 17 shows their variation in 
terms of size and cargo capacity. Figure 14 and Figure 15 represent an early model of 
a semi-submersible artefact with a cargo capacity of 2 tons of cocaine that was 
captured in 1994. Figure 16 shows a ‘fully’ submersible artefact with a cargo capacity 
of up to 10 tons, captured in February 2011.  
 




Figure 15. The Tayrona side view. 




Figure 16. Timbiquí Submarine. 
Source: Author. 
 
Figure 17 and Figure 18 show the submersible version known as ‘Narcotorpedo’ or 
simply ‘torpedo’, with a cargo capacity between 2 to 5 tons. Figure 19 and Figure 20 
corresponds to a Low Profile Vessel, with a cargo capacity between 6 to 10 tons. Cargo 
capacity is then an integral feature in the design and construction of these artefacts. In 
terms of cargo capacities, the images demonstrate the variably of shapes available to 
drug smugglers. Figure 14 and Figure 15 show the earlier versions of submersible 
artefacts buildt by smugglers, and Figure 16 shows a more ‘submarine like’ artefact, 
with a periscope and a custom made submarine propeller. Figure 17 and Figure 18 show 
two different versions of the ‘torpedo’ the first one with a compartment where a 
communication system was found. The narcosub in Figure 14 uses a boat propeller. 
















Figure 19. Inside of a fully loaded low-profile vessel. 
Source: Colombian Antinarcotic Police, press release. 
 
 
Figure 20. Narcosub displayed at the Buenaventura Coast Guard Base. 
Source: Author. 
 
Features that are important in some designs can be easily disregarded in others. A good 
example of that can be found in the proposed solutions to visibility issues, that is to 
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say placement of the windows, ‘the glasses’, the artefact in Figure 21, found in the 
Pacific while for other artefacts visibility is clearly important as demonstrated by the 
artefacts shown in Figure 22 and Figure 23. The nonexistence of windows allows the 
Navy to approach these artefacts without warning, and, therefore, motivated designers 
to include them. A captain explained: ‘Those without a window, you just boarded them 
from behind and you started knocking on the hull, and when they came out to see what 
it was (the noise) you would detain them. So that’s why they started putting all those 
windows’ (Interview). The most common design places the cabin at the rear and the 
cargo hold amidships.  
 
Figure 21. Semisubmersible captured in the Pacific with no back windows. 
Source: Lesmes (2005). 
 
 
Figure 22. Semisubmersible, cockpit detail. 




Figure 23. Low profile vessel, cockpit detail. 
Source: Author. 
 
Common to crewed narcosubs is the use of maritime diesel engines. Several reports 
indicate the use of 350hp engines, which are tied to a gear in order to move the 
propeller. Also common is the use of ‘goose neck’ tubes in order to ventilate the 
interior of the vessel. Materials used for the construction of the hull are more varied. 
Some narcosubs are made of a combination of wood and fiber glass, while others are 
made of a combination of wood and steel, and some others of only steel. There has 
been at least one report of the use of Kevlar.  
 
Narcosubs remain a vehicle for transporting illicit drugs. In previous years the sanction 
of the Law penalizing the building or sailing of submersible or semisubmersible 
artefacts, led owners or sailors of narcosubs to disguise their vessels as ‘tourist 
vehicles’, or as artefacts built as part of a hobby.27 Strong suspicions as to the illicit 
use of such vehicles led the Navy to initially propose control over these vessels by 
means of maritime registers, and to require compliance to the rules of maritime 
                                                          
27 In at least one case the owner of the artefact was detained but later released without charges when 
it was alleged that the artefact was used as part of his hobby and that the artefact was built as a part 
of a tourist company aiming to carry passengers to the surrounding beaches. 
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authority, demonstrating: flag, name, registration, names of the crew, port of departure, 
and the maritime authority that issued the departure and port of destination. 
 
Despite warnings of the potential of these vehicles to transport weapons, violent 
extremists, or weapons of mass destruction (Lichtenwald et al., 2012; Stavridis, 2014; 
Watkins, 2011), narcosubs discovered until today have not been used for a different 
purpose than for the transportation of illicit drugs. These associations go in line with 
the rhetoric of the merge between ‘organised crime’ and terrorism present in policy 
analysis and official documents discussing the threats of drug smuggling for the 
region. These voices stated the potential threat of narcosubs if drug smugglers decided 
to rent or sell these artefacts to terrorist organisations, or if terrorist organisations were 
able to profit from obtaining the knowledge to build the vessels. Documents from the 
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, signal the need to increase 
interdiction operations and security in Ports, and that the overall efforts to thwart drug 
smugglers’ use of maritime routes goes hand in hand with anti-terrorist efforts.  
 
One key issue (besides the obvious illicitness of their purpose) that separates these 
artefacts from other user driven innovations is the fact that builders and owners (or 
owners of the illicit cargo) are not usually members of the crew. Although builders 
may take part in the early trials of the artefacts, sailors are usually brought to the 
departure points while the artefact is being loaded in order to be familiarized with the 
machine and instructed on its destination. Such sailors are recruited based on previous 
ties with smugglers and their skills. When referring to reasons for being hired, the 
captain of a narcosub, in a confession made to Police, said, ‘they look for experienced 
Navy men’ (Policia Nacional, n.d.). The fact that crews have nicknamed these artefacts 
‘water coffins’ exemplifies the harsh conditions inside and the high probability of 
failure. The sailors’ abilities and knowledge in solving issues regarding navigational 
issues and engine failures are key, not only to the fulfilment of their task but also to 
the safeguard of their own lives. In an encounter between builders and a prospective 
narcosub captain, recorded by the Colombian Police, the latter recalled being 
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instructed: ‘take care of the engine, your life depends on it’ (Policia Nacional, n.d.). 
Experienced fishermen often have the required abilities and knowledge to navigate 
narcosubs, experience that some have gained from government funded courses, 
courses taught with the aim of professionalising fishing activities and reducing 
poverty.  
 
As of 2015 Narcosubs continue to be used as an illict drug transport method. Their 
varied designs and manufacture practices (materials, shapes) suggest a combination of 
formalized knowledge in some cases (more on this later), local knowledge, and 
navigational skills. The latter two are quite common in the areas where the narcosubs 
are built and sailed from, places where fishermen have traditionally built their own 
boats and tinkered with engines due to a lack of close repair shops. Navigational skills 
are also quite common in those areas, and traditional knowledge of dead reckoning 
navigation methods is complemented by the use of GPS. Several concepts from STS 
can explain this phenomenon. The ‘pick-and-mix’ strategy by which users create 
‘configurational technology’ adapted to their needs (Fleck, 1994), is a process of 
recombination in which existing components are adopted, modified, and/or 
recombined to create new forms adapted to the outlaw users requirements, or bricolage 
(Büscher, Gill, Mogensen, & Shapiro, 2001). This patterns of dispersed peer 
innovation (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015) through the recombination of existing 
materials and knowledge paves the way to either the creation of ‘hybrid’ artefacts, 
represented in two different forms (off the shelf boats covered with fibreglass or other 
materials) or new designs of narcosubs, traveling as a ‘flexible techno-meme’ that is 







The Evolution of Narcosubs 
 
The narcosubs seized from Colombian drug smugglers from 1993 until 2015, either 
while in construction or while sailing, demonstrate a combination of materials, 
designs, and building techniques indicating various approaches preferred by drug 
smugglers to solve the problem of transporting big amounts of illicit drugs. In doing 
so outlaw users benefit from the pattern of dispersed peer innovation, in which the 
design and construction of these vessels, not being bound by standardized procedures, 
profit from the possibilities of creating their own designs with high degrees of 
flexibility in exploring the different aspects of the ‘techno-meme’. Those involved in 
the process of outlaw innovation are able to mix local available knowledge of 
traditional boat building with off-the-shelf technologies.  
 
Whether or not drug smugglers used narcosubs before 1993 will perhaps remain 
unknown. The history of the development of the narcosubs remains elusive, with 
different versions milling around. A heroic account of Pablo Escobar’s enterprise 
places the ‘invention’ of this artefact as a part of his ingenuity in the transportation of 
drugs, an idea that Pablo Escobar supposedly developed after watching a James Bond 
movie. In this story a Russian and an English engineer were hired to design the 
submarines while Pablo’s brother took care of the electric circuits (Escobar & Fisher, 
2009). Other accounts situate the ‘Cali Cartel’ as the source of the idea to use 
submersible methods to transport illicit drugs, who were claimed to have initially tried 
to buy fully made submarines from the former Soviet Union. Supposedly, under the 
disguise of an oceanographic research vessel, they transported drugs from Central 
America to the U.S. (Navarro, 1997). An account of the history of the ‘Cali Cartel’ 
places the narcosub as part of an alliance, or as confirmation of the alliance, between 
the ‘Cartel’ and the ‘Russian Mob’. In this account the builders are two Russian 
engineers and an American who were in charge of the design and construction 
(Chepesiuk, 2003; Darling, 2000). In another version of this account an already 
existing friendship between a Colombian drug smuggler and a Russian was key to the 
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design and development of the Facatativa submarine (Semana, 2003). While in an 
autobiography a retired drug smuggler also claimed that the ‘Cali Cartel’ invented the 
narcosubs, but this was done as part of the link between that group and ‘Mexican 
Cartels’ (Montoya, 2007).  
 
A key element plays a role in these accounts, the availability of money. In the Escobar 
story the decision to build such an artefact was motivated by security concerns: ‘It 
didn’t matter how much it might cost, money was never a bar to anything Pablo wanted 
done’, affirms Pablo’s brother. While the ‘Cali Cartel’ attempted to spend up to US$ 
5.5 million to buy a tango-class diesel submarine or up to US$25 to build one.  
 
 











The first documented report of the use of narcosubs dates from 1993. On the 22nd of 
May near the Island of Providence, a semi-submersible vessel about 7 meters long 
with, according to different accounts, a cargo capacity between 1 to 2 tons of cocaine 
and a crew of two, named the San Andres Narcosub or Laura (Figure 24 and Figure 
25) was seized. The vessel was captured while being towed behind a powered 
watercraft, according to reports. Even if not fully submersible, it had the capacity to 
control its direction and depth. Its speed was slower than 8 knots, and it was designed 
to be quickly discarded if LEAs approached (Policia Nacional, n.d.; Semana, 2011).  
 
In 1994 three distinctly unalike narcosubs were found in different places in the 
Colombian Caribbean Coast: one while in construction, one in a shipyard, and a third 
aground near the coast. The first one was found near the town of Turbo in the area of 
the Gulf of Urabá. It had a metallic structure and was partly covered with fibreglass, 
and propelled by one diesel engine and two electric engines, Figure 26 and Figure 27 
(Policia Nacional, n.d.). The Barranquilla narcosub left little trace and it is often 
neglected from accounts of the history of such artefacts. It was found in a dry shipyard 
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in Barranquilla while being repaired and was described by the then Commander of the 
Navy in the Caribbean as ‘some sort of boat with a shell’ (El Tiempo, 1994b, 1994c).  
 
 
Figure 26. Semisubmersible in the making 1994, front view. 
Source: Colombian Antinarcotics Police. 
 
 
Figure 27. Semisubmersible in the making, 1994, side view. 
Source: Colombian Antinarcotics Police. 
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Figure 14 and Figure 15 display the third model of a narcosub seized in 1994, an almost 
10m long vessel that was named The Tayrona after the name of the beach on the 
northern Caribbean Coast where it was found. It was built of fiberglass on top of a hull 
of wood. For movement it used a 6hp diesel truck engine. The muffler and exhaust 
pipes were also from a truck in addition to three boat propellers, Figure 28. An 
arrangement of air boxes and fifty 25 kg lead weights mounted on the hull were used 
to control floatability. This narcosub also possessed an air compressor that allowed for 
the interchange of air between the interior of the artefact and the outside, and a power 
plant. This hybrid artefact carried a maritime camera and monitor that could be viewed 
by the crew from the metallic beach chair nailed to the floor of the narcosub.  
 
 




The cylindrical metallic structure reappeared in 1995. That year in a shipyard in 
downtown Cartagena, the Colombian Navy seized a nearly complete artefact that had 
an 11 meters long and 2 meter wide aluminium structure and was covered in fibreglass 
(Figure 29). It had three compartments, possessed a sonar and ‘sophisticated 
communication equipment’, and was equipped with a 100hp diesel engine. According 
to the Navy reports it could be submerged up to 20m and could carry six tons of 
cocaine. Others estimated the cargo capacity was only 1.5 tons. Those reports also 
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consider that in order to design this artefact smugglers hired ‘experts’ who produced 
an artefact with a hydrodynamic design (El Tiempo, 1995a; Ramirez & Bunker, 2014). 
 
During 1996 there were several reports in Colombian newspapers about the use of the 
narcosubs as a transport method. Intelligence reports based on eye witness accounts 
suggested the existence of a submarine that was loaded with illicit drugs in La Guajira 
region and sailed to supply the European Market (Semana, 2003; El Tiempo, 1996).  
 
 
Figure 29. The Cartagena submarine. 
Source: Colombian Antinarcotics Police. 
 
In 2000 a different narcosub design was found in the middle of Los Andes, far from 
any coast, it was named The Facatativa for the name of the nearest town. It was 30m 
long, or 36m according to others, and 3.5m wide, and approximately 30% to 40% 
complete. It had three modules and a double hull (Figure 30 and Figure 31). Reports 
agree on the fact that it was being designed to be a fully submersible, stealthy narcosub. 
But assessments about its capabilities vary widely. While some highlight that it would 
have had a range of up to 700 nautical miles (Moore, 2001), others report that it would 
have been able to navigate up to 2000 nautical miles diving from 10m to 20m (Ramirez 
& Bunker, 2014). Estimates about its cargo capacity and building cost are also 
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inconsistent. While some claim that its cargo capacity would have been between 10 to 
15 tons, others’ accounts affirm that the cargo capacity of that model was of an 
astonishing 150 to 200 tons, that is to say, almost a third of the potential production of 
cocaine in Colombia. Its cost was estimated between US$ 10 to US$ 25 million. 
 











Although no one was ever captured in relation to this artefact, the discovery of this 
vessel was considered clear proof of the links between the ‘Cali Cartel’ (assumed 
owners) and the ‘Russian Mob’. The design was consider to be ‘Russian’ with its 
building undertake by ‘Russian naval experts with the assessors of American 
engineers’, and according to the Russian security attaché in the Colombian Embassy 
it was assured that ‘without Russian technology, that submarine [would have been] 
impossible to build’ (Semana, 2000). Others state that at least this attempt followed 
‘Russian’ plans and specifications, but without direct involvement of Russians.  
 
Besides The Facatativa narcosub, until 2005 all of the vessels with those 
characteristics were seized near the Caribbean, indicating that smugglers followed the 
‘traditional’ Caribbean smuggler routes when using this new artefact. There are no 
vestiges of the building and use of narcosubs between the 2001 and 2003, but there are 
some reports about their use during 2004, with the Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) affirming that at least four of these vessels were able to sail up to the Mexican 
Coast and deliver up to 16 tons of cocaine (El Tiempo, 2008b). Incontestable proof of 
the use of the narcosub appeared in 2005, until then considered only a fringe method 
of transport. From 2005 on the variation in their design and building places and 
materials indicates a new stage, with new designs, ending what can be labelled an early 
stage of experimentation. 
 
The first narcosub of this stage found on the 24th of March 2005 was also the first 
narcosub found on the Pacific Coast of Colombia, specifically in the mangroves of the 
Nariño Region. This vessel was built of fibreglass on a wood hull and used a single 
maritime diesel engine and a single propeller, and had a cargo capacity of between 6 
and 10 tons (Figure 32). That same year the first ‘narcotorpedo’ was discovered by the 
U.S. Coast Guard as the result of information provided by Colombian Navy 
intelligence. These artefacts are essentially a cylindrical steel tube with stabilizing fins 
and a beacon that allows its recovery if LEAs approach. The narcotorpedoes are towed 
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behind a powered boat and are able to submerge from 20m up to 30m (Figure 17. 
Narco-Torpedo, Buenaventura). 
 
Figure 32. Semisubmersible in the making. 
Source: unk, Provided to author by an ex intelligence detective. 
 
Since 2006 the seizure of narcosubs and illegal shipyards has increased. According to 
Navy data, just in 2008 fourteen of these vessels were captured, and in 2009 twenty of 
thse artefacts were seized while en route or while being built. Most of these artefacts 
use either go fast boat hulls or appropriate their shape in order to create an artefact that 
is able to submerge over 70% of their structure. In 2010 new attempts to build fully 
submersible artefacts were discovered.  
 
The majority of accounts about narcosubs present the development of these artefact as 
independent from other forms of illicit drug transport. Those accounts argue for 
interpretations of smugglers’ artefacts as happening in stages, in which the narcosubs 
mostly ‘replace’ other forms of transport, or in a ‘generation’ with an incremental 
innovation in propulsion (e.g. from one to two engines or stealthiness, changes in 
colour or employment of strategies to diffuse heat signature) (e.g. Diálogo, 2009; 
Lesmes Duque, 2005). I suggest that the path to the design, building, and use of 
narcosubs is in fact entwined with other forms of maritime drug transport and that, 
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there are only a few short steps between submersible and semisubmersible methods of 
transport and go-fast boats and fishing boats. These steps have been provided by the 
embeddedness of the knowledge available to build such artefacts within the relatively 
small areas where narcosubmarines can operate.  
 
As explained, the narcosubs seized between 1993 and 2000 varied widely in shape, 
materials used, and places of building. However, from 2005 the vast majority of these 
artefacts seized, either while being built or en route to their destinations, were 
concentrated in three areas of Colombia, two of them in the Caribbean and one in the 
South Pacific, specifically the northern sector of La Guajira, (Map 2), in the Urabá and 
Darien areas of the Atlantic Coast, (Map 3), and the on south Pacific Coast, specifically 
in the Nariño department, (Map 4). These three border coastal regions are characterised 
by their relative distance from the central government with a weak or nonexistence 
presence of the state, and are highly unpoliced due in part to the persistence of multiple 
violent actors (guerrillas and right wings paramilitary groups). Since colonial times 
these border areas have also been places of import and export of both legal and illegal 
goods. Specialized groups primarily dominated the contraband of such goods. It can 
also be argued, following Thoumi (2005), that these are areas where legality does not 
coincide with legitimacy (Thoumi, 1996). In these areas the services that the state 
should provide, security and protection, are delivered by a different set of actors.  
 
The Guajira region is exemplary of this, a region with a long history of contraband that 
predates the modern Colombian state and where until recently illegal activities played 
an open central role in their inhabitants lives, inhabitants who actively prevented the 
deployment of state control and even demanded their rights to ‘contraband’ (González-
Plazas, 2008). This was also central in what is known in the history of drug smuggling 
as the ‘bonanza marimbera’.28 During the late 1960s and 1970s ‘professional’ goods 
smugglers established contacts with American marihuana drug smugglers and buyers 
                                                          
28 Marihuana bonanza. 
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to distribute the marihuana harvested in the nearby Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. 
They provided their knowledge of smuggling maritime routes and hiding places in the 
Caribbean. The south Pacific region of Nariño and the Urabá region also have a long 
history of smuggling practices. In short, these are areas characterised by traditional 
smuggler practices, the relative absence of government, and with no shortage of 
knowledge about maritime related issues, such as tinkering with engines, locally 
repairing boats, etc. and the cohabitation of different maritime smuggling methods.  
 
The capture of several rings of narcosub builders and designers also shows how these 
artefacts evolved as a result of different groups aiming to solve the same problem. The 
consolidation of the use of narcosubs by drug smugglers as deduced by the increase of 
seizure of these artefacts from the regions mentioned above from 2005 to 2014 allows 
for a classification of these artefacts. To this I propose a broader categorization in two 
main typologies based on the immersion capabilities: semisubmersible artefacts and 
submersible artefacts. As noted the main difference between the two is their immersion 
capacity: semisubmersibles can submerge up to three quarters of its structure, using a 
diversity of strategies to achieve this (lead, stones, etc.), while a submersible achieves 
full immersion of its hull. Based on its principles for construction this typology can be 
expanded to encompass the diversity and evolution of narcosubs, in which further 
differences between materials used, building places, and a series of micro innovations 
can also be appreciated. In order to build this classification I borrow from Lichtenwald 
et al. ( 2012) and Ramirez & Bunker (2014), but while neither make a distinction or 
make explicit the differences between the Low Profile Vessels (LPV) and the 
semisubmersibles,29 I propose that this can be found in its building principles:  
 
 
                                                          
29 In journalistic reports, governmental reports, and even LEAs reports those differences are 
completely blurred, e.g. an antinarcotics police report only distinguishs between torpedoes and the 






1. Low Profile Vessels (LPV): These are self-propelled vessels that are capable of 
lowering their surface profile while controlling their depth and direction, although they 
not capable of full submersion. Their cost is estimated at US$1 million. They are 
capable of carrying between 2 and 8 tons, depending on their design. They are built 
using a go-fast boat or any other small boat that is covered usually with fibreglass 
(Figure 33 and Figure 34). 
 
2. Semisubmersible: Alternatively, Self Propelled Semi Submersibles (SPSS) are self-
propelled vessels built from scratch usually using a wood or aluminium frame and are 
covered with either fibreglass or aluminium sheets. With an increased cargo capacity 
of between 6 and 10 tons of cocaine. They consist of a wide variety of designs, 
differing specifically in hydrodynamics, exhaust systems, refrigeration systems, and 




3. Torpedo: Cylindrical shape artefacts with stabilization fins, built of steel. They are 
not self-propelled and are unmanned. The torpedoes are usually towed by a fishing 
boat. While towed this artefact is able to fully submerge. These artefacts are able to 
transport up to two tons of cocaine and their cost has been estimated between 
US$250,000 and US$500,000 (Figure 36 and Figure 37). 
 
4. Submarines: The Submersion capacities of these vessels are contested, but they can 
be described as artefacts designed and built with the aim of achieving full submersion 
of the hull. They are self-propelled and use a snorkel and cameras as visual aids. They 
are equipped with a radar system and other navigational technologies. Its more 
sophisticated design suggests specialized forms of knowledge. Its cost has been 
estimated between US$2 million to US$4 million and their capacity cargo is around 





Figure 33. Low profile vessel, Pacific. 
























Figure 38. Submarine type artefact, Timbiqui. 
Source: unk, Armada Nacional de Colombia. 
 
The images above suggest a high degree of variation even regarding narcosubs that fit 
these categories. The disposition of many of the important features of the narcosubs 
suggests a process of learning by trial and error, and attempts to find the optimal 
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solution. Torpedoes and semisubmersibles are a clear example regarding this, even if 
artefacts fitting these categories do not vary widely in size. The exemplars of torpedoes 
examined show differences in the disposition of the fins, likely as a result of 
experimentation with different strategies to guarantee submersion of the artefact while 
towed, while others also present changes to the ballast systems and weight distribution. 
A couple of these examples present a sophisticated hydraulic system designed to 
compensate for forward and backward movement while being towed. Finally, some 
torpedoes possess a box on the nose in which a beacon is located to help the recovery 
of the artefact in case it had to be set loose due to the presence of LEAs. 
Hydrodynamics, exhaust systems, refrigeration systems, coating and material features 
vary greatly, and it can be argued some reach a high degree of sophistication in the 
semi-submersibles. 
 
Self-propelled narcosubs also present interesting variations in their propellers, both in 
their quantity and design, as well as in the materials used and in their procurement. 
LPVs, semisubmersibles and submarines use between one and two propellers, but 
there is greater variation in the procurement of their propellers. While some low profile 
vessels and semisubmersibles use propellers from available manufacturers, new or 
second hand, being those readily available in near shops, other users prefer custom 
made propellers. In several instances the Navy and Police have found propellers that 
due to their characteristics were considered as ‘hechizas’30 that demonstrate variable 
degrees of skills in their design and construction from artisan work to propellers whose 
design reveal naval engineer knowledge (Policia Nacional, n.d.).  
 
Characteristically in the LPV and semisubmersible models the cockpit and ‘goose 
neck’ ventilation tubes remain visible above water, while exhaust pipes either remain 
visible in most of the artefacts seized or in some other examples remain below the 
waterline together with heat exchangers tubes. The ventilation pipes in the ‘goose 
                                                          




neck’ shape that allows the intake of air for the engine room and cabin, vary in their 
quantity, shape and materials. Some users prefer off-the-shelf technology for the 
ventilation pipes, either bronze or PVC pipes, while in other models the goose necks 
are custom made in glass fibre (Figure 39). The air exchange is helped in some cases 
with the placement of an air extractor. In some instances, builders of narcosubs coat 
the the exhaust pipes placed on the top with different fibres in order to help reduce 
heat. Some models possess an intricate pipeline as in industrial double pipe heat 
exchangers running alongside the vessel to cool the machine room as the ship moves 
(Figure 40). Some have suggested this later use was developed as an innovation in 
order to reduce heat signature emitted by the powerful diesel engines thus making the 
detection by infrared detectors more difficult.  
 
 






Figure 40. Heat exchengers. 
Source: Author. 
 
Together with the reduction of heat through the use of pipes and shielding the exhaust 
system, two other innovations in those artefacts have been interpreted by LEAs and 
the Navy as designers’ strategies to enhance stealthiness: painting and shielding. The 
colours used in narcosubs have been assumed to be a scheme to camouflage them in 
the water, and are said to be carefully chosen by designers in order to match the colour 
of the sea in which the narcosub is set to operate, making visual detection from above 
or from navy ship decks more difficult (Bunker, 2010). Various degrees of blue, grey, 
and sea green are common. Anti-slip paint has also been detected and is used in order 
to diminish the risk of crew falling in the water when they have to walk on top of the 
artefact. A common interpretation of LEAs is that fibreglass is used as the material of 
choice because artefacts built from this material are more difficult to detect with radar 
(Policia Nacional, n.d.). Clearly designers have attempted to apply different solutions 
to difficult detection techniques by shielding the narcosubs. Some exemplars do 
possess an upper lead shielding to help minimize the heat signature and therefore 
infrared detection means, while in others the shielding is made with different asbestos 
fibres, and even one recovered vessel was covered with cathodic protection using zinc 
blocks. In short narcosub builders attempt to reduce the risk of detection though a 




One aspect that remains rather similar among self-propelled narcosubs is the 
distribution of the compartments. In self-propelled narcosubs (SSPSs and LPVs) the 
engine room is placed at the rear of the artefact, with a small cabin space in the middle, 
and storage space in the front. Fuel tanks are placed in the rear and at the bow (Figure 
41). 
 
Figure 41. Semisubmersible, blueprint. 
Source: Colombian Antinarcotics Police. 
 
Another feature of the narcosub that seems to be present in most of the variants of this 
artefact is the existence of a valve that allows water to flow inside the artefact and, in 
fact, sink the artefact and any evidence in case of being detected by LEAs or the Navy. 
The crew are intended to abandon the vessel wearing life vests or by inflating a small 
zodiac boat. This practice extends both to artefacts built in the Pacific and Caribbean, 
and in practice turns an interdiction operation into a search and rescue operation. After 
the Anti-submersible law was passed this occurrences diminished, as the law permitted 





The overview of the evolution of the narcosubs provides an entry point to reflect on 
the process of innovation in outlaw environments. The narcosubs emerge as a user-
driven solution to the problem of transporting big amounts of illicit drugs while 
evading state action, from an initial stage of experimenting and prototyping to the 
dynamic of dispersed peer innovation (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015). This has been 
carried out by different groups with little incentive to collaborate among themselves 
giving rise to a wide variation of artefacts following two different avenues, 
submersible artefacts and semisubmersible ones. Being able to configure a complex 
artefact using a mix and match approach, producing hybrids, in which local available 
pieces and knowledge are blended with off-the-shelf solutions and expert engineering 
knowledge resembles some of the patterns of innovation found by Hyysalo and 
Usenyuk (2015) in their study of the Karakat. As result of this pattern of dispersed peer 
innovation, where antagonist and non-collaborative relationships are also key 
characteristics, smugglers and outlaw innovators, as in the process of adapting 
biological entities in which they face many conflicting constrains both from their 
internal organisation and the interaction with the environment, are left with many 
alternative, locally optimal, compromised solutions (Kauffman & Macready, 1995).  
 
I also argue that what diffuses is the ‘techno-meme’; in absence of blueprints or 
established designs, what travels is the promise of stealthiness and sophistication 
offered by this specific solution. Competition with other smugglers, as well as with the 
state, also plays a role that promotes the process of innovation. Fleck’s (2000) concept 
of artefact-activity couple further helps us to understand how particular innovators in 
particular variants of the narcosubs were able, thorough trial an error, to master the 
building principles of the narcosub and introduce minor variations into their models. 
The variation and innovation (as much as the interpretations of those innovations), in 
the narcosub also create changes in a coevolutionary fashion, in which the 
consequences of the choices of the illicit actors, competing among themselves and 
against the state, constantly destabilize the landscape in which they act, triggering a 
situation in which multiple players attempt adaptive alterations, which create new 
floods of adaptations. In Chapter 1 I suggested that the ‘Red Queen effect’ may help 
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to explain this scenario, in which players keep adapting simply to sustain their current 
level of fitness (Kauffman, 1995).  
 
Building a Narcosub: Underground Knowledge and Outlaw 
Innovation 
 
From the early years when state agencies, the Navy, and the Antinarcotic Police did 
not possess clear knowledge of the use of narcosubs in drug traffic, the design, 
building, and use of these artefacts remained an underground activity. Before 2009 the 
building or possession or these artefact was not a criminal offense and early narcosubs 
were built in or near populated areas. Voss (2007) studied how innovation in highly 
stigmatized, hidden, and illegal environments, in which users often gain some form or 
‘underground or forbidden knowledge’, facilitates some aspects of knowledge 
exchange while it constrains others due to the stigma of participation. As stated 
previously, most narcosubs are built in border areas where boundaries between legality 
and illegality often have a different logic that the one promoted by the state, and where 
the state sanctioned laws are scare and kinship relationships can function as incentive 
enough to participate in ‘illegal activities’.  
 
Kleemans and de Poot (2008) introduced the concept of Social Opportunity Structure 
to emphasise the important of social ties, work relations, leisure activities, and life 
events in providing access to ‘organised crime’ activities, while other researchers from 
the criminology perspective have highlighted the importance of possessing certain 
skills as a factor that may contribute to the involvement of people in ‘organised crime’ 
activities, skills that they might acquire in their professional settings (Van Koppen & 




Little is known about how narcosub designers organize themselves and how designs 
are decided on or modified. The design, building, and use of the narcosub is sometimes 
assumed to be the result of ‘cartels’ who hire ‘expert knowledge’, such as naval 
engineers who then recruit builders. This notion is common in journalistic reports, 
while the idea of ‘Transnational Organize Crime Networks’ is used in other reports 
and policy documents to explain the widespread use of those artefacts (e.g. Rico, 2013; 
Hernandez, Galeano, & Escobar, 2012). Others assume that narcosubs are the result of 
the application of years of military innovation by the FARC (the main guerrilla group) 
transferred to ‘their’ drug traffic enterprises (e.g. Jacome Jaramillo, 2016), or 
superimpose locality of FARC actions with smugglers’ activities (e.g. Hernandez et 
al., 2012).  
 
A set of documents allows us to take a glimpse at the organisation of a narcosub 
enterprise. These include the Supreme Court of Justice ruling on the extradition of 
Colombian nationals to the United States in order to be judged by courts in the US for 
criminal offenses including narcotics violations,31 and intelligence reports from the 
Colombian Antinarcotics Police.  
 
What intelligence reports establish is that in general it can be considered that narcosub 
builders are often independent groups that are able to contact, or be contacted by drug 
smugglers in order to build these artefacts according to customers’ needs and 
specifications (Policia Nacional, n.d.). As part of a bargain plea a submarine builder 
narrates how as part of his enterprise with the organisation he belonged to he carried 
out and presented blueprints of ‘his’ narcosubs, and descriptions of the areas where the 
artefacts could be built and launched. As part of his negotiation with prospective 
buyers he shared his past experience of success in the building and sailing of these 
artefacts.  
                                                          
31 The current Colombian-United States extradition agreement became enforced in 1997.  
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Benson and Decker (2010) argued for the presence of some specialization within drug 
smuggling organisations, implying that different members of the organisation possess 
different skills and individual abilities. Specialization also implies some degree or 
coordination and interdependence between the different units of the group. The 
description offered in the official documents shows a highly specialized organisation 
in which different forms of knowledge converge in order to, not only provide a design 
and to build it according to those specifications, but to overcome barriers, such as 
distance and surveillance.  
 
Figure 42. Narcosub building team. 
Source: Author, using data from the General Attorney Office. 
Arrows only account for main relationship as described in the official documents. 
 
Figure 42 reconstructs the main links in a narcosub builder organisation, and shows 
the multiple forms of knowledge and relationships that can be found in such an 
organisation. While some aspects of the design are carried out by ‘specialists’, such as 
electrical and mechanical engineers, others are left to people with local knowledge, 
such as knowledge about fibreglass handling and coating. On the other hand, at least 
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in this organisation, another individual, in this case the provider of the fibreglass, also 
plays the role of ‘comptroller’ guaranteeing that in fact the vessel is correctly 
waterproofed. Other individuals are in charge of the logistics, and buying and carrying 
the materials and personnel to the shipyards. Finally, some individuals are hired as 
crewmen.  
 
The organisation described in the legal files is interesting, because it has two different 
construction sites, one in Colombia’s south Pacific and one on the Ecuadorian Coast. 
The organisation boss was not actually involved in the construction of the narcosubs, 
but he was the main source of finance and the owner of the narcosubs, the shipyards, 
and the drugs. The main builder of the narcosubs is considered also a ‘chief’ within 
the organisation. Besides providers of drugs, every shipyard has an administrator 
accompanied by a chief of security. The description provided does not delve into the 
process of designing and building of the narcosubs, but shows the participation of 
people with formalized knowledge, together with others in possession of craftwork 
knowledge, such as the people involved in the woodworking and the fibreglass 
construction, some of whom worked in both shipyards. The fibreglass work was 
supervised by another specialist, who provided expert knowledge and supervision at 
both sites. This person was not part of the organisation, but the provider of the 
fibreglass. In the same organisation a mechanical engineer was identified, who was in 
charge of the design and building of the hatches, steering mechanisms and 
galvanization of the narcosubs.  
 
Zaitch (2002) showed the presence of some overlaps between kinship structures and 
friendship structures in criminal organisations that smuggle drugs into the Netherlands. 
This organisation also shows the different forms of kinship relationships, ranging from 
friendship, family, acquaintances, and referrals. Kinship relationships are also present 
in other groups, as it was in the so-called era of ‘cartels’. In this circumstance sharing 
underground knowledge on how to build these artefacts is open to the members or the 
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groups in these rather informal associations. In addition, builders spend several months 
sharing small rooms, just meters away from where narcosubs are built. 
 
Builders are hired from the local area, and transported to the areas where narcosubs 
are being built, which are also the areas where they will depart from. Marquez (2014) 
has documented the existence of knowledge about building artisanal boats in 
Caribbean coastal areas, knowledge informally transmitted, and the existence of 
people with the capacity to create models or to build an artisanal boat given the 
availability of a model. Narcosubs are built in makeshift jungle workshops in the areas 
of Urabá and the Pacific Coast, Figure 43 and Figure 44), and the ones found in La 
Guajira, have been built in tents in the middle of semi deserted areas (Figure 45).32 In 
these workshops builders proceed by building the moulds, mixing the resins, fitting 
together the engines (to which they use the nearby trees as pulleys), and making the 
flotation and waterproof trials.  
 
As mentioned, these areas are characterised by being barely policed. Narcosub builders 
that operate in the South Pacific area also take advantage of the tide regime, and the 
intricate mangrove labyrinth in order to transport personnel and materials needed to 
build the artefact, as well as to programme the launch of the narcosubs, which implies 
the deployment of local knowledge. People from local areas also make up the crew, 
with one of the members, an experienced seaman, taking the role of captain.  
 
                                                          
32 Some anecdotal evidence also suggests that builders are transported from their region of origin to 
a new setting. This is the case of narcosubs found in La Guajira. Two interviews in this area affirmed 
that a particular artefact was built from people from the Pacific, ‘The submarine they found near 
Esmeralda, that one was built by people from Choco. You see some black folks that you have never 





Figure 43. Makeshift shipyard in the middle of the jungle. 






Figure 44. Semisubmersible in the making. 





Figure 45. Steel hull semisubmersible, La Guajira. 
Source: Colombian Antinarcotics Police. 
 
The characterisation of narcosub builders and the description of the set of relationships 
and context in which they work demonstrate that in order to understand the diffusion 
of smuggler technologies it is important to understand the forms of underground 
knowledge that is needed for the construction of narcosubs, a theme that has been 
neglected in academic literature so far. Including such themes allows to overcome the 
shortcomings of an analysis in which interdiction is the only explanation for smuggler 
innovation. I attempt to present a more nuanced description of how outlaw innovators 
are able to integrate characteristics of complex organisations, such as some degree or 
hierarchical structure and specialization with informal interactions, in order to create 
a complex technology, all this in the absence of established arenas of interactions such 
as in the case of the Karakat (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015) and the early rural cars in 
United States (Kline & Pinch, 1996). This suggests that in some instances, for outlaw 
innovation, arenas of interaction and interchange of information are not necessary for 





The Navy and the Narcosubs 
 
A retired captain of the Navy and the first commander of the Coast Guard in the 
Caribbean narrates the Navy’s first encounter with the narcosub phenomena:  
 
In the 1994 or 1995…I enrolled in an antinarcotics course in Martinique, it was 
a course taught by the Organisatio of American States (OEA) I went on my 
own, the Navy didn’t pay for it…nevertheless, when we were there, I found 
out that of all of the Navies there, no one, no one had any idea what was 
happening…The Argentinians had no idea…the French people, they were 
teaching the course, they knew something, but only superficially…my team 
and I with only eight months of experience in the field…we had much more 
experience than all of them…that day that I travel to Martinique...was the day 
we caught the first submarine here, they had already used some 
semisubmarines…and that capture was published in the newspapers…so I 
bought the newspaper…and it was a two hour class that day, me with the 
newspaper teaching about the submarine…(Interview). 
 
The use of submersible or semisubmersible artefacts was perceived as a new challenge 
for the Navy and Coast Guard personnel, one that was augmented as smugglers 
increasingly moved their activities to unpoliced and difficult to access areas. A Coast 
Guard Captain, then a lieutenant by the time of the capture of the first narcosubs, 
explains that ‘in that time (1994-1995) we captured two of those, one in Tayrona and 
the other in Providencia…and since the Coast Guard Unit didn’t exist, those people 
performed their activities in broad daylight’ (Interview). 
 
In order to control the use of narcosubs the Colombian Navy developed different 
strategies to discourage or stop smugglers from using such artefacts. They did so by 
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creating new uses of old artefacts, by increasing intelligence efforts, and by 
establishing close relations with lawmakers in order to include a clause penalizing the 
building and possession of submersible and semisubmersible artefacts in the Penal 
Code.  
 
Initially the use of sonar was considered a tool to counter the narcosubs, leading 
authorities to taking advantage of the skills of sonar personnel. Nevertheless, the 
visualization of narcosubs from the air has been considered a major asset in attempts 
to identify these artefacts when it is not feasible to catch them before they set sail. The 
use of airplanes with radar can provide means of detection once an area has been 
sufficiently confined by intelligence efforts, or they can provide initial leads that are 
then evaluated and discarded or pursued. A Navy captain explains: ‘the detection on 
the surface…the means…the navigational radars and other types of radars can detect, 
let’s say, just initially a heat signature…or any other technical details…that can be 
workable…’. The procurement of airplanes for maritime vigilance implied a 
redefinition of roles between the Navy and Army, who at the same time (late 2000s) 
were aiming to create their own air branch, according to a Navy Captain: ‘We had this 
problem with the Army, it was necessary to clearly define areas of action…well not 
ours…theirs…because they don’t have maritime patrol airplanes…they could have’ 
(Interview).  
 
Several informers highlighted what the existence of narcosubs has implied for the 
Navy. On one hand it required innovation in the use of resources: ‘the means are the 
same, but we have to use it in different ways’, claimed a Coast Guard commander. On 
the other hand, to strengthen intelligence as a main strategy as a deputy commander of 
a Navy base explained:  
 
We had discussions, well, the first problem is detection. So we gave orders to 
increase all the efforts to capture those artefacts before they set sail, because, 
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when you’re talking about transport, the method is the centre. But we decided 
that the most efficient strategy was to capture them on the shore, because when 
they’re on the sea, it is really hard. And even if you see them, then there is 
another problem, how do you stop those things? Those closed things, they carry 
people inside! So you can’t just sink them. (Interview). 
 
In 2008 the Colombian Navy contacted several members of Parliament in order to 
create a law to penalize the possession and sailing of submersible and semisubmersible 
artefacts, and to increase the penalty if these artefacts were being used to transport 
illicit drugs. The bill was proposed in September 2008 and passed in August 2009.33  
 
As justification for this effort the Colombian Navy presented operational results from 
1993 to 2008, stressing the fact that during 2008, fourteen of these artefacts were 
captured. They also highlighted that the smugglers’ strategy when captured was to sink 
the narcosub. In absence of illicit drugs smugglers turned themselves into castaways, 
turning an interdiction operation into a search and rescue one. According to the Navy 
this practice allowed the smugglers to accumulate experience in the use of narcosubs, 
increasing the likelihood of their use. Crew that was rescued after the sinking of a 
narcosub, in absence of a penal sanction, could use their experience and attempt to sail 
another narcosub.  
 
The new law then stated that those persons involved in financing, building, storing, 
commercialising, transporting, or buying submersible or semisubmersible artefacts are 
subject to a sentence of between 6 and 12 years, and it defines a semisubmersible or 
submersible artefact as any artefact able to move in the water with or without its own 
                                                          
33 In 2008 the US senate approved the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act of 2008, with a similar 
purpose. In fact both laws are very similar with a notable exception: the sentence is doubled if the 
person convicted is a former member or employee of any state agency. In 2011, The Colombian Navy 
presented a Model Legislation on Self-Propelled Submersible and Semi-Submersible Vessels to a CICAD 
meeting, with the intention to serve as a template for similar legislation regarding narcosub threat.  
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propulsion, including artefacts able to fully submerge or those that cannot. The 
sentence is higher if illicit drugs are discovered and would be increase if the person is 
or was a member of any Colombian security or military agency or any other state 
agency.  
 
According to the Navy, as stated during the interview and in the media, the 
promulgation of this law was considered a success, and to some this was seen to lead 
to the displacement of the narcosub phenomena to other countries without a similar 
legislation and the decrease in the number of crew members using the castaway 
strategy (Rodriguez Viera, 2013). Several other member of the Navy agreed, with, for 
example, a Coast Guard Captain stressing the importance of the law in the reduction 
of the narcosub phenomena:  
 
We came from the previous years, 2008, 2009…and you have twenty one cases 
per year…but in 2009, the submersible law appears…and in 2009 its just 
starting…but in 2010 is already in place…and you see…three, four or five 
cases…is not that the semisubmersibles have disappeared…they continue to 
sail…but now…those who want to try…well at least they think twice 
now…(Interview). 
 
A lieutenant narrates his experience with the adoption of the Law:  
 
They had it clear before 2009, before 2009 we could capture those artefacts, 
with people inside, and we couldn’t do absolutely anything. I caught 4 people, 
they were navigating, but without illicit drugs, and nothing, absolutely nothing 
happened… (…) but after the law in 2009, it was easier for use, because even 
if they sink the vessel, we, with video evidence, we could say they were 
committing a crime…(Interview). 
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Another Captain affirms: ‘well, the submersibles are practically out of the race’. 
However, in 2015, several narcosubs were captured while en route or on shore, three 
of them in the Pacific and one on the Colombian Caribbean Coast (CIMCON, 2015), 
and others in places such as Ecuador and Brazil.  
 
At least since 1993 smugglers have used submersible and semisubmersible artefacts 
in order to transport illicit drugs, mainly cocaine. In the last few years similar artefacts 
have been built in Spain, Brazil, Venezuela, and Ecuador. The Office of Homeland 
Security in the U.S. built their own narcosub, in order to analyse the capacities and 
develop technological solutions for thwarting such artefacts. The artefact was named 
‘Pluto’ and it emulates many features of the Narcosubs, but it was built to be ‘safe’, it 
didn’t possess the sinking valve. Pluto was tested, in the words of the Homeland 
Office, in ‘realistic operational conditions in order to compile realistic scenarios, in 
an attempt to mimic the real thing to suggest procurement of technology and policies’ 
(The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate 
(S&T), 2012).  
 
I have described the Narcosubs as a hybrid, in which the adaptation of sophisticated 
navigational electronics, traditional boat building, off-the-shelf solutions, and formal 
knowledge places a diversity of solutions in the hand of drug smugglers. The overview 
of the narcosub that I have provided shows a continue process of innovation, with 
outlaw users and designers innovating the design of narcosubs. From the early 
prototyping phase in the early 1990s, the seizure of these artefacts suggests a shift from 
the Caribbean coast to the Pacific (altogether with the displacement of drug smuggling 
routes).  
 
A common thread in academic, policy, and journalistic documents present the history 
of the development of narcosubs in a logical progression, both from the perspective of 
others methods of smuggling narcotics and as a history of continuously technical 
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improvement in the progressive development of the various versions of the narcosubs. 
I have suggested that in order to have a more appropriate account of the development 
of the narcosub and of smuggling technologies, the concept of dispersed peer 
innovation (Hyysalo & Usenyuk, 2015) is useful, in order to understand how non-
coordinated actors, without the presence of arenas of interaction, can produce complex 
pieces of technology.  
 
The narcosub presents a bricolage type of construction, in which outlaw users opt for 
a mix and match approach in order to produce a highly cost-efficient product suited to 
their needs. A product that can help them to avoid procurement from manufactures as 
it makes use of local, traditional knowledge. The narcosub solution travels as a 
‘flexible techno-meme’ that is used by different groups as a generic solution for the 
transport of big amounts of illicit drugs, as it adapts to different production setting. 
This techno-meme offers the promise of stealthiness to drug smugglers who are in 
competition with other smuggler groups and state agents. 
 
There are obvious difficulties in establishing certainties about the process of design, 
building, and use of submersible and semisubmersible artefacts, with the asymmetry 
of information being a significant barrier. Nevertheless, borrowing from STS and user 
innovation research I have showed that this discipline can provide useful insight for 
the study of Outlaw Innovation and provide an analysis that avoids the shortcomings 
that emphasise a process of pull/push with interdiction as the main driver of smuggler 
innovations. In this chapter, I have suggested that this can only account for some initial 
push, but it cannot explain the diversity of artefacts nor the process of diffusion.  
 
The history of the narcosub then produces empirical evidence of how users, and in this 
case outlaw users can produce a complex artefact, and overcome barriers to their 
production, such as geographical distance and difficulties to access materials for their 
construction, and continuous changes in the system in which they are produced. Over 
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more than 20 years smugglers have produced a wide variety of narcosub artefact, and 
despite the efforts of state agencies to control these artefacts, their use continues. The 




















Chapter 6. How to Control the Sea: Strategies, Plans 
and Strategic Concepts 
 
 
In order to plan operations and long-term development the Colombian Navy has had 
to develop answers to a number of questions: What methods are being used to smuggle 
illicit drugs? What is the best way to thwart each illicit transport method? What 
artefacts should be procured in order to catch smugglers? What are the best methods 
to patrol the sea, and how can operational success be maximised? What are the short-
term and long-term consequences of the Navy’s actions against smugglers, their 
routes, and transport methods?  
 
Since the War on Drugs (WoD) was declared by the United States government during 
the Ronald Reagan presidency in 1982, and with the enrolment of producer and 
transhipment countries, billions of dollars have been spent on a multitude of efforts 
aimed at disrupting and dismantling the drug market, thwarting organisations, 
capturing the ‘bosses’ of the so called ‘cartels’, destroying laboratories for the 
production of illicit drugs, and seizing assets acquired with money resulting from the 
involvement in illicit drug traffic.  
 
The defence of Colombian maritime borders, state territoriality, and state sovereignty 
have played an important role in shaping the choices made by the Colombian Navy in 
the WoD. Since the early years of chasing marihuana smugglers, the Colombian Navy 
- and particularly the Coast Guard as a specialized unit devoted to interdiction 
operations - has procured vessels, communication systems, developed several plans at 
different levels, and established agreements with other Navies and countries in order 
to thwart smugglers from reaching their destination. These multiple solutions are 
aimed at responding to the question on how to patrol the sea.  
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In the preparation of these plans the upper ranks of the Colombian Navy have made 
use of statistics on drug seizures in order to evaluate and make sense of future 
scenarios. In these plans the Colombian Navy have made the case for the procurement 
and deployment of the right tools and strategies in order to wage the WoD and attempt 
to integrate the developments of the Navy with broader policy issues, e.g. the fight 
against narcoterrorism. The plans, and the understandings and visions that come with 
them, have allowed security forces to create a backdrop through which to measure 
their operational success. Plans having different operational focuses and responding to 
different threats are instruments to reveal success and to explain the changes in 
enemies’ plans and strategies.  
 
In this chapter I present some evidence about the key elements of this arena, the arena 
of command. In this arena commanders deploy their visions of the Navy as a modern 
and flexible Navy, with a focus on producing tangible results in order to reassert the 
Navy as able counter-drug agency. I point out that developments do not necessarily 
follow a pattern of response/counter response, as simplistic conceptions of the 
interdiction/evasion binary might suggest, but are instead intertwined with ideas about 
security and border control, success, the role of the Navy, and other values such as 
flexibility that are important in guiding the actions of the Navy. This is also a broad 
attempt to detail how the Coast Guard Unit has developed since the year 1994, the year 
in which the first commander in the Caribbean found ‘some offices and four boats’ 
(Chapter 7), to the current socio technical complexity in which different generations 
of boats, communication systems, and radars have co-evolved with different 
interpretations of the enemy and strategies of control. In this chapter I also show that 
as part of these plans, the Colombian Navy has encouraged collaboration, and coped 
with the difficulties and limitations of such. I present evidence from interviews with 
senior officers, among them two former Navy commanders, and evidence from Navy 




How to patrol 928,660 km2 of ocean? 
 
The Colombian Navy has the responsibility of assuring sovereignty over the Caribbean 
Sea (540,876 km2)34 and the Pacific Ocean (339,500 km2) accounting for 928,660 km2 
of maritime water, 40,875 km2 of coastal land, 9 maritime borders, and it also has 
jurisdiction over navigable rivers and some 2,900 km of shoreline.  
 
The Colombian Navy has four strategic goals: 1. Protecting Colombian citizens and 
the nation’s resources, as well as the consolidation of territorial control, 2. 
Neutralization of Narcoterrorism financial sources, 3. Strategic deterrence, and 4. 
Providing Maritime and Fluvial Security. In short the Colombian Navy has three main 
missions: to serve as a deterrence against rival nations (although regular war scenarios 
seem unlikely, naval exercises often contemplate scenarios of naval clash against 
Nicaragua and Venezuela, as they are the most expected adversaries on single attacks 
or combined attacks); to wage a war against left and right wings groups, which often 
overlaps with the previous; and to stop smugglers from using maritime routes in order 
to transport illicit drugs. The last two missions are often presented together, as the 
official document of the Navy equates drug smugglers with irregular armed groups.  
 
While currently maritime interdiction operations are a fundamental part of the 
activities of the Navy and particularly the Coast Guard, the first operational 
commander of the Coast Guard in the Caribbean narrates the initial reluctance of 
personnel of the Colombian Navy to engage in counter narcotic operations:  
 
                                                          
34 Territorial and maritime disputes in the Caribbean between Colombia and Nicaragua, and the rule 
of the International Court of Justice in 2012 diminished Colombian maritime territory by 75,000 km2. 
The Colombian government, nevertheless, has not accepted this ruling.  
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Then I found the first logical difficulty…and it was…this thing…as I call it…to 
change the chip…to change from a traditional Navy to have a Coast Guard 
Unit…so…many of the old officials…they didn’t like that…but we know that 
with the tools and the doctrine of a traditional Navy we had…that we couldn’t 
do what we needed to do…so…we had to change…to adapt to those new 
situations (Interview).  
 
The admiral in charge of the operational strategy Closing the Gap stresses the 
difficulties of accepting the new role of the Navy, who moved from an entirely Blue 
Waters Navy (Continental waters) to one of Brown Waters (Territorial waters), as a 
reason why there were no clear strategies for controlling smuggling routes before 
Closing the Gap:  
 
There was some opposition…to the idea of that being a role of the 
Navy…because…the idea was that the role of the Navy was only to control 
blue waters, and a Blue Waters Navy is a real War Navy…and if you start 
working on brown waters you turn the Navy into something else (Interview).   
 
According to the Navy, even if all resources are channelled in order to fulfil these 
objectives, this multitude of goals implies that the Navy has to prioritize some over 
other goals: ‘Due to this multitude of goals, it is difficult to predict which ones will be 
prioritized during a specific frame of time’ (Armada República de Colombia, 2015). 
Adding to the multitude of goals, the Navy has to perform these activities in a number 
of geographical spaces, and in order to face all potential threats and fulfil all the goals, 
the Navy must aim to acquire capacities that allow both a quick adaptation to every 





The requirements of flexibility are closely tied to the need to adapt to asymmetric wars. 
The day to day of the WoD resembles crime fighting activities. Even if drug smugglers 
engage in violence and on occasion use fire arms in order to evade capture, a typical 
counterdrug operation, , suggests that the use of evasive techniques and stealth are the 
common strategies of drug smugglers in order to carry out their activities. As discussed 
in chapter 1, stereotyped descriptions tend to emphasise that flexibility is an important 
characteristic of drug smugglers, who are said to be able to rapidly change in order to 
guarantee the success of their goals, while the Military and LEAs agencies are said to 
be constantly on their tails but unable to really catch up with the innovative smugglers.  
 
Smugglers are then portrayed as highly dynamic and the illicit drug market as in 
continuous flux. Several metaphors have been used to describe this phenomenon. The 
‘balloon effect’ is a metaphor used to describe how enforcement in one region pushes 
whole or parts of the illicit traffic from one region to another, that is to say, that 
interdiction results in geographical displacement of the actions of smugglers (Bagley, 
2012; Mejía & Posada, 2008).35 Trends and trajectories are mapped; a retrospective 
accumulation of data and localized views are used as evidence for prospective 
thinking. Whenever a major trend is ‘discovered’, policies, resources, and strategies of 
the law enforcement agencies and military organisations are reconfigured, involving 
the procurement and implementation of new artefacts or the repurposing of existing 
ones.  
 
It has been affirmed that thwarting air drug smuggling forced smugglers to search for 
new means of transportation (Decker & Townsend Chapman, 2008).This represented 
one of the major changes in relation to drug traffic routes and transport methods that 
implied enormous challenges for both LEAs and the Military, especially the 
Colombian Navy. This trend was consolidated by the late 1990s, and by the mid-2000s 
                                                          
35 As pointed out by Reuter (2014) the effects of interdiction efforts should be taken only as part of 
broad explanations, and there are reasons to assert that the Balloon Effect is a over-simplifying 
metaphor produced by the invisibility of smugglers actions and the fact that  statistics rely solely on 
seizure data which are not necessarily reflexive of the actual situation.   
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the Colombian Navy reported that 72% of the cocaine transported using maritime 
routes leaves Colombia from the Pacific Coast while 27% travel from the Caribbean,. 
At the same time the Navy claimed that it was the ‘national institution that captures 
the most on an annual basis’ (Revista Armada, N 86, 2004). By 2010 the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated that the vast majority of drugs 
smuggled from Colombia were transported using maritime routes and a large 
percentage is transported from the Pacific. In her book Seas of Cocaine, Perez affirms 
that roughly 70 to 80% of cocaine is transported using maritime routes (2014).  
 
Colombian Navy personnel make observations regarding this issue: 1. The key 
strategic location of Colombia, the vastness of the space, and he differences between 
the two key scenarios, the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, with further regional 
and local differences.  
 
To the members of the Navy the geographical position of Colombia favours illicit drug 
traffic. According to the deputy commander of the South Pacific task force the location 
of the country is key: ‘Colombia is located in a geostrategic position that favours the 
drug traffic’ (Interview). To others this geographical location also provides the 
conditions for transnational crimes to emerge, as affirmed by the Caribbean 
commander of the Coast Guard:  
 
Colombia…is really in a good geostrategic situation…somehow it is the 
bellybutton of the world…and for that very location…almost all transnational 
crimes are going to touch the country somehow…all the routes that come or go 
to the Panama Canal, they pass over our waters…so, in a way all those crimes 




Several interviewees pointed out that the size of the territory over which the 
Colombian Navy is required to exert control is the main problem. The vastness of the 
maritime space is then provided as an explanation for the difficulties of controlling 
maritime drug traffic. A base commander explained:  
 
Colombia…with the transit zone…that is the Pacific and the Caribbean…this 
consists of an area the size of the U.S.…and you’re set to patrol that area with 
eight cars, with a maximum speed of 25km per hour…so it is that simple…it 
is like patrolling the U.S. with only ten, eight, five, six, seven, ten police patrols 
going at 25 km per hour (Interview). 
 
This also highlights the problems Navy personnel face in regards to performing their 
jobs. A commander talking about smugglers strategies using maritime routes points 
out that ‘well…it is really hard…because it is not only a matter of detection, to catch 
them…is another thing altogether…it is like finding a corn seed in a stadium’ 
(Interview).  
 
The Navy personnel point out that their knowledge of the differences between the 
Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean is a key element in performing their jobs. The 
interviewees stated that the differences, do not only condition the way smugglers act, 
but the methods of transport used, as well as the strategies and tools that the Navy 
needs to deploy. A good commander is one who is aware of such differences. The 
Pacific changes, the Caribbean does not. The Pacific Ocean has a tide regime that 
increases or decreases up to several meters a day, a characteristics that the Caribbean 
Sea does not have. This provides different operational scenarios that contribute to the 
way officers perform their operations and view their enemies. A view shared by most 
of the interviewees is that it is possible to match geographical conditions to actions, 
both for the Navy and for smugglers, as a Navy commander states: ‘Nature determines 
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the way traffickers do what they do…Nature constrains …both the way they commit 
their crimes…and the way we (the Navy) operate’ (Interview).  
 
These differences give the Navy the opportunity to perform different actions, when the 
tide is low in the Pacific they can go and try to find smugglers logistical centres and 
makeshift shipyards in the jungle, when the tide is high they perform open sea 
operations. A commander explains:  
 
There are operational efforts in the Pacific that sometimes are focused on the 
tidal change…I mean different efforts when the tide is high or low…it is so 
much easier when the tide is low, because the troops can go into [the jungle] to 
search, even more if we have an intelligence report…it is so much easier if the 
tide is low (Interview).  
 
A former commander of the pacific Coast Guard complements the narrative above:  
 
There are geographical and meteorological, geomorphological 
differences…the first one…and that influences the illicit traffic dynamics using 
maritime routes…is…the tidal regime…the tidal regime in the Pacific changes 
every six hours…and it changes up to four meters…and once a month even 
more than four meters…and this doesn’t happen in the Caribbean…so here we 
have an initial difference…nature that influences the way the narco-traffickers 






A third commander in a Caribbean base agrees: 
 
Because of the geography…then the strategies that the Navy have implemented 
in the Caribbean…in collaboration with friendly countries…those strategies 
are somehow different from the ones (implemented) in the Pacific…we have 
similar tools in both…but we used them in different ways (Interview).  
 
This tidal changes and the possible different operations that comes with and the 
resulting operations in those dissimilar conditions also provide various appreciations 
of the operations. While other officers consider that open sea operations with different 
units working as the perfect example of beautiful operation, a Coast Guard 
Commander, pointing out a recently captured boat, says: ‘this one was captured in the 
open sea…nine miles out in open sea…that is a beautiful operation’ (Interview), as for 
others a good operations is one in which the smugglers are not even let to set sail.  
 
Commanders provide further interpretations concerning the relation between 
geographical conditions and criminal activities. Particular regions are tied to specific 
transport methods used by smugglers, in which the behaviour of the sea, characteristics 
associated with the shore areas and distance from destinations play a role in those 
interpretations. A commander states:  
They do not commit the crimes in the same way from the mid Pacific (coast) 
to the south…that from the mid Pacific to the north…they don’t’. A local 
commander, pointing out to a map of the Colombian Pacific Coast: ‘well…they 
organize things…and how do they get to their destinations…here in the Central 




The Caribbean scenario, however, is seen as mainly used to perform quick short moves 
using go-fast boats. This view that different geographies allows different smuggler 
strategies is also present in strategic documents. The Closing the Gap strategy from 
2007 points out:  
 
The Colombian Pacific region has two geographical characteristics that merit 
the use of different means to resist the criminal activity of the NTOs in this 
area of the country. The northern Pacific coastline is characterized by rocky 
cliffs with beautiful bays and inlets, while the southern coastal region consists 
of a wide tidal floodplain forming a waterborne conduit of dense mangrove 
swamps and a labyrinth network of streams, channels, and estuaries. 
 
The 2011 (Armada República de Colombia) strategic plan points out the advantages 
offered by the Pacific Coast to harbour illegal activities:  
 
This is an area with humid tropical forest, with high pluviosity, dense 
vegetation, mangroves, and the absence of roads. The terrorist groups use the 
camouflage offered by the jungle and the riverine tidelands to send drugs on 
go-fast boats or semisubmersibles. 
 
References to space and geography are then offered as explanations for the difficulties 
of preventing drug trafficking, but also as a way to simplify smugglers actions. By 
establishing patterns in which the interdiction/evasion binary is matched with 
geographical features, the knowledge of the local perspective of commanders and the 
more distant knowledge and global view of the upper echelons of the Navy offer an 
over simplified version of the binary. The snapshot views of local commanders are 
reconciled with the panoramic view of the Navy command as demonstrated in their 
different plans.  
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Plans: Means Are Never Enough to Fulfil the Missions 
 
The efforts of the Colombian government to disrupt the drug market have been focused 
mainly on strategies aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. The main strategies have 
been the reduction of the coca plant fields through aerial fumigation or manual 
eradication, the capture of ring leaders, and the interdiction of cocaine. On the other 
side farmers and a multitude of smuggler rings have attempted to avoid state control 
through deploying various forms of local knowledge and tactical-logistical knowledge 
(Martin, 2012). That is to say making use of existing infrastructure such as ports, 
airports, ICTs, etc. Three years before the installation of the initial Coast Guard bases, 
meaning the Navy was fully responsible for tackling drug smugglers, the Colombian 
Government signed an agreement with the U.S Government to control illicit flows. 
Almost ten years later it published its first strategic approach to control smugglers, 
while at the same time, the development of strategic plans offered ideas around the 
goals of the Navy regarding illicit drug control and the actions to achieve control.  
 
Agreement to suppress illicit traffic by sea  
 
In 1997 Colombia and the U.S. signed the ‘Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of Colombia to suppress illicit traffic 
by sea’, signed at Bogota February 20. The agreement allows the U.S Navy and Coast 
Guard to patrol maritime areas of the Colombian Caribbean and the Pacific. The 
agreement set the conditions for cooperation between the Colombian Navy and the 
U.S navy in carrying out combined maritime interdiction operations and: 
 
Regulates the boarding and search of private or commercial vessels of the 
nationality or registry of one of the Parties, which are found seaward of the 
200 
 
territorial sea of any State, and which either of the Parties has reasonable 




Reaffirming their commitment to fight effectively against illicit traffic by sea 
through continued mutual cooperation in technical, economic, and training and 
equipment matters; Recognizing also the need to strengthen bilateral 
procedures involving boarding and search of vessels which are suspected of 
engaging in illicit traffic by sea. 
 
This agreement was instrumental in providing the Colombian Navy and the Coast 
Guard Unit with tools to professionalize their approach concerning activities related 
to interdiction operations. This agreement was also instrumental in the diplomatic 
relationships between Colombia and the U.S. insofar as it helped to demonstrate the 
Colombian disposition to control the illicit flows of narcotics. This agreement was 
therefore an important step towards recognizing that the Colombian government was 
removed from the list of countries signed by the US government as non-cooperative 
with the WoD, in the process known as certification36. The agreement initially set out 
that U.S. naval vessels could perform patrol within the 200 miles of economic 
maritime area and the 12 miles of Colombian territorial sea. In 2010 the Colombian 
Navy pointed out that the agreement facilitated the seizure of 800 tons of cocaine 
between 1997 and 2006.  
                                                          
36 The certification is a unilateral decision of the U.S Government, specifically the executive branch. As 
a matter of internal policies, the U.S Government established a series of legal mechanisms through 
governmental and congressional procedures that require the president on a yearly basis to provide 
his/her judgement on the efforts of different countries regarding issues affecting the security of the 




According to members of the Navy the agreement was key in improving resources and 
capabilities to control the sea. It provided the resources that the Colombian Navy did 
not previously possess. A rear admiral who participated in the elaboration of the 
agreement pointed out: ‘that agreement was really good, because it provided us with 
tools, most of it, money, which we didn’t have’ (Interview). As a result of this 
agreement the Colombian Navy was responsible for the persecution of smugglers’ 
boats while the U.S. Navy and U.S Navy Coast Guard was responsible for closing 
possible escape routes. A Navy commander explains: ‘They had the tools, we didn’t, 
so we made an alliance…and with the little resources we had we chased the smugglers 
and they (U.S Boats) made a closure outside our territorial waters’ (Interview).  
 
A central element in the negotiation process of the agreement was the question of how 
to patrol the sea, but more important for members of the Colombian Navy was the 
issue of sovereignty of borders and especially maritime borders. As an admiral states:  
 
When the maritime interdiction agreement was signed between Colombia and 
U.S. …let’s go back…actually the U.S wanted Colombia to authorize the entry 
of the U.S Navy into our territorial waters…the twelve miles…but Colombia 
said…wait…we can’t allow you to do that…but we can make an 
arrangement…you do not enter our territorial waters and we guarantee that we 
will control them (Interview). 
Borders and territorial concerns are also voiced by the admiral in charge of the Closing 
the Gap Strategy, in which control of territorial waters is both directed at smugglers 
efforts and U.S. attempts: 
This strategy was born…if we wanted to control the sea…not to have 
voids…cause if you have voids others could fill them…the idea from the 
U.S.…it was that we were incapable of doing that (…) and they wanted to 
control our territorial seas…they always wanted us to negotiate the 
202 
 
agreements…through that we granted them the possibility of patrolling our 
territorial seas…so…it was also a matter of sovereignty (Interview).  
 
The agreement also represented the full entry of the Colombian Navy into the WoD 
and a confirmation of its capacity as an able player in the WoD. While results in terms 
of seizures are represented as the indicator of success, it is also important to note the 
implications that the signing of the agreement had on the identity of the Colombian 
Navy. Interestingly, as is emphasised by a senior members of the Navy regarding the 
effectivity of the agreement, not only in terms of the results, but in terms of the capacity 
of the Navy as an able interlocutor:  
 
Until that moment, we worked practically alone…and the Agreement with the 
United States in 1997…which was one of the best agreements ever reached 
between Colombia and another country…and it allowed the beginning of 
permanent cooperation and the exchange of information….and it didn’t 
happened overnight….but it was the result of a process of creating trust 
between personnel of the different Navies (Interview). 
 
The agreement also served both as a way to differentiate a Colombian way to operate 
from a binational way to operate. The Colombian way to operate consisted of focusing 
on the efforts to control the jurisdictional waters (blue waters) and shores, the 
performance of Maritime Interdiction Operations as described in chapter 8. While the 
binational way to operate implied a combination of resources, mainly for the detection 
and tracking of suspicious vessels, with emphasis placed on the importance of warship 
vessels and aerial platforms with electronic detection and tracking capacities, such as 





Figure 46.Maritime Interdiction Operation, binational way to operate. 
Source: Lesmes (2005). 
 
The signature of the agreement was fundamental in boosting Colombia’s involvement 
in the WoD and especially in the strengthening of the Coast Guard Unit. A retired 
admiral explains:  
 
To me the signing of the agreement was what finally motivated the transfer of 
ships from the Navy Fleet to the Coast Guard and the acquisition of 
boats…boats to be specifically assigned to function as Coast Guard or at least 





Colombian Navy Operational Plans and Strategic Concepts  
 
In July 2003 the Colombian Navy presented the Strategic Naval Plan of 2003-2006. 
This plan was followed by the Strategic Naval Plan of 2007-2010 and the Strategic 
Naval Plan of 2011-2014.37 Those plans correspond to presidential terms and follow 
the main objectives of the National Development plans and the goals of the Ministry 
of Defence, who set short-term objectives. Since 2006 different dependencies of the 
Navy and the upper echelons of the Navy have presented different plans of diverse 
term spans, such as the ‘Development Plan for the Coast Guard Unit’ in 2011, and the 
Orion Plan (2011) which proposed to modernize the Navy fleet. In short, the Navy 
plans developed at different levels in relatation to the role of the Navy as a player in 
the WoD. It was not until 2006 that the Colombian Navy presented its first operational 
strategy, entitled Closing the Gap, which was in place until 2015 when it was replaced 
by the Naval Network Against Drugs.38 Those plans have been attempts to mobilize 
discourses around technological solutions and the possibility of rationally deploying 
technological solutions to control the illicit flows and smuggler artefacts.  
 
Operational Plans, 2003-2014 
As highlighted in chapter 3, the budget of the Colombian Navy grew as a result of the 
finance resources from the Plan Colombia. Most of those resources targeted the 
improvement of the Navy’s capacity to perform maritime interdiction operations. The 
U.S Defence and State Departments contributed with US$89.3 million to improve 
coastal and riverine interdiction operations between 2004 and 2008.39 Despite the 
                                                          
37 Although interviewees, specifically senior officers, affirmed the existence of previous ‘Naval Plans’, 
it was not possible to identify or to obtain such plans.  
38 The Naval network is defined as ‘a combination of efforts, capabilities and information that 
incorporates concepts as fusion centres. Their main objective is to collect all the information 
generated by different agencies so as to produce leading intelligence to support planning and 
operational development, as well as to simplify the legalization process in order to promote the 
achievement of integral results through the participation of national and international agencies, 
judges and district attorneys’.  
39 United States Government Accountability Office, 2008 
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increasing budget there have been concerns about the lack of appropriate resources to 
provide widespread coverage over both the Pacific and Caribbean Coasts. The strategic 
plans summarize the Navy’s short-term goals regarding how resources should be 
allocated and provide a description of the priorities of the Navy. These plans provide 
insights into 1.) What are the main tasks of the Colombian Navy, 2.) Who is the enemy, 
3.) How the enemy should be faced, and 4.) How resources should be deployed.  
 
While the 2003-2006 strategic plan describes the Navy’s efforts to solve what are 
considered the main threats presented by Narcoterrorist Organisations (NTOs), 
subsequent plans have make attempts to address both NTOs and to prepare the Navy 
to the future scenarios, arising from the defeat of NTOs. The enemy here is defined as 
the Narcoterrorist Organisations40 and the task of the Navy is to: ‘Defeat the 
narcoterrorist organisations that transgress in the areas of Maritime, fluvial and 
terrestrial responsibilities of the Navy’ (Armada República de Colombia, 2003). The 
priority set by the 2003 naval strategic plan was to win the war against the 
Narcoterrorists. Since 2006 the strategic concerns of the Navy have moved between 
internal enemies and the need to modernize their fleet in order to catch up with similar 
strategies of regional states, pointing out that the Navy’s recent investments have been 
motivated by their involvement in the WoD. The 2011 plan continues to stress the dual 
mission of the Navy, to control the NTOs and to serve as a credible deterrence force. 
The 2011-2014 Strategic Plan, nevertheless, stresses the fact that the fight against illicit 
flows is central to the Navy’s mission: ‘One of the most exigent activities that the 
National Navy carries out is the fight against narcotrafficking’. Reference is also made 
to the Closing the Gap strategy that stressed the goals of those activities: ‘Closing the 
gap that narcoterrorists have established in our seas and shores to finance terrorist 
activities affecting the Nation’ (Armada República de Colombia, 2011).  
 
                                                          
40 Left wing guerrilla Groups such as FARC-EP, and ELN, as well as various right wing paramilitary 
groups, and emerging band remnants filling the void of demobilized Self-Defense Armies during the 
Uribe government since 2003.   
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A key element of the Navy’s plans from 2003 to 2011 is the idea of flexibility as a 
central feature of the Navy. The 2003 Plan states: ‘The Navy should have an effective 
fleet that guarantees success, but it should be a flexible one that is able to quickly adapt 
to different operational environments’ (Armada República de Colombia, 2003). The 
stress on flexibility and adaptability is very much at the forefront in subsequent naval 
strategic plans. The 2007 Plan states: ‘Flexibility and an adequate, planned and 
coordinated use of the tools will allow the Navy to confront Narcoterrorism 
simultaneously in several scenarios’ (Armada República de Colombia, 2007a). The 
2011 Plan stresses the complexity of the operational environment and aims for a navy 
‘capable of using the naval power in a flexible manner, quickly adapting to ever 
changing situations and to the dynamic actions of the enemies of national security’ 
(Armada República de Colombia, 2011).  
 
The 2003 Strategic Plan emphasised communication and intelligence gathering as the 
main weaknesses of the Navy, and stressed the need to make attempts to create a new 
and modern navy, the navy of the future, in which information gathering and 
processing would be the first task. The 2007 and 2011 Plans highlighted the key role 
of Maritime Interdiction Operations, but both made proposals to participate in 
controlling not only the flows of illicit drugs but performing actions to control other 
stages of the illicit drug traffic market. The 2007 Plan claimed that apart from 
‘eliminating the flows of drugs and illegal supplies’ through interdiction operations, 
the Navy should participate in operations aimed at ‘[neutralizing] groups or individual 
members by means of [capturing] or killings.’ It also stressed the destruction of 
laboratories and seizure of supplies used for processing cocaine. The 2011 Plan 
pledged to continue the fight against ‘narcoterrorists organisations’, involving the 
Navy in the control of ‘drug trafficking in all the stages of the illicit drug market’ 
(Armada República de Colombia, 2011). 
 
As I have highlighted, Strategic Plans are designed to correspond with the broader 
strategies of the central government and align with the Ministry of Defence’s broader 
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goals. The plans of 2003, 2007, and 2011 highlight the central role of the Navy in the 
WoD and call for the increased participation of the Navy, including not only the Navy 
carrying out maritime interdiction operations, but also increasingly their participation 
in controlling other stages of the drug market.  
 
Strategic concepts: Closing the Gap 
The operational strategy Closing the Gap (2006) is presented as the second stage of 
the involvement of the Navy in the WoD, the first being the Maritime Agreement 
(Armada República de Colombia, 2015b). This plans places the fight against illicit 
drugs, defined as the fight against Transnational Criminal Narcoterrorists 
Organisations, at the core of the Navy’s strategy, in which concerns about the borders 
and security are merged. 
 
Throughout the extensive and diverse Colombian geography a convergence of 
geopolitical factors occur that is exacerbated by the transnational character of the 
criminal narcoterrorist organisations (NTOs) operating in our country and their new 
trend towards globalization. This situation presents new challenges within more than 
one million square kilometers of maritime, riverine, and land areas under Colombian 
Naval Forces responsibility which must be addressed in order to contribute effectively 
to guarantee the security of people living in Colombia. 
 
Closing the Gap develops a program of maritime, riverine, and territorial control and 
interdiction with the specific objective to combat the production and storage of 
narcotics and deny narco-terrorism the use of maritime, riverine, and land areas as 




The Strategy contemplated the use of naval, aerial, riverine, and terrestrial power in 
order to control the flows of illicit drugs. This strategy was structured around 
strengthening intelligence and intelligence cooperation with other Military and LEAs 
agencies, placing emphasis on carrying out operations with a clear focus or objective. 
The Strategy Closing the Gap also looked to boost the effectiveness of the Coast 
Guard, building new stations as well as the procurement of new boats and radar 
systems (Figure 47). In short, the Strategy Closing the Gap proposed the 
rationalization of resources by planning operations firmly based on intelligence 
information and the combination of the different resources of the Navy, with an 
emphasis on boosting units expected to face the flows of illicit drugs in the so-called 
blue waters, riverine waterways, and coastlines. According to the Admiral, head of the 
Colombian Navy and primary individual responsible for the Strategy, when the plan 
was being developed the enemy was considered to be: ‘small and fast ships, mostly 
everywhere’. The aim of this program was to create a shield to impede smugglers from 
setting sail and reaching the open sea.  
 
 
Figure 47. Current and projected Coast Guard stations in the 2006 strategic concept 
Closing the Gap. 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia, Closing the Gap (2006). 
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This Strategy clearly states the need for the Navy to adapt to the requirements of an 
asymmetric war, with a focus on controlling narcotrafficking. This was set to be 
achieved through 1.) Force strengthening, 2.) More effective application of force, 3.) 
Increased surveillance and reconnaissance, 4.) Increased cooperation, and 5.) 
Increased interoperability, in different operational environments including the 
Caribbean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and rivers. This plan calls for the ‘recovery, 
modernization and procurement of units and equipment’ (Navy, 2007).  
 
Closing the Gap aimed to combat the different strategies used by smugglers to 
transport drugs. It required redirecting all efforts of the organisation towards the 
efficient employment of the Naval, Coast Guard, riverine, and infantry units to deny 
the Criminal Organisations the use of these different spaces. This Plan presents a 
complete review of the 2006 Navy assets, pointing out the type of tasks for which the 
vessels and aircrafts could be deployed in order to participate in Maritime Interdiction 
Operations. In this Plan, missile frigates, submarines, and other components of the 
Navy fleet were repurposed in order to participate in operations against drug 
smugglers.  
 
Closing the Gap shows the disparities of resources deployed by the Navy to face 
smugglers actions. Figure 48 shows the complex sociotechnical arrangement that the 
Closing the Gap plan aimed to deploy in the capture of smugglers’ artefact, including 
satellites, aircraft, war vessels, several stations, patrol vessels, and interceptors vessels.  
 
The strategic plan Closing the Gap, is 1.) Tied to the early history of the Coast Guard’s 
role in the WoD, 2.) Presented as a clear response to the threats faced by the Navy and 
the Colombian State, and 3.) Turned into a vision that guided the rationale behind the 





Figure 48. A Maritime Interdiction Operation according to Closing the Gap. 
Source: Armada Nacional de Colombia, Closing the Gap (2006). 
 
Closing the Gaps also built on early ideas around the development of the Coast Guard 
Unit. In 1992 the first commander of the Coast Guard, Admiral Matallana,, projected 
a ten years development plan for the Coast Guard, that mainly implied the building of 
several coast guard bases along the Caribbean and the Pacific Coasts. A Navy Captain 
affirms the idea behind the Closing the Gap plan:  
 
I think that appeared early on, with the initial Coast Guard Development Plan 
by Admiral Matallana…he was the founder…well not the founder…but he 
actually developed the Coast Guard Unit starting in 1992…he conceived the 
Coast Guard…he’s the father of all of that…and what he thought in 1990…to 
2030 will still be valid (Interview). 
 
The admiral, who replaced Admiral Matallana as Coast Guard Chief explains: 
Well…that was Matallana’s idea…he was the one who designed where all the 
coast guard stations should be…the timetable for their construction…all of that 
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changed with the time…but he was the one who made the first analyses of the 
operations…who designed where the different stations should be located…the 
characteristics of those stations…what types of radars, etc. (Interview). 
 
By the time of its development the Closing the Gap strategy was seen as the necessary 
step to articulate the efforts of the Colombian Navy. An admiral pointing out the role 
of the Strategy stresses the lack of a clear vision of Navy efforts previous to the Closing 
the Gap strategy. According to him: ‘The previous efforts were completely 
dispersed…we had the objective of fighting narcotrafficking in the sea…but we had 
no strategy…and a strategy allows one to see not only the what...how are we going to 
fight…but what we need’ (Original emphasis, Interview). The Closing the Gap 
strategy is portrayed by the upper echelons of the Navy as the logical step of the Navy’s 
fight against illicit flows. The admiral who followed up the development of the strategy 
stresses this idea: ‘It was completely logical, because if you have a big problem…and 
the responses are not structured…you have to create a strategy to solve that code’ 
(Interview). 
 
Although Closing the Gap was promulgated as a clear road map to control illicit flows, 
it was not necessarily seen by all members of the Navy as a plan, but as something that 
could only be achieved under very specific circumstances. A Navy Commander states: 
‘It is a concept difficult to achieve…it is extremely costly…we keep working towards 
it…but we know we have other development plans both for the Navy and the Coast 
Guard’ (Interview). Another Commander points out: ‘The Strategy is ideal…Closing 
the Gap is ideal…but you can’t have all the tools at your disposal’. Other members of 
the Navy consider the possibility of achieving a total control of the maritime space, 
given that the Navy concentrates its efforts in fighting smugglers: ‘Closing the Gap is 
possible…but is possible only if we…I mean the Navy…and the Colombian 




I argue that an important function of both strategic plans and strategic concepts, such 
as Closing the Gap, is to situate the Navy as a key player in the WoD. This includes 
stressing the vision that the organisation is an able counter drug agencies, using several 
indicators and presenting a list of operations (such as the destruction of laboratories, 
the capture or killing of numerous ring leaders) that is to say, successful operations, as 
further proof of the effectiveness of the Navy. While, on the other hand, stressing the 
difficulties of performing the task of obtaining absolute control over the illicit flows 
by emphasizing the vastness of the maritime spaces under the Navy’s control, 
particularly given the descriptions of the enemy as ingenious. ‘The NTOs have found 
an ideal space in the jurisdictional Colombian waters, in which they deploy their 
ingenuity and their criminal capacities to traffic illicit drugs, arms, ammunitions and 
explosives’ (Armada República de Colombia, 2007a).  
 
While Closing the Gap had made practical proposals for the creation of new coast 
guard stations and the procurement of new artefacts, strategic plans fall short with 
regard to practical details. I argue that this is the result of both the difficulties of 
translating the everyday experience of Maritime Interdiction Operations and the 
difficulties of directing the procurement of vessels due to a lack of financial resources.  
 
Collaboration and competition 
 
The multiple dimensions of the WoD, particularly when seen as an extension of 
terrorism, present scenarios for inter- and intra-agency competition and collaboration. 
The Coast Guard Unit performs co-joint operations with other military and LEAs 
agencies, including the Army, Air Force, Colombian Antinarcotic Police, the 
Attorney’s Office, and before its demise, the Administrative Department of Security 
(DAS). The Coast Guard has also collaborated with other branches of the Navy, such 
as the Navy Fleet and Navy Infantry and, as seen previously, with other countries.  
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Grissom (2006) affirms that the process of innovation of military organisations can be 
affected by issues of competition and collaboration intra or inter different branches of 
the military. Collaboration between different branches of the military in Colombia was 
actively promoted as a key element of the ‘Democratic Security Policy’ of the Uribe 
Government between 2002-2010 (Porch & Delgado, 2010). The promotion of 
collaboration between the Colombian Army and Colombian Air Force has been 
deemed fundamental to the efforts of the Colombian Government aimed at weakening 
the guerrillas. The Navy has made efforts to show how collaborations with LEAs have 
also been important in their determination to stop drug smugglers’ actions. 
Nevertheless, several tensions are present when issues of prestige, identity, and 
recognition of achievements mediate the collaboration between military/military and 
military/LEAs in the WoD in Colombia. Specialization, experience, knowledge, and 
results are then key factors mediating the collaboration/competition between different 
players in the WoD and among the members of the Navy and the Coast Guard.  
 
These tensions affect both short-term adaptations of the Navy and long-term co-
evolution of the different players involved, on the two sides of the binary in the WoD. 
Interaction between senior officers and lower ranking officers is an important aspect 
of learning. Officers and NCOs acquire knowledge from formal training and 
experience. The experience of older colleagues, relayed to NCOs through 
conversations during informal forums or participating in operations together, is 
important in the creation of NCOs’ unique set of knowledge about the enemies’ tactics 
and how to face them. This continuous interaction between individuals creates not only 
‘individual learning’ but organisational learning, making possible the creation of new 
patterns at the macro-organisational level (Eve Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). The sharing of 
knowledge of Coast Guard personnel is mediated by issues of prestige, seniority, and 
the ethos of secrecy, in which the possession of secrets plays the role of both increasing 
the prestige of those who have the rights to possess them and, as the same times, as a 
justifiable barrier that prevents the sharing of knowledge. Information here then, plays 




Competition expressed in the language of individual achievement also plays a role 
among the Coast Guard personnel, and has an impact on the careers of officers and on 
the macro goals of the Coast Guard Unit. A lieutenant narrates the practice of publicly 
displaying success on a board:  
 
We are assigned to units, to specific boats and each boat has an identifier 
number, and to each boat they (commanders) attached operational results, and 
they publish the results on a board, where everybody can see them, so you can 
see how your own folder is getting bigger, and you start to feel proud of your 
work and to receive recognitions and rewards (Interview).  
 
Several functions of the military and LEAs in the WoD are clearly limited by the 
traditional role assigned to each unit. There are, nevertheless, three spaces/activities in 
which the work of several military and LEAs may overlap, and where issues of 
collaboration and competition mediate the outcomes of each one. The emphasis during 
the Uribe Government on interagency collaboration, including the collaboration and 
sharing of information and intelligence, is one of them. The second one is the area in 
which several military and LEAs may act, specifically coastal areas, in order to capture 
drug smugglers or seize drugs. The third one is the collaboration with foreign military 
especially the U.S.  
 
A U.S. 1991 report on the involvement of the military in the WoD highlights several 
of the initial difficulties with collaboration between the military and LEAs. These 
included different perceptions of carrying out an operation and ‘entering into action’, 
equipment mismatches, the treatment of information, and different perceptions about 
secrecy and classified information and unresolved issues of authority and hierarchy 
(Ahart & Stiles, 1991). Some of the same problems can be identified in the 




A retired intelligence agent pointed out the difficulties of sharing information in co-
joint meetings:  
You arrived to such meetings and everybody would be looking at the other, to 
see who started talking, but the police never wanted to show their information, 
and we didn’t want to show ours, and then the Navy took our information and 
carried out the operation in the open sea. They asked the British for 
collaboration and they had the means to achieve the ‘event’ (Interview). 
 
However, LEAs or the military can also overestimate the difficulties of an operation 
in order to claim the event as their own, a navy commander recalls an operation in 
which the Police in order to claim an event attempted to pursue an operation near the 
shoreline:  
 
I commanded an operation and the guys returned with 270, 280 kg, and I knew 
from experience that there had to have been more, but then I received a call 
from a police man, really scared…If you put a guy who doesn’t know how to 
swim, you put him on a boat, and he’s going to be scared, they tried to carry 
out the operation and almost drowned, instead of calling us, we could have just 
gone and done the deal (Interview).  
Interviewees pointed out that there is a risk in sharing intelligence: if their organisation 
provides another one with intelligence and reliable information to carry out an 
operation, then the organisation that received this information may carry out the 
seizure, claim the success and results, and report it as their own.  
 
This coincides with the view of regional forums regarding the difficulties of sharing 




Information and intelligence are not usually shared among and within countries 
in a timely, proficient manner in order to create effective and efficient 
counterdrug operations. The sharing of information and intelligence is limited 
among agencies/countries for several possible reasons. Among them are the 
fear of compromising operations or sources, no direct contact between officers 
that would foster trust, lack of communications, institutional rivalries, lack of 
bilateral or regional agreements/arrangements, lack of a secure means of 
sharing the information, limited knowledge of the operational capacity of 
others, and lack of understanding of the needs of others.  
 
Efforts made by the Uribe government were reflected in the goals of the Navy to create 
coordinated operations with the Police and other inter-agency activities. The 
integration of Police units with the Navy and Coast Guard can be appreciated in the 
anti-drug joint task force lead by the Navy, but with the broader aim of achieving not 
only military success but carrying out a social program integrating other state agencies. 
The integration of the police and military was initially received with apprehension 
based on the traditional distrust between the institutions. A deputy commander 
remembered the difficulties of having police personnel in a Navy base: ‘When the 
Police started to arrive…here…to Tumaco…the brigade was 
really…really…reluctant…that is to say, it was really hard to break the paradigm by 
having Police men inside a military Unit’. This also offers opportunities for the Coast 
Guard and Navy personnel to differentiate themselves from the Police: ‘to them is 
difficult, you go and asked them, we got an operation let’s go, and for them is difficult 
to face the sea, so they say, no, no, you can go, we’ll wait here, because is years of 
training going to the sea, they’re police’ (interview). This highlight the importance of 
issues of identity and competition among the different players, and especially among 
Military and Police.  
 
During this period collaboration between Colombian LEAs and Military and U.S. 
Agencies, especially the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the U.S. Navy 
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provided new opportunities for competition. Kenney (2007) points out that the 
relationship between the Colombian Police and the DEA created the possibility for the 
Police to become ‘more competent in identifying, infiltrating, and disrupting 
trafficking networks than they have been in the early 1970s’; the same can be said 
about the relation of the Colombian Navy and the U.S Navy. The maritime agreement 
allowed the Colombian Navy and the Coast Guard to improve their record on 
successful operations. Operational results due to the collaboration between the 
Colombian Navy and the U.S. Navy are highlighted both in the media and navy 
documents (i.e. El Tiempo, 2001).  
 
Co-operation between the US Navy and the Colombian Navy is a fundamental for what 
Griffith (1994) calls geonarcotics41. This was staged in different moments of transfer 
of knowledge and artefacts. The Mentioned ‘Dolphin’ and later the ‘Midnight Express’ 
interceptor boats were obtained by the Colombian Navy via donations of the US 
government and as mentioned, early training in the conduct of Maritime Interdiction 
Operations was also provided by the US government. Carrying out joint operations 
have been also important for the navy results. Some of the most successful operations 
were conducted as result of human intelligence and collaboration between different 
agencies, e.g.. the operation ‘under the sea’ that lead to the capture of 22 people 
involved in the design, construction and sailing of narcosubs artefacts in the 
Colombian pacific was the result of the infiltration of the smugglers organisation by a 
Colombian infantry man, approached by the organisation to sail one of the submersible 
artefacts (Administration., 2011). 
 
Collaboration with the US navy required a process of overcoming mistrust. The 
agreement allowed officers of the navies to command vessels of the other country 
during interdiction operations, which in practice also mean trusting the decisions of 
the other. A second challenge was the development of a common operational language. 
                                                          
41 Defined as the relations of conflict and co-operation among national and international actors that 
are driven by the narcotics phenomenon.  
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In short, the collaboration with the US Navy have helped the Colombian Navy and 
Coast Guard in establishing their role as a key player in the WoD. At an individual 
level taking part as commander during joint interdiction operations by participating in 
an international task force reinforced the prestige of the officers.  
 
Two decisive events have been crucial for the short history of the Coast Guard Unit, 
first the interdiction agreement with United States (Agreement Between US and 
Colombia to Suppress Illicit Traffic by Sea, 20 February 1997), and second, the 
formulation of the strategic plan Closing the Gap in 2006. Even if those plans were 
not specifically focused on the role of the Coast Guard, in practice more of the 
interdiction responsibilities were assigned to this unit. The strategic plan closing the 




After describing the interceptor boats and their experiences during interdiction 
operations (Chapter 8) all but one of the interviewees pointed out the importance of 
intelligence information for their operations. In the previous chapter I mentioned the 
importance of events in the everyday life of officers and NCOs and showed the 
relationships between the perceptions of the enemy and the actions of the members of 
the Coast Guard. In this section I do not attempt to describe the process of intelligence 
gathering nor to describe the workings of the Navy Intelligence Unit,42 but to stress 
the importance of intelligence in relationship with the strategies of patrolling the sea 
and in talk of success.  
 
                                                          
42 Although attempts were made to interview members of the intelligence unit and clearance was 
gained, in the end gaining access to members of the intelligence unit was unsuccessful.  
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As highlighted in chapter 7, before the creation of the Coast Guard Unit, the Navy 
carried out counter drug operations, but not necessarily as a result of deploying fleets 
of ships to pursue smugglers. Rather, the Navy’s operation came about as a result of 
detailed intelligence information that allowed the positioning of frigate or corvette type 
vessels to stop smugglers using trawlers or fishing boats in traditional smuggling 
corridors. The idea that tactical and strategical intelligence plays a key role in the 
consolidation of the Navy and the Coast Guard as players in the control of flows of 
illicit drugs, as part of a larger attempt to control the sea and to secure border is 
presented in the official discourse of the Navy as expressed in their plans. The Naval 
Strategical Plan of 2011 states as a key objective of the Navy: ‘Improving the capacity 
of obtaining information, via human or electronic sources, as well as strengthening the 
process of analysis and diffusion of information and intelligence’ (Armada República 
de Colombia, 2011). The same plan stresses the importance of acquiring technologies 
and reinforcing international agreements as key to the process of information 
gathering.  
 
In order to achieve operational results, and develop sound operations such as the 
capturing of smuggler artefacts (narcosubs, go fast boats, trawlers, etc.) and/or 
operations against smugglers and illicit smuggling rings and members of both left wing 
or right wing armed groups, the Navy makes use of both human and technical intel, as 
well as coordinating with other agencies. In performing these actions, the Navy is 
implementing the ideals and fulfilling the goals proposed in strategic and operational 
plans that, as mentioned, stress intelligence at different levels (tactical, strategical, and 
operational) in order to achieve success in all operations. As highlighted in the 
previous section, intelligence gathering is a moment in the process of constructing the 
shape and capacity of the enemy, in which the gathering and analysis of information 
is both a tool to achieve results and a source of producing images about the enemies’ 




The Navy has developed a network of a variety of collaborators, including other law 
enforcement agencies and local informants, and has developed strategies to infiltrate 
drug smuggler rings. Infiltrating a drug smuggler ring can be a good way to achieve 
events. Nevertheless informants are not necessarily aware of the goals of the Navy, 
and therefore occasionally provide information that could lead to an operation but not 
necessarily to an event, such as informing about the departure of a smuggler artefact, 
but one that was not carrying out drugs at the moment of capture. Two interviewees 
narrate operations carried out following the receipt of information supposedly about 
narcosubs that later turned out to be regular boats hidden in the jungle. The 
trustworthiness of the informant is also key, in which the success of a previous 
operation resulting from information provided by an informant is seen as a sign of the 
reliability of the sources. Determining when information and intelligence is then 
accurate enough to consolidate an intelligence package is a key moment for an officer 
and his/her staff, one that might lead to the attainment of an event (Chapter 8).  
 
Maritime Interdiction Operations are then, intelligence based operations, and in this 
sense the aim is to control the sea through the development of specifically targeted 
operations. This intention can also be seen in the transformation of the Navy’s 
practices to control the sea, which have moved from patrolling (the blending of the sea 
approach, guaranteeing a continuous control for a limited period of time of a limited 
space, assisted by the detection tools of ships and the autonomy of airplanes) to the 
carrying out of intelligence based operations (targeting specific movements of people 
and artefacts). After years of conducting traditional patrolling in areas considered to 
be traditional smuggling routes, the Navy, and specifically the newly formed Coast 
Guard Unit, started to guide their operations solely based on intelligence information. 
The point at which the practice of interdiction is tied to the practice of intelligence is 
summarized by a Coast Guard Commander:  
 
Everything we do…the main aspect is the intelligence…yes…that is something 
that is clear…for us to access these organisations…we have to have…really 
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strong intelligence…like the one the Navy has…technical 
intelligence…communications interceptions…cell phones…other 
communication equipment…satellites (phones)…we also have some 10% of 
success that is just luck (Interview). 
Another commander states: ‘Well…yes…you can’t be just around…we have routine 
patrols…but it is just routine…but to find something out there? You have to be really 
lucky…so it is so much easier when you have a guide…something that tells 
you…hey…look there, to that point’ (Interview). Here issues of geography, resources, 
and events are clearly connected. 
 
Success, achieving results, and events are central to Coast Guard efforts, and 
intelligence is key in assuring this, as the previous commander continues: ‘You just 
can’t go from here to there…yes, well…maybe one day you find something…but if 
you have a focus, based on intelligence, well you’re going to have better results’ 
(Interview). And according to some members of the Navy, the control of the sea, 
thwarting smuggling efforts, should be done solely using intelligence: ‘What is ought 
to be be…is [intelligence based operations] 100%...of that, that is what is ought to be’ 
(Interview).  
 
Carrying out intelligence base interdiction operations is seen as a way to maximize 
results given the shortage of resources, a retired rear admiral states:  
 
As we didn’t have the resources…we had to plan the operations…with 
intelligence…you can’t go out to the sea and wait for the fishes…because they 
won’t come, it is not to go out to burn gas, to spend money…if you go to an 
operation it is because you have at least a high degree of knowledge of the 




An admiral, commander of the Navy states: ‘Intelligence is first of all needed to save 
resources… an operation without intelligence means throwing away money…with 
intelligence the operations are carried out in a cheaper way’ (Interview).  
The First Commander of the Coast Guard in the Caribbean held similar views on the 
importance of intelligence based operations, resources, and success: ‘You have to 
work a lot with intelligence…information…so you don’t make unnecessary efforts…if 
you don’t, if you don’t work with information…the effort is lost’ (Interview).   
 
Thus, for the Coast Guard personnel, success in carrying out MIOs is clearly linked 
with intelligence based operations. In doing so, interpretations of the role of the Navy 
and the Coast Guard and how to patrol the sea are transformed from establishing, albeit 













Chapter 7. The Coast Guard Unit 
 
 
The open sea, near midnight. Several miles from the coast two Colombian Coast Guard 
vessels chase a go-fast boat, presumably loaded with tons of cocaine neatly packaged 
in several bags. They feel the tension of being at a disadvantage because they don’t 
know how the smugglers will react. Thus, they have to wait for the smugglers reaction 
to being chased by two new coast guard boats. They feel the adrenaline bursting on 
their veins. They have the information about the name of the boat, its point of 
departure, and approximately how much cocaine it is transporting. What is the new 
young commander going to order? Is he going to forego the pursuit? Is he going to 
order the Coast Guard to follow at full speed, as they think they should? Now they feel 
somehow safer using this ‘new’ boat, the Midnight Express, where there is more 
shelter if the smugglers decide to shoot, but will this new boat be true to its promise? 
Will it turn as fast as they need it to? Will it help them to catch the smugglers? Are the 
boats easy to manoeuvre at high speed? They are using these boats for the first time in 
an interdiction operation, though of course they have made several trials. But, there 
have not been enough trials because resources are scare and they cannot waste money 
on gas during such trials. What will the smugglers do? Will they try to zig-zag, or will 
they try to crash the boats? They decided the latter, colliding twice with Coast Guard 
boats before throwing away the cocaine. Then they headed to the shore, resulting in 
bad luck as the smugglers end up tangled in a thick bush of thorny plants, and are 
caught by the Coast Guard. 
 
The events detailed above are an account of the first time the Coast Guard personnel 
used the Midnight Express boats to catch smugglers as recounted by a Navy captain, 




Drug smugglers are said to have innovated in the use of different routes and transport 
methods (Caulkins et al., 2009; Decker & Townsend Chapman, 2008), and this 
capacity for almost boundless innovation is assumed to be at the core of the drug 
traffickers’ success. A wide array of smuggling methods have been extensively 
documented, especially in journalistic reports highlighting the ingenuity of Colombian 
drug smugglers (Escobar & Fisher, 2009; Semana, 2011). Since it began its 
involvement in the War on Drugs (WoD), the Colombian Government, with the 
support and encouragement of the U.S. Government, has developed several strategies 
to thwart smugglers’ efforts. These include creating specialized law enforcement units, 
such as the Colombian Antinarcotic Police, and extending the involvement of the 
military to take control of different stages of the production and transport of illicit 
drugs.43 Those ‘Atypical Military Instruments’, as Moloeznik (2003) characterises 
them requires both the Colombian and Mexican Military to carry out operations for 
which they are not necessarily trained and which are beyond their traditional missions. 
 
In this chapter I present an overview of the history of the Coast Guard Unit, specifically 
the procurement of interceptor boats between 1994 and 2013. I also present evidence 
that rather than being a result of the accumulation of formalised data or ‘factual’ 
evidence, the procurement and use of boats and operational strategies has been shaped 
by the knowledge and experience of local commanders and their perceptions of 
interdiction ‘events’ (as will be described further in chapter 8). This chapter, together 
with most sections of the following ones, deal with the arena of practices where the 
knowledge and experience of local commanders and their perceptions of interdiction 
events shape the technological and practical choices of the Navy in regards to the 
WoD. 
 
                                                          
43 The participation of the US military in interdiction operations was sanctioned in 1989 National 
Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989. 
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Some Offices and Four Boats: The Creation of the Coast Guard Unit 
 
While The Colombian Navy has participated in counterdrug operations since the early 
1980s, mainly in thwarting marihuana smugglers in the Caribbean Sea, full-on 
involvement only came with the creation of the Coast Guard Unit. This in turn implied 
that at that point operational success started to be measured in terms of seizures of 
illicit drugs, and military trained personnel became involved in law enforcement 
operations.  
 
Statistics on drug seizures confirm the use of maritime routes and particular transport 
methods from Colombia to consumer and transhipment countries as the main practices 
used by drug smugglers (Map 5). In the early 1990s, the Colombian Government 
decided to boost the role of the Navy in the WoD with the deployment of the Coast 
Guard Unit, which although established since 1979, did not possess, boats or 
personnel. This Unit became devoted mainly to maritime interdiction operations to 
thwart smugglers efforts.  
 
When created in 197944 none of the fourteen functions postulated for the Coast Guard 
Unit directly implied the enforcement of counter drug policies. Later, the ‘Directiva 
Presidencial N 5 from the 28 of December of 1991’, established that the Coast Guard 
Units were in charge of ‘carrying out operations in the fight against illicit drugs, 
guiding their efforts to eliminate the illicit traffic of drugs through actions in order to 
fight against the full chain of illicit drugs, precursors, transformations, processing, 
transport, distribution, treatment, and consumption’.  
 
                                                          
44 COLOMBIA, Decreto no. 1874 de 1979, Mediante el cual se crea el Cuerpo de Guardacostas, Diario 




In 1992 the first ‘Development Plan’ for the Coast Guard was designed, entitled the 
‘Development Plan for the Coast Guard of the National Navy.’ This plan made 
provisions for ten years and included the construction of primary and secondary bases 
all along the Caribbean Coast. Since 1991 the office of the Coast Guard had been 
located in an old music hall, which the first operational commander of the Caribbean 
Coast Guard described as ‘some offices and four boats’ (Interview). The Coast Guard 
unit went into operation in 1994 with the establishment of the first Coast Guard base 
in Cartagena, on the Colombian Caribbean Coast, and the building of the Buenaventura 
base in the Pacific Coast. The new offices in Cartagena, were officially inaugurated in 
1995. 
 
The Coast Guard is a branch of the Colombian Navy and is directly attached to the 
Chief of Naval Operations. The Coast Guard consists of four departments: Planning, 
Projects, Security, and Operations and Administration. In order to carry out their 
operations the Coast Guard is divided into three commands, Caribbean Command, 
Pacific Command, and Amazonian Command.  
 
 
Map 5. Direction of Illicit Drug Flows. 




The Coast Guard initiated operations with ten minor units of boats quickly reassigned 
from other posts belonging to the Caribbean Fleet (then branded as the Atlantic Fleet). 
Most of them were discharged or repurposed within a few years. These boats were a 
mixture of maritime patrol boats and logistic vessels, ranging in operational age from 
10 to 30 years when assigned to the Coast Guard.45 Personnel were assigned from 
different dependencies of the Navy. In 1995 the Colombian Navy received 10 rapid 
reaction Dolphin boats from the United States Government to be used by the Coast 
Guard,46 opening up a period in which such specialised artefacts were used by the 
Coast Guard in order to carry out counter drug operations.  
 
By 2010 the Coast Guard had two first order stations in the Caribbean, one in 
Cartagena and the other in Santa Marta, five second order stations along the Caribbean 
(in Barranquilla, San Andres, Turbo, Puerto Bolivar and Coveñas) and two third order 
stations (in Ballenas and Punta Espada). It possessed nine small surface boats, twenty 
Dolphin boats, seven assorted interdiction boats (Lobster boats), and twelve Midnight 
Express boats. The Pacific area consisted of one first order station (in Buenaventura) 
and two second category stations (in Tumaco and Bahia Solano). These three stations 
in the Pacific included six coastal patrols boats, nine Dolphin boats, four Midnight 
Express boats, and six assorted interdiction boats.  
 
The Buenaventura Coast Guard Base in the Colombian Pacific started operations with 
ten Dolphin boats of 8.2 m length. Counter drug operations were carried out combining 
the small Dolphins with bigger surface boats. In 1999 two Lobster boats, were 
integrated into the Pacific Coast Unit. These boats were 10.6 m long. In 2007, they 
added two new boats, Midnight Express boats. These boats are equipped with four 
                                                          
45 A couple of these boats had even seen action during the Vietnam War as part of the U.S. Navy and 
were donated to the Colombian Government. The majority of those vessels were quickly dismantled 
or repurposed to others duties, such as training boats or logistics boats, following the introduction of 
proper interdiction boats.  




220hp engines that are used to combat the speed of smugglers using go-fast boats. In 
2008 the Pacific Unit was improved by adding two bay control units of 12.1 m long.  
 
The Pacific plans continued with the establishment of the Tumaco Coast Guard Base 
on the southern Pacific Coast in 2004. This base was constructed with the support of 
the U.S. Navy, consisting of an office building and a dock for minor units. Initially 
two Dolphin boats were moved from the Buenaventura Station and two new Lobster 
boats were assigned, later joined by two Midnight Express boats in 2006. In 2006 a 
new base in the Pacific was inaugurated, in Bahia Solano, which started with one 
official and four NCOs, together with two boats from the Buenaventura Station.  
 
Finding the Right Boat: The Coast Guard Unit’s Rapid Reaction 
Boats 
 
The rapid reaction or interceptor boats play a central role in the Coast Guard’s 
interdiction operations. These are the boats used to hunt and approach the smugglers. 
Beginning with the Dolphin, between 1994 and 2014 the Colombian Coast Guard used 
a range of different Patrol boats. The boats that have been used as interdiction vessels 
have been obtained from several sources: donations from the U.S. Government, 
procurement from the local naval industry, repurposing seized smuggler boats, the 
development of boats between the Navy and Navy Shipyard, and procurement from 
the international market.  
 
Until 2013 the Coast Guard and their auxiliary fleet were mostly second-hand 
purchases and donations from the U.S. In addition to interceptor boats entering into 
action between 1994 and 2013 the Coast Guard also: 1.) Modified old boats to increase 
speed; 2.) Used captured smuggler boats that they repurposed to be used during 
interdiction operations; 3.) Designed and built their own boats (the beast and the 
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Orca), 4.) Received donations or procured new boats from the U.S. Government. Most 
of these were aimed at achieving higher speeds in order to match what was perceived 
as the main threat, the go-fast boats and their increasing cargo capacity, camouflage, 
and speed. As such the procurement of these boats was the result of localized efforts.  
 
From 2013 onwards, the Coast Guard made attempts to formalize a procurement 
process, establishing needs based not only on current, localized threats but also in order 
to maintain more permanent control of maritime areas, as was stated in the 2013 Coast 
Guard development plan. Table 1 shows the type and figures of the different patrol 
vessels registered by the Coast Guard Unit in 2014.47 In this section I will present an 
overview48 of the history of the acquisition of patrol vessels, and discuss the relation 
of the Coast Guard personnel with these vessels and how localized views of enemies’ 
activities affected the procurement of interceptor boats. Most of the stories narrated by 
members of the Coast Guard Unit present a similar pattern, an initial moment in which 
the boat assigned is considered a suitable tool, a second moment of discomfort with 
the vessel due to modifications, damages, or perceptions of the enemies’ boats, and 
finally discarding or repurposing the vessel to be replaced with a ‘more’ suitable one.  
 
Table 1. Colombian Coast Guard Rapid Interceptor boats 1994-2014. 
Source: Elaborated by Author from diverse sources. 
                                                          
47 These quantities correspond to the number of boats acquired and registered. It is worth pointing 
out that several of the boats are not currently in use, or are used intermittently and no longer for the 
initial purpose of pursuing smugglers, such is the case of the Dolphin and Orca.  
48 By the time of the fieldwork the Coast Guard Unit was receiving and starting to deploy the boats 
proposed in the 2013 Development Plan.  
Type
Origin 
Country Condition Adquistion Year Quantity
Dolphin U.S.A Second-Hand and New Donation 1994 20
Lobster boats/Andromeda class Colombia Second-Hand and New Repourpose, local industry 1995 15
Interceptor/Go-Fast Colombia Second-Hand and New Repourpose, local industry 1995 17
Orca Colombia New Local Industry/Navy Shipyard 2003 15
Midnight Express 39 U.S.A Second-Hand and New Donation/Procurement 2005 15
SAFE Boats Defender 380X U.S.A New Donation/Procurement 2013 5
Renegade Patrol Boat 38 U.S.A New Procurement 2013 10
EDUARDOÑO 380 Tipo B Colombia New Local Industry 2013 24




The Dolphin was the first proper patrol boat used by the Coast Guard Unit to chase 
smugglers. The firsts Dolphins were donated by the U.S. Government and later others 
were built in Colombia.49 A Dolphin is a fiberglass boat that is 7.81m long, 2.60m 
wide, with a maximum speed of 40 knots. It is propelled by two 200hp outboard 
engines, and has no armor.50 The Dolphin was widely used during patrols, maritime 
interdiction operations, and search and rescue operations, and currently some of these 
initial boats are displayed as monuments in Coast Guard bases (Figure 49 and Figure 
50). By the time the Dolphins were deployed in the early 1990s smugglers were already 
using GPS, while member of the Coast Guard had to make their own attempts to 
acquire GPS, either by buying or using seized ones.  
 
Figure 49. Dolphin boat, displayed at the entry of the Coast Guard Unit in Buenaventura. 
Source: Author. 
                                                          
49 The Company in charge of building the Colombian version of the Dolphin was Eduardo Londoño e 
Hijos Sucesores, S. A. Eduardoño, S.A., a company based in Medellin with offices in Bogota, 
Buenaventura, and Cartagena. This company mostly built small boats in polyester and PRFV, between 
4 and 13m long, to be used in transport, fisheries, and sport activities, until commissioned by the Navy 
to construct the Dolphin.  
50 The Dolphins were also used by maritime infantry and Antinarcotic Police and equipped with a 




Figure 50. Dolphin boat, Displayed at the Tumaco Coast Guard Base.  
Source: Author. 
 
The Dolphins were mainly used as a bay control vessel. Some members of the Coast 
Guard Unit consider that for some time the Dolphins were a reliable tool: ‘The 
Dolphins were useful…really useful in interior waters…but to go out in the 
sea…so…to go to the open sea, they were not so good there…they weren’t designed 
to do that…the engines were too small…not designed to be used in the open sea’ 
(Interview). As deployed by the first operative commander of the Coast Guard in the 
Caribbean, these vessels had the mission of controlling the main bays. Bay control was 
perceived as a big step in controlling illicit flows, as commented by a retired captain: 
‘The Dolphins were bay boats…there it is where all the things [illicit flows] set off…so 
if you control the bays…well you’re controlling a huge part’ (Interview). Regardless 
of their intended use, as a bay or riverine vessel, during the mid-1990s Coast Guard 
personnel were able to use them to chase smugglers in the open sea. At that time, in 
certain conditions, the Dolphins were able to compete with smugglers’ go-fast boats 
and lobster boats, as a Navy captain, then a fresh lieutenant, narrates: ‘Those 
[smugglers] used to set sail full of gas…with 1200 kg of cargo…well those hulls could 
go up to 30, 32 knots…which was about the same as the Dolphins…but they 
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[smugglers] sail with full cargo, full gas, supplies, spare parts, so, they were really 
heavy’ (Interview).  
 
Besides matching smugglers’ speed, the Coast Guard personnel had to face the 
differences between the Pacific and Caribbean Seas, which affected the 
manoeuvrability of the Dolphin, which was affected by the different length of waves 
in the two seas. A Coast Guard captain, who sailed a Dolphin in these diverse 
conditions, when asked about sailing that vessel in the Caribbean and in the Pacific, 
summarized this thus:  
 
The difference is overwhelming…here in the Pacific the sea is really calm…it 
is a relatively calm sea…well there are tough moments…it turns out 
terrible…it can be like a bull fight…but normally, 95% of the time…it is really 
calm…so that boat here…they behave really, really good…whereas in the 
Caribbean, it is a good boat, a 32 feet boat51 …but due to the length of the 
waves in the Caribbean… a 36 or a 38 foot boat would be ideal (Interview). 
 
In order to match the speed of smuggler artefacts and to overcome the difficulties 
regarding the length of the waves, the Coast Guard personnel decided to lengthen the 
vessel, extending the size by 0.6 to 1.2 m, and making trials to check the 
manoeuvrability of the boat after the changes. The Coast Guard mechanics were in 
charge of these modifications, cutting the boat in two and adding a custom made 
fibreglass piece. The life span of these vessels was initially only seven to ten years, 
however, due to continuous tinkering with the hull and engines, their life span was 
stretched to nearly double this in some cases. Coast Guard personnel were in charge 
of the fibreglass work and repair, as well as in charge of replacing and modifying the 
                                                          
51 According to the technical description of the Dolphin it is a 26 foot boat, thus the captain may have 
been referring to the longer version of the Dolphin modified by the Colombian Navy.  
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engines. In all, these modifications provided the Dolphin with what an Admiral 
described as: ‘better stability and better speed’ (Interview).  
 
Despite gaining speed through modifying the hull, the Dolphins were not able to match 
the speed achieved by go-fast boats from the mid-1990s onwards. A retired captain, 
who was the first commander of the Coast Guard in the Caribbean narrates the 
difficulties, even of the U.S. Navy, in catching smugglers using go-fast boats:  
 
I was in San Andres…and the Gringos detected a go-fast…and they sent a 
landing boat…and obviously, a landing boat is useless for that…so they sent a 
helicopter and nothing…so the guys actually reached another island…the 
Gringos tried to put the blame on us, but fortunately there was an airplane from 
the Air Force…that took pictures of all of what the Gringos did to capture those 
guys and nothing! (Interview). 
 
During the mid-1990s, some smugglers were able to increase the speed of their 
artefacts and the Dolphin were no longer useful in pursuing smugglers as pointed out 
by the previous captain: ‘The Dolphin became completely useless to control 
narcotraffickers…because if a go-fast set sail…reaching…the Dolphin was reaching 
more or less 30 knots…the go-fast could reach 50 knots per hour’ (Interview). A rear 
admiral, then commander of the Cartagena Base comments: ‘They [smugglers] were 
using 500hp engines…and…or course…they [smugglers] were reaching 50 knots of 
speed in the sea…and we, well…we just didn’t have those capacities…sure, we had 




The Beast, the Orca and Smuggler Boats 
In 1997 the Navy Chief of operations, given the continuous reports about failed 
operations due to the difficulties of matching smuggler artefacts’ speed, decided that 
the Navy should construct its own rapid interceptor boat. The rear admiral entrusted 
to a group of naval engineers the drafting of a prototype, which was then reviewed by 
an external boat designer to finalize the design. The initial design proposed a boat that 
could achieve up to 45 knots, but was easy to manoeuvre and capable of being 
launched or picked up by corvette type vessels or frigates, and included as a novelty 
the use of GPS. The boats had a weight of 1500kg and a range of 200 miles, and most 
importantly the boats were set to cost half the price of the off-the-shelf models 
(Restrepo, 1997).52 This rapid interceptor boat was designed to be employed in the 
Caribbean Sea. 
 
The rear admiral in charge of the project narrates the decision making process:  
 
We had to find a way to fight the threat in a more efficient way than that which 
we were doing…and logically…that’s why we got to the…decision that the 
best we could do…was to build our own boats…with better capacities in 
speed…and that’s what we did (Interview).  
 
The process of designing and building these boats, from the moment the decision was 
made until the boats were commissioned to carry out interdiction operations, took 
about six months.53 The four rapid interceptor boats built were able to achieve a speed 
of up to 60 knots per hour and to spin on their own axis. It was soon nicknamed the 
Beast by Coast Guard personnel, it was the first time they were able to achieve such 
                                                          
52 Each boat cost 40 million pesos in 1997, compared with 80 million pesos for a similar model off the 
shelf.  
53 The design and building process took five month, with a month of trials and adjustments.  
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speeds: ‘Can you imagine!...it was…that thing can go up to 60 knots…and all the 
people were really happy…for us it was a beast’ (Interview). However, the rear 
admiral was soon transferred and the project was abandoned.  
 
Another approach during the late 1990s involved the use of Eduardoño Lobster boat 
hulls, Figure 51. According to Navy reports smugglers were using a range of 
Eduardoño Lobster hulls varying between 8.2 m, propelled by two outboard engines 
with up to 25 knots per hour, to 10.9 m hulls with three to four engines.54 At this stage 
the Coast Guard personnel started repurposing smuggler seized boats in order to carry 
interdiction operations. The First Commander of the Coast Guard in the Caribbean 
explains the transition from the Dolphins to the Eduardoño boats: 
 
So…we basically started with the Dolphins…and then we started to make a 
new development…and it was…as we were capturing…and those were 31.5 
feet…which is a good hull…we realize that their behaviour in the sea was even 
better than…than…the Dolphins…and that is when we started a process with 
Eduardoño (Interview).  
 
A captain complements: 
 
We had these boats…the Dolphins…the one that you see at the 
entry…well…as we were facing drug trafficking…we were noticing that the 
Dolphins were useless…that the smugglers ride on Lobster boats…so every 
lobster boat we can lay our hands on…we put on the Coast Guard stripes…and 
                                                          




we started to operate on them…and soon we started to achieve results 
(Interview). 
 
The same experience is narrated by the Deputy Commander of the Pacific Task Force:  
 
Back in the 90s…this is a story that I lived…well…we started…using those 
hulls against them…we received those boats…we painted them grey…and 
started using them against them…and that is a 32 foot hull…which is so much 
better than a 29 foot one…and they are really good hulls…and how we used 
them? Mostly just as they were…the hull, the two engines…paint…gas…and 
go (Interview).  
 
 
Figure 51. Eduardoño hulls seized by the Colombian Navy and repurposed to carry out 
interdiction operations. 
 Source: Author. 
 
At this time the preferred hull to do the job of pursuing smugglers is precisely the 31.5 
foot Lobster Eduardoño hull. Several captains, fresh lieutenants by the time the Coast 
Guard started using these vessels, praise the characteristics of the Eduardoño hull. One 
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captain explains: ‘Of the boats that we have used, none of which were designed having 
military applications in sight…and the one I could say…were kind of good…were the 
Lobster boats, but the original, the Eduardoño’ (Interview). The same appreciation of 
that type of hull is voiced by another captain:  
 
Well…I would never put myself on one of those things [pointing out to a 
makeshift go-fast boat]…do you follow? I would never go to the sea on one of 
those artisanal things…if you say to me…do you see that Eduardoño Lobster 
boat that is turned to *^”%&… I say ready, because I know it would work, but 
a boat that is not original? Never (Interview).  
 
The use of smuggler boats as part of the Coast Guard efforts is justified in several 
ways. A lack of resources and the perceptions of being defeated are expressed as the 
main concerns. The First Commander of the Coast Guard in the Caribbean Sea 
articulates some of these ideas, when discussing the use of smuggler boats: ‘Well…it 
was important…we had to use the same as what they were using…otherwise we would 
have been in bad shape…it’s like many diseases…that you have to fight with the same 
disease’ (Interview). While the Deputy Commander of the Antidrug Task Force states:  
 
I remember…when I started in the Coast Guard…I started chasing go-
fasts…without knowing how to…we only had those big bay security 
boats…and the narcotraffickers had their go-fast boats…and you only see their 
wake (…) so…if we got any information…we caught the boat…brand 
new…no owner…or the owner never appeared…we painted it grey…we 




In previous paragraphs, modifications of the hull only mention a livery change, but 
captured smuggler boats were also often modified to overcome smuggler artefacts. The 
First Commander of the Coast Guard in the Caribbean recalls:  
 
The same boats that we capture…well, first we used them as they were…later 
we started modifying those boats, adapting them, improving them. If they had 
three engines…we added another one, and the like.’ And later also: ‘Well lots 
of the boats we had in the beginning…were the ones we captured…and then 
we used them…but not only used them…but improve them [laughs] 
(Interview).  
 
Further attempts to modify the hull, introducing improvements for personnel well-
being such as chairs or rooftops or communication equipment, diminished the 
capacities of the Eduardoño hulls. A captain narrates the results of the modification of 
that hull, which I quote at length because he describes the five moments of the process: 
the arrival of the boats, the initial success, subsequent modifications, failure of the 
modifications, and expectations from the Navy and disposal of the artefact: 
 
Oh…yes…the [year] 1997…we acquired the famous Eduardoño boats…and 
yes…they were superb…but then later we realized….every time you try to 
place anything on the boat, the centre of gravity…it turns completely 
unstable…so it wasn’t that good…was it? And it was the same boat that we 
had recommended to be bought…because it was superb! The best at the 
moment!...but as soon as they tried to place a tent…and they put a radar 
antenna…a radio antenna…it lost stability…so you went out to the sea, on 
those things…and that thing tended to sink!...they’re still around…they 
removed all the antennas…all the things [laughs]…and in conclusion…they’re 
no good for &*(%^…they do not work, they lost stability…and I’m talking 
about the very basic stuff. (Interview).  
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By 2002 a new attempt to build a rapid patrol boat was commissioned to Cotecmar55 
(Science and Technology Corporation for the Development of the Maritime and 
Fluvial Naval Industry). Coctmar is the Navy shipyard founded in 1998, when the 
Colombian Navy reacted to a failed attempt to privatize the first Navy shipyard 
CONASTIL, which was the property of the Navy from 1968 until the mid-1980s and 
that declared bankruptcy in 1989. Partners of this new Navy shipyard included the 
Ministry of Defence, the main national public university (Universidad Nacional), a 
local university (Corporación, Universitaria Tecnológica de Bolívar), and an 
engineering specialty university (Escuela Colombiana de Ingeniería Julio Garavito. 
Cotecmar is a non-profit company which is mainly state owned. The shipyard began 
activities in 2001 and in 2002 received instructions for two interrelated projects that 
involved the design and building of small boats of high speed: the Orca boat for the 
Coast Guard Unit; and Patrol River Boats for the Marine Infantry Unit. The Orca boat 
was set to replace the Dolphin boats and the Eduardoño hulls.  
 
In the process of design of the Orca boat, the navy personnel and Cotecmar designers 
met in order to clarify the requirements of the boat, which was to perform MIOs in 
coastal and jurisdictional waters in both the Caribbean and the Pacific. In that sense, 
speed was considered the main variable in the process of design of that artefact 
(Webinfomil, 2003). The final design was a fibreglass hull of 11.8 m long, 2.6 m wide, 
with three 200hp engines, 500 nautical miles of range, and a five person crew, reaching 
speeds of up to 40 knots when fully loaded or 60 knots on a smooth sea (Degree 2, 
                                                          
55 Corporación de Ciencia y Tecnología para el Desarrollo de la Industrial Naval, Marítima y Fluvial.  
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0.10–0.50 height of the wave)56 with no cargo (
 
 
Figure 52, Figure 53, and Figure 54). The design of the Orca included improvements 
in the well-being of the sailors, such as ergonomic chairs, a resting room, and a 
bathroom. Designers estimated savings of up to 50% between the Orca and similar 
off-the-shelf boats. The building process of each Orca was approximately 150 days. 
Trials were performed in April of 2003 and a month later the boats were appointed 
their first missions.  
 
 
Figure 52. Orca boats. 
                                                          












Figure 54: Orca boat. 
Source: americamilitar.com. 
 
Trials of the Orca were carried out by Coast Guard personnel with experience of high 
speed pursuits in early 2003 and provided hints of several problems with the vessel, 
and the foreseeable problems of carrying out interdiction in the vessels. A captain who 
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participated in the trials explains: ‘during the trials…we saw that it is a raked bow…in 
V shape…but it is raked…so whenever you jumped over a wave you hit the next 
one…so…yes…the boats were of no use to interdiction in the open sea’ (Interview).  
The Orca boats were deployed to perform interdiction operations; two members of the 
Coast Guard narrate their experiences:  
 
They had a design flaw…and that’s what made them fail…you just have to see 
the short bulwark…so it is impossible to surf over the waves in the open 
sea…or even move at high speeds…if you go too fast…the waves…they pass 
over you…and they were not too strong...in some of them the frames ended up 
broken because of hitting the waves…so at the end, the few that were not 
damaged ended up around the bay…but they’re incapable of interdiction…or 
you may sink (Interview). 
Another experience confirmed some of the difficulties of carrying out high speed 
interdiction operations using the Orca:  
 
On one occasion…to the poor (the orca)…first in a chase a wave basically tore 
off the cabin…we later put that on a Lobster hull…we tried to reinforce where 
you put the engines…to see if it worked…but it wasn’t worth it…the frames 
just broke…and the water keep pouring in…they weren’t useful for the 
mission…so it was better to replace it with Lobster hulls…which are better at 
the job and are far cheaper than those monstrosities (Interview). 
 
Those characteristics were not only identified by members of the Coast Guard during 
the trials and when chasing smuggler go-fasts, but were also perceived by smugglers 
during interdictions which they evaded. Two stories corroborate the abilities of 
smugglers to identify the characteristics of their persecutors that allowed them to make 




I was in the first interdiction we made with…two boats…two Orcas…the 
Captain X…he had to go wide…so he was wide…we were…he was wide and 
I was inside…the Captain of the other boat, a firpol 3857…it is a good 
hull…well the guy just got close to Captain X…rin…rin…it was during the 
day…rum, rum, rum, rum…the guy saw the Captain’s boat…I know this 
because the guy told me…we could catch him later…the thing is…the block 
started to make waves…and waves until the boat sunk dove…and with the 
hit…the windows just broke…all…and that was the interdiction…it flooded 
(Interview). 
I remember…here near Buenaventura…we caught some guys…so here it 
is…the other side of the coin…so the guy told us… ‘we were worried and we 
started throwing the drugs….and then we saw the boat…it was running really 
smooth,’ the guy told us: ‘that boat was running really smooth…but when we 
saw it…20, 30 mt…we saw the bulwark was really low…and thought, I can 
break this thing…and so I started zigzagging…until your boat sunk 
dove’…so…it was the guy who told us how easy it was to drive that boat away 
(Interview). 
 
In short, the Orca boat, despite being designed to carry out interdiction operations and 
to develop high speeds, could only achieve those speeds in particularly calm sea 
conditions. The ones that were not damaged beyond repair currently are deployed to 
perform routine patrols in Cartagena Bay.  
 
                                                          
57 Colombian company that designs and build fisher and recreational boats.  
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Midnight Express  
A new interceptor boat arrived in late 2005 and was introduced in 2006. Mentioned in 
the 2006 strategic concept Closing the Gap as the replacement of the Dolphin boats,58 
the new boat, the Midnight Express, was a 39.2 foot long, 9.6 foot wide, fibreglass 
vessel fitted with four 220hp engines, which could develop up to 50 knots of speed in 
smooth sea conditions (Figure 55). Partly acquired via the Plan Colombia as a donation 
from the U.S Government,59 the rest was funded by the Colombian Government in 
various instalments. Four of these vessels were received in 2005 and they were set to 
operate in the Caribbean. Ten more arrived between 2008 and 2009 to be assigned to 
different bases in the Pacific and Caribbean (Ministerio de Defensa, 2008).  
 
Figure 55. Midnight Express boat. 
 Source: Author. 
 
The Midnight Express boats were introduced to the Colombian Navy, together with 
training courses for officers in interdiction operations, as a suggestion from the U.S 
                                                          
58 No mention of the Eduardo;o or the Orcas.  
59 Together with a reliance type boat, discarded from the U.S Coast Guard were it was on service from 
1968 until 2001, renamed as Valle del Cauca, and refitted, to realize patrol duties in the Pacific Ocean.  
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Government as part of the Plan Colombia, These boats were described in the official 
newspaper of the Navy in a promotional tone: ‘The new generation of interceptor, 
provided with the best sensors and high speed’ (Armada República de Colombia, 
2005). The commander of the Pacific Coast Guard when describing the procurement 
of the Midnight Express states: ‘The Americans told us…look…we have this, do you 
want them? Yes, yes, we didn’t know the boat, but we said yes, we can use it…and we 
were really in need…so that’s how we end up with that…but they turned out pretty 
good’ (Interview). The speed and the detection capacities of the Midnight Express was 
considered a strategic advantage for the members of the Coast Guard. A lieutenant 
narrates his experience with the Midnight Express boat as:  
 
Well in its prime…the Midnight Express boats really offer us an 
advantage…they had an exceptional speed…obviously…us with Lobster boats 
with two engines of 200hp and they already with go-fasts with 5, 4 engines…so 
for example…you could even dispense with other units, the patrol vessels…at 
some point the Midnight Express had better radars than the fleet…so you could 
go on your own (Interview).  
 
Despite the detection and speed advantages provided by the Midnight Express, some 
commanders became weary of their performance and decided not to employ them 
during interdiction operations. The Caribbean Coast Guard commander explains: ‘Lots 
of people didn’t like that boat…they didn’t like to use it in the sea…it didn’t provided 
the reliability…a captain was pursuing a boat…and suddenly our boat started to lag 
and he couldn’t catch the boat’. Maintenance played a key role in upholding the 
Midnight Express expectations, the boat was considered a good tool, but one that 
needed to be handle with care, as explained by the same commander: ‘The Midnights 
are really good…but they are like a Ferrari, if you do not give them good 




The Midnight Express boats were modified by Coast Guard mechanics in order to 
solve some of the boats’ reliability problems as encountered by the Coast Guard when 
carrying out interdiction operations. Reinforcement of the frames supporting the 
engines, and in some boats changes in the structure such as the placing of a door in 
order to make up for the absence of a water pump to expel the water falling inside the 
vessel, were common alterations. 60 Maintenance was, in other cases, not enough to 
sustain their use during interdiction operations. In a visit to the workshop of the Coast 
Guard in the Pacific a mechanic offered a catalogue of the problems found in the 
Midnight Express, including engines detaching from the hull, breaks in the hull, and 
corrosion. 
 
As previously highlighted in 2013 the Colombian Navy procured several new types of 
boats both from the local Market, Eduardoño 380, or from U.S. Companies: Renegade 
Patrol Boat 38, SAFE Boats Defender 380X, and SAFE Boats Apostle 410. The 
decision to buy those new boats, was contemplated in the Coast Guard Development 
Plan and was accompanied by a reassessment of the procurement strategies used until 
2010.61 This was seen as a ‘continuous evolution’ of strategies needed to be replaced 
by a ‘home reorganisation’, as the Navy Commander in charge of the Development 
Plan put it. 
 
While the strategic plans and Navy documents often refer to the procurement and 
repurposing of boats to be deployed during MIOs as responses to operational 
requirements, the story of the interceptor boats shows that the localized view of Coast 
Guard personnel played an important role in decisions to use new boats and specially 
in the modification of the boats to respond to local threats. The next quote supports 
this idea:  
 
                                                          
60 Excess of water inside the vessel during high pursue operations was also highlighted as a problem.  
61 The Plan also included the procurement of eleven radars.  
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You start feeling…when you say…a [smuggler] boat just slipped away…and 
you think…what happened?...it was going at such a higher speed than 
mine…and what else…maybe it was just not the speed…it was my speed and 
suddenly my boat just broke…so you start thinking, looking…how people 
feel…and you say…we have to solve this (Interview). 
 
When visiting Coast Guard bases you notice many similarities: usually at the entry a 
Dolphin boat will be displayed, on the near dock possibly a couple of Eduardoños 
(bought or repurposed) share the space with a Midnight Express, and recently with the 
new defenders or Apostol boats. In the workshop nearby a Midnight is being refitted, 
an Orca is used close by in training new recruits, while some other Orcas share the 
warehouse with some other discarded hulls. This display offers a glimpse of the story 
of the process of procurement and use of the interceptor boats. Already discarded boats 
that were considered not too long ago to be effective tools sit alongside vessels being 
modified or refitted which are set aside the the new generation of boats. 
 
The story of the interceptor patrol boats also challenges widespread versions of the 
interdiction/evasion binary as equated with inflexibility/flexibility as an explanation 
for the competitive advantage of smugglers (Chapter 1). As explained, several Coast 
Guard projects intended to match the capacities of smugglers took less than six months 
to conclude, while refurbishing engines to improve speed or replacing engines took 
less than this. The story of patrol boats also allows reflection on the role of discourse 
around success in the WoD. Together with the patrol boats and detection tools, for the 
Coast Guard personnel sound intelligence is also key to achieving successful 
operations. 
 
In 1994 the First Commander of the Coast Guard Unit in the Caribbean Sea 
complained that the goals of the Navy to stop smugglers from using maritime routes 
to transport drugs faced important challenges. The Navy did not have enough resources 
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to control the Caribbean routes, which was compounded by a lack of regulations to 
limit boat owners from modifying their boats. Thus smugglers were able to modify 
their boats in order to increase the speed of their boats and cargo load. The same 
captain confirmed that smugglers were building their own fibreglass boats, usually 
with double hulls or fake gas tanks where smugglers concealed the illicit cargo. 
Smugglers also carried their cargo to open seas where the drugs were then transferred 
to cargo containers. The Capitan complained; ‘The Coast Guard Unit has three sea 
patrol vessels, 2 small patrol vessels, and 10 small boats (Dolphin) intended to cover 
an area of 1650km2. This is obviously insufficient to carry out the duty of controlling 
both goods smuggling and illicit drug traffic’ (El Tiempo, 1994a).  
 
As stated in the introduction, even before, when this commander took charge of the 
Cartagena base, he found that the Coast Guard was just some offices and four boats, 
and that the personnel had no instructions or knowledge of how to perform the mission 
of thwarting smugglers. Twenty years later the tools used by the Coast Guard may 
seem completely different, but it is possible to hear the echo of the voice of the first 
captain in the voices of the new generation of Navy personnel: the lack of resources or 
limited resources is argued to be the main difficulty in fighting the WoD. A 
commander, when discussing the Closing the Gaps strategy, points out: ‘The thing is 
that we had lots of difficulties…we can make minor investments…but it is difficult to 
achieve...because it is costly…that is the ideal thing [Closing the Gap]…but we have 
never been able to complete it’ (Interview).  
  
There are both decisive differences and similarities between these two experiences. 
While the similarities are provided by the common experience of not possessing 
enough resources for the control of smugglers, the striking differences are portrayed 
by the technological transformation of the Coast Guard and Navy’s interdiction 
practices due to the introduction of and attempts to implement different strategic plans, 
boats, communication systems, etc. I argue that there are two temporalities with two 
different responses to the question of how to patrol the sea: The one given in the plans 
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and visions of the Navy, in which the implementation of new technological artefacts 
and systems follow the logic of the powers of rationalization of military activities, 
which often place these developments in the near or distant future. The second is given 
by the day to day activities of the Coast Guard personnel where issues regarding their 
relationship with technological artefacts are mediated by issues of deploying available 
resources or tinkering with such artefacts in order to achieve the capacities needed to 
face what is perceived to be the main threats.  
 
It can be argued that the story of the patrol boats used by the Coast Guard also 
constitutes a process of learning how to procure technologies. The procurement of 
boats, the formulation of operational strategies, is mediated by the (necessarily 
imperfect) assessment of technological artefacts designed and used by the Smugglers 
(Chapters 4 and 5).  
 
The story of the procurement of boats is a mixture of attempts to develop a local 
military industry that could benefit from the local experience of the Colombian Navy 
and local pressures to achieve results. Matching smugglers, the perceived capacities of 
smuggler artefacts, was the main drive behind procurement efforts that took place from 
1995 until the aforementioned Coast Guard Development Plan of 2013 in which an 
experienced Coast Guard commander was able to coordinate a process of procurement 
that responded to the different needs of the Coast Guard that surpassed the need for 
high speed transport in the open sea. Between 1995 and 2013 the use of go-fast boats 
and the increasing use of speed in order to evade control motivated the Navy to explore 
alternatives to catch with smugglers. This included them developing their own plans 
for designing and building their own boats, and using captured smuggler boats. The 
story of the Coast Guard patrol boats follows a similar pattern. Early impressions of 
effectively matching smugglers’ capacities, followed by discovering problems with 
the artefact and their abilities to match smuggler vessels, and finally discarding or 
repurposing those vessels.   
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Chapter 8. Maritime Interdiction Operations: Evasion is 
a State of Mind 
 
 
For a few years during the mid-1990s the main tool of the Colombian Coast Guard for 
maritime interdiction operations, was the 7.81 m boat known as the Dolphin (Chapter 
7), or more commonly, the ‘Colombian’ version of the Dolphin (Figure 56 and Figure 
57). This boat could sail, according to technical descriptions, at a speed of up to 4062 
knots. The Dolphins were the first proper boats acquired by the Colombian Navy in 




Figure 56. Dolphin Boat. 
Source: Author. 
                                                          
62 Several respondents have different recollections of the actual speed of the Dolphin. This is probably 
associated with use. In the early years some reported that the Dolphin achieved 45 knots, while in 
later years 35 knots was reported. The Dolphin was designed and build by Mako Marine as 216B type.  
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An experienced Captain, who was a fresh lieutenant at the time the Coast Guard began 
activities, narrates the experience of the first year’s operations against smugglers on 
board the Dolphin:  
 
In that time they just told you to find a GPS or buy your own…and go my 
brother…just carry a battery in the pocket…and see how to come back. (…) In 
that time you could end up far away from the coast alone, and you could end 
up carrying out the operations alone…there were no cell phones…there were 
cell phones but they were really expensive…or there was no cell phone 
coverage…so you just blessed yourself and sailed…today…seventeen…eighteen 
years later…we have changed our way of thinking…our way of carrying out 
operations (Interview).  
 
This story is important to illustrate the technologies and practices used by Law 
Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) and the Military - in this case the Colombian Coast 
Guard Unit - but it also is important in highlighting a comparison between the more 
recent state of affairs regarding maritime interdiction operations and older operations. 
In this account there are elements relevant to understanding the dynamics of the 
interdiction/evasion binary. One side of the binary is made up of the practices, 
artefacts, plans, and actions of the LEAs working to stop the flow of illicit drugs, while 
on the other side the smugglers plans, devices, actions, and strategies are oriented 
towards evading state control. Also, to introduce the idea, that the initial binary 
opposition can, in some instances, by the existence of local relationships, operate in 
terms that create continuum rather than dichotomies. 
 
In this chapter I will focus my attention on the practice of ‘Maritime Interdiction 
Operations’. I present evidence to show that interdictions practices draw on, and are 
the result of the interplay between a local and a centralized view of smugglers’ actions 
as well as definitions of who smugglers are (Chapter 4). I also question the widespread 
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dichotomy which portrays smugglers as flexible vs Military/LEAs as bureaucratic, I 
argue then that this is the result of an asymmetric view that overestimates the benefits 
of the ‘small networks’ and does not take into account the advantages the 
Military/LEAs have in regards to the production of organisational learning and, most 
importantly, the everyday practices of the members of the Military/LEAs.  
 
Figure 57. Dolphin Boat. 
Source: Revista Armada N. 48. 
 
Temporary Measures of Success: Events 
 
The seizure of drugs during interdiction operations and indicators associated with these 
activities, such as the capturing of narco-traffickers and their artefacts, are constantly 
brought to the fore to highlight the importance of the Navy and the Coast Guard in the 
WoD. While the Navy as a whole presents cocaine seizure statistics as an important 
indicator of their operational results and their continuous ‘success’ in the WoD, for the 
men and women of the Coast Guard this implies that their operational success is in 
turn measured in accordance to the overall objectives of the institution:  
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Well…my operational results are measured by the number of kilos that I 
chase...my work is measured on the number of kilos…it is that simple…and I 
have to fulfil…the commanders say to me…you have to fulfil this goal…and 
that’s how the game is played…and that’s how we keep fighting to catch every 
guy…the cat and mouse game…they go out…we go out after them…and that’s 
how they measure my performance…but I also have 14 other functions…but 
there’s no goals regarding those. (Interview).  
 
For local commanders and the personnel under their command these seizures are 
turned into ‘events’, and these events are important for boosting their careers and 
prestige, and that of the institution. Events play an important role in the bureaucratic 
struggle in terms of how LEAs and MOs position themselves as key players in the 
WoD. The importance of these events in terms of institutional prestige is expressed by 
an Antinarcotics Police Commander, when he explains how for him it is important to 
know that not only the illicit cargo will be seized, but also that the ‘event’ will be 
attributed to them: 
 
If I know there is a boat full of cocaine, if our intelligence tells us that there is 
a boat, that is going to go with 200, 300 kilos, wherever, I prefer to tell the 
Gringos, and they will catch it, because if I told the Navy, they’ll catch it and 
they will say it was their operation, but if the Gringos catch it, I can say it’s 
mine (Interview).  
 
These ‘events’ are important on a day to day basis because the performance of 
commanders is measured by the amount of illicit cargo they are able to thwart, as a 
Regional Commander explains: ‘If you don’t catch 800 kilos a week you’re screwed’ 
(Interview). These events provide prestige and help advance the careers of officers 
(e.g. officers competing with each other to see who will catch the faster boats or 
discover the ‘latest’ smuggler innovation). While statistics are important at the 
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institutional level, ‘events’ are important for Navy Officers because involvement in 
(successful) events provides prestige, helping them to build a personal narrative of 
historical success. Among these events, the capture of narcosubs is regarded as one of 
the most important.  
 
Maritime Interdiction Operations: Policing the Sea 
 
Spaces are socially constructed; permissible forms of actions are clearly delimited and 
non-conforming forms of behaviour are disciplined (Hudson, 2004). The interdiction 
approach, that is to say, actions aimed at apprehending smugglers or illicit drugs, 
applied to drug trafficking is a way of disciplining unruly users of socially constructed 
space. This is based on the idea that increasing the cost of transport will make drug 
traffickers give up on their intention to smuggle cargo and abandon the business 
altogether (Echeverry, 2004; Kawell, 2001).63 According to Mejia (2016) the 
interdiction approach adopted in 2006 yields far better results than other forms of 
controlling illicit drug traffic. For smugglers, at this stage, adaptation and substitution 
is more difficult, and money lost is considerably larger than in earlier stages of the 
drug traffic chain.  
 
The participation of a military organisation and military trained personnel in law 
enforcement activities implies further uncertainties among the Coast Guard personnel 
about the ‘goals’ of their institution. In an interview a local commander explaining the 
need to perform policing activities noted that: ‘We have the most militarized police 
and military doing police work’. This means that Coast Guard personnel need to 
comply with procedures for which they are not initially trained and which are often 
seen as another difficulty to overcome in performing their activities. A regional 
                                                          
63 Interestingly in 1991 a document from the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force considered that the main 
goal of the Military in the WoD would tend to add to other policies in their effects on the drug market 
(Ahart & Stiles, 1991). 
255 
 
commander, discussed a recent event in which personnel under his command were 
involved in an interchange of firing with smugglers: 
 
We have big strengths…but also great threats…and one of those big threats…is 
that we have to motivate people and say…be ready…the procedures have to be 
in agreement with the law…if not it is useless…is useless to achieve 
results…we cannot go over the procedures…because we have lots of eyes 
looking at us. (Interview). 
 
In short, in order to fulfil the new operational requirements for success, Coast Guard 
personnel also have to be trained in legal procedures and accept the participation and 
collaboration of Law Enforcement Agencies such as the Police and the General 
Attorney’s Office in their operations.  
 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) are well-established practices of navies. They 
have been defined as ‘operations to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy an enemy’s 
surface capabilities before they can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to 
otherwise achieve objectives’ (Smart, 2015. p, 730). More generally, the term 
Maritime Interdiction is applied to different operations where the military or LEAs 
from a legitimate state proceed to board and inspect a suspicious vessel. This definition 
allows us to understand the role of the military in controlling the many insecurities that 
they must deal with below the classification of warfare: piracy, people smuggling, 
terrorism, and the illicit traffic of weapons and guns. In order to face non-traditional 
threats, navies need to transform their goals in terms of the procurement of technology, 
innovation, and learning. An interesting case of the adaptation of a navy in order to 
face asymmetric wars, is the Sri Lanka Navy, which had an important role in defeating 




The specificity of MIO in the case of Colombian include: 1.) The symbolic use of the 
(many) borders (Chapter 6); 2.) The characteristics of the ‘enemy’ mean that these 
operations are in fact, enforcement operations; and 3.) The reconfiguration of the idea 
of success. Drug interdiction operations in the United States target the entry of illicit 
flows, exemplified by the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy (NDSC), which 
is to ‘shield America’s air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat’ and by 
achieving interceptions of at least 30% of illicit drugs to discourage smugglers from 
doing their business (Decker & Townsend Chapman, 2008; also see Ahart & Stiles, 
1991).  
 
For the Colombian Navy, MIOs are the main tools used to diminish the export of illicit 
drugs, and thus to reduce the cash flows of the DSOs.64 A Maritime Interdiction 
Operation, for the Colombian Navy, is the practice of ‘thwarting smugglers efforts at 
using Colombian jurisdictional waters, coastal sectors, and rivers to perform their 
illegal activities or using maritime transport methods for carrying drugs to other 
countries’ (Lesmes Duque, 2005). The concept has a central role in the Operational 
Normativity of the Navy.65 Interdiction operations are a control tool, and their aim is 
to reduce smugglers’ earning and deter smugglers from carrying out future actions. It 
is considered a ‘defensive’ operation as ‘the idea is that only with our presence…with 
the lights…with the signs…these will people stop…’ (Interview). The Coast Guards 
learn the procedures for MIO as part of their training. A MIO requires the deployment 
of an advanced technological system in conjunction with sensorial capacities. An acute 
sense of smell, even in the open sea can be key to pinpointing a smugglers vessel: ‘We 
couldn’t see anything, it was already dark, and we couldn’t hear. But because of the 
                                                          
64 The U.S. Navy in its Naval Operational Concepts establishes two different concepts for Maritime 
Interdiction Operations: ‘Maritime Interception Operations: monitor, query, and board merchant 
vessels to enforce sanctions against other nations such as those embodied in United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions and prevent the transport of restricted goods.’ And Interceptions operations, 
which are operations carried out by LEAs mainly the Coast Guard Unit (U.S. NAVY, 2010). To the OTAN 
a Maritime Interdiction Operation ‘encompasses seaborne enforcement measures to intercept the 
movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specific area ‘(NATO, 2005). 
65 COMANDO ARMADA, Disposición 016/ 06 de COARC, Normas de Procedimiento Operacional. 
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smell we knew we were close, when we were about a kilometre away we started to 
smell the chemicals, we knew we were close’ (Franklin, 2009). 
 
The responsibilities for carrying out a MIO are distributed across different levels of 
the Navy: the Naval Operations Chief Office (JONA in Spanish), the commander of 
the operational theatre, the commander of the base or bases participating in the 
operation, and the commander of the operation: 
 
The chain of commanders receives the information and decide whether it is 
‘good enough’ to set up the operation. Then the commander of the operation 
receives the intelligence package…and there within that package, we have the 
time variable…so…having the time variable…and of course all of the other 
information…the operation itself is programmed…the proper operation to 
which the intelligence package refers (Interview). 
 
An intelligence package may provide only part of the information needed to design 
and carry out an operation, providing the objective of the operation and approximate 
location.  
 
Maritime Interdiction Operations are key actions in which competing complex socio-
technical systems display their tools/knowledge, creating the conditions that further 
help the two sides of the binary to co-evolve, and where those interactions further 
affect the ecosystem in which they act. A particular form of understanding the co-
evolution of biological entities can be a useful device for understanding this particular 
form of co-evolution: the host-parasite red queen co-evolutionary dynamics. The red 
queen hypothesis describes a scenario in which the success of different players is based 
on the premise that in order to match or exceed the other, all participants have to 
constantly move in a continuous arms race of defence and counter-defence (Barnett & 
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Hansen, 1996; Baumol, 2004). Like in Lewis Carroll’s book, in which Alicia and the 
Red Queen have to run quickly, and not really getting anywhere.  
 
Host-Parasite is one of the many explanations for selection and adaptation. In this 
theory, host and parasite co-evolve. The selection process favours host genes 
resistance to the parasite, to defend and reject the parasite, but the parasite is also under 
pressure to overcome that resistance. This form of co-evolution which involves 
antagonist interactions often leads to a dynamic arms race (Jablonka & Ziman, 2000). 
Predator-prey, host-parasite compete and new adaptations in one species triggers the 
selection of the other species, triggering further counter adaptations in the first one. 
The result is a persistent change in both species, the accumulation of ‘improvements’ 
in both the host and the parasite (Goater, Goater, & Esch, 2014). When referring to 
biological theories, I do so only for their metaphorical value. As this research 
demonstrates, the Colombian Navy does not simply respond to smugglers' threats, but 
they are also shaped by organizational politics. Furthermore, smugglers do not only 
seek to overcome LEAs' capabilities. Therefore, on both sides there is more going on 
than simply a race between the two sides, something that neither current studies of 
criminal networks not theories of co-evolution fully explain. 
 
Other metaphors of parasitic relationships have been applied to the social sciences. 
Serres uses the idea of the parasite as a device to explain both the asymmetrical 
situation of ‘taking without giving’ and the fundamental dependence of host and 
parasite (Brown, 2002). Serres’ notion of the parasite is used by Martin (2015) to 
explain the relationship of smuggling activities and container mobilities, where the 
parasite is not an unproductive figure, rather it is productive in the sense that it 
stimulates the complexity of container security by triggering a set of innovations and 
inspection practices.  
A successful maritime operation produces ‘results’, quantifiable results, expressed in 
the capture of smugglers boats, smugglers, and cargo. This configures a set of practices 
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that both create an idea of how a successful operation must be carried out, while at the 
same time undermining the existence of the reality that allows the very presence of 
those who achieve success. This represents a sort of paradoxical action in which to 
differentiate among what is created, what is destroyed, and what remains becomes 
difficult, an action in which creation and destruction cohabit.  
 
In this ever changing environment, drug smugglers have used and innovated transport 
methods (Chapter 4 and 5) and the Navy has created plans and procured technologies 
in order to face smugglers’ techniques (Chapter 6). In this chapter I describe some 
features of the MIO carried out by the Colombian Coast Guard. I describe the MIO as 
the moment in which different forms of knowledge, images of the enemy and the 
enemies’ capabilities, and collaboration between different agencies are performed.  
 
The Practice of a Maritime Interdiction Operation 
 
In order to carry out a Maritime Interdiction Operation, commanders need to negotiate 
and balance several factors: reliability of the information or intelligence, availability 
of means, knowledge and experience of personnel, descriptions of the enemies’ 
artefacts, information about the conditions of the sea, rules and standard procedures, 
and legal requirements. The vision of the ideal interdiction operation is exemplified 
graphically in the Closing the Gap operational strategy (Chapter 6), and is described 
by a regional commander as one in which: 
 
You got a ship, you got a rapid reaction boat, or a group of rapid reaction boats, 
you got an airplane doing the intelligence, you got intelligence information, so 
you know where exactly they’re going to sail from, so once they sail, you got 
the ship, covering the area with its radar, pin pointing the smugglers boat, and 
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the rapid reaction boats start the persecution, the plane follows the smugglers 




Figure 58. Ideal Maritime Interdiction Operation. 
Source: Lesmes Duque, 2005. 
 
The socio-technical system needed to achieve this vision has been put in place as a 
result of different learning experiences, learning how to procure technology, learning 
when and how to interdict, learning when to change strategies and adaptations to 
perceived smuggler changes, and adaptations to the macro-environment. In an 
interdiction operation, commanders and NCOs combine different kinds of knowledge, 
tacit knowledge/sophisticated local knowledge and formal knowledge (standards and 
procedures). A successful commander is often described as one that not only has the 
right training, but also has the right knowledge. A commander must know not only 
how to carry out an operation, but also must be aware of the cues that indicate when 
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to stop the operation. A Navy officer explains some of those moments in which a 
commander needs to stop an operation and a series of cues that could lead to this:  
 
There are last minute issues…those issues can indicate that it’s better to abort 
a mission…because there’s more danger than initially thought…because 
something broke…because something couldn’t be checked…(…)…and there 
are some check points that can assure that the operation may be a success…and 
there are some points of no return…where success is guaranteed…but we have 
seen in the case of too many young officers...who, wanting to obtain results, 
jump over those point (Interview).  
 
Maritime Interdiction Operations occur in a highly complex setting, where conditions 
are hardly predictable.66 Commanders in charge of operations need to make several 
decisions in a short period of time, assessing their strengths, the possibilities of 
success, and characteristics of the enemy. A combination of different forms of 
knowledge and experience are important while carrying out a Counter Drug Maritime 
Operation, as one of the respondents described, they are ‘arts and science’ (Chief of 
the Coast Guard Unit).  
 
In what follows I present a description of an MIO as carried out by the Coast Guard. 
This account was developed using descriptions provided by several interviewees. In 
doing so, I point out that the different innovations in these operations are the results of 
the interplay between the local view of commanders and the macro strategies set by 
the Navy, and that MIOs and the procedures after and before channel what is ultimately 
perceived by the Navy (State). It is here where the view of the individual and the 
organisation merge.  
                                                          
66  Even if intelligence reports are able to produce accurate information about location and cargo, they 




A MIO starts with information from a reliable source or from work of the Intelligence 
Unit, human intelligence or technical intelligence. Here ‘historical intelligence’ also 
plays a role, that is to say, an evaluation of the reliability of that information based on 
previous occurrences. A critical mass of information, good enough to establish an 
‘intelligence package’ contains information about the type of vessel, crew, 
approximate time and site of departure, and cargo. Different smuggler artefacts require 
different types of information (Chapters 4 and 5). The commander must be sure of the 
reliability of the information in order to plan for contingences. The commander 
evaluates the intelligence package. Once it is decided that the information is enough 
to properly launch a MIO, the planning stage begins. Commanders need to learn to 
plan their actions in order to safeguard the operation, and to plan their actions and the 
actions of their subordinates in a way that correspond with judicial procedures. Thus, 
according to a commander, ‘We have had complicated operations…with interchange 
of fire out there in the open sea…we have lost people…they have lost people…but if 
the intelligence package and the planning is weak…well…that’s where juridical 
procedures may arise…and you have to clearly present your objectives and the 
manoeuvres you undertake’ (Interview). Here secrecy is important, a strict protocol 
regarding who should know what information is followed in order to avoid smugglers 
being informed of Navy operations. Units are always ready to operate; the 
‘infrastructure is open 24/7’. The operation is not launched until the commander is 
assured of a high rate of success. The commander works out the time needed to operate, 
the characteristics of the area where the operation is going to be carried out, and any 
security issues. 
 
The commander then decides which boats and officers are going to carry out the 
operation, requests boats from other units or bases, or requests collaboration from other 
LEAs or the military if needed, and matches information with interdiction assets. The 
use of supplementary units, such as helicopters or planes, are subject to availability. 
Once the boats are launched, usually two rapid interceptor boats (a primary boat and a 
secondary boat) pursue the smugglers’ vessel. The boats can be launched from a Coast 
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Guard base or from a bigger unit in the open sea. An ocean searching radar from the 
sea fleet, the base, or if possible from an airplane guides the operation.  
 
The movements performed by the smugglers provide an idea of the direction. The 
commander and his staff then triangulate possible points of encounter and direct the 
boats towards them. When the smugglers’ artefact is visualized by the crew of the 
rapid reaction units, a series of synchronized movements are performed by the Navy 
boats in order to approach and block the movement of the smugglers’ boat. Until this 
point there is continuous contact between the officers in charge of the operation and 
senior officers at the base, but once officers in the rapid boats visualize their target, 
they take command of the chase. Those synchronized movements are also used to 
avoid smugglers’ evasive actions and to get as close as possible in order to initiate the 
third stage of the MIO. Sailing rapid reaction boats plays a central part of the training 
courses, where Coast Guard personnel begin to learn different aspects of those boats, 
such as speed and balance. Here, many decisions have to be quickly taken: ‘under 
difficult conditions, you have to make decisions…really tired…under stress…under 
fear…but you have to take the right decision…and commander ha to trust his 
knowledge…and how do you take the right decision?...well, that is easy…training, 
training, training’ (Interview). 
 
Interdiction boats get as close as possible in order to perform the next stage of the 
MIO, to signal visually and verbally to request the smuggler’s artefact to stop. 
Smugglers may decide to stop or to evade. Evade here is a ‘state of mind’. Navy 
personnel consider that smugglers will try to evade at any moment. Navy personnel 
may also wait for a designated sniper to be in range to shoot at the smugglers’ boat. 
Smugglers may decide to continue performing evasive manoeuvres, use speed, waves, 
the darkness, in order to avoid capture. They may decide to turn back, abandon the 
boat and cargo, and run into the jungle where catching them is difficult. Coast Guard 
personnel will try to get as close as possible, and now the verbal signals are replaced 
by warning shots. Again smugglers may stop, retaliate, or continue. If the last option 
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is taken, a sniper shoots at the smugglers’ boat engines, with the sniper positioned in 
the middle of the boat, where the boats’ see-saw movement is less acute. The sniper 
does not look ahead, does not look at the smugglers, and does not look back, he only 
looks down, where the engine is located. This operation requires a continuous 
communication between the machine operator and the sniper, a back and forward 
shouting, ‘Out (of range) Out, Out, there!’. The driver will try to maintain the optimum 
distance so that the sniper can make a clean shot.  
 
When smugglers stop (or are forced to stop), Coast Guard boats approach and proceed 
to board. If drug smugglers are carrying a large amount of illicit cargo it will be easy 
to spot. There will be big bags, carefully packaged to avoid the sea water damaging 
the expensive cargo. An NCO, probably trained to perform the next task, takes a 
sample of the white powder and applies a reactive agent. If the mix turns blue, it is 
beyond doubt, they have achieved an ‘event’. If the cargo is not bulky, Coast Guard 
personnel perform an inspection. Visual clues often give information about where the 
illicit cargo may be hidden. For example, an uneven size of the gas tank, an excessive 
or ‘suspicious’ number of chairs, a section recently painted or new screws, etc. may 
indicate where the drugs are stored. Often smugglers are smart, the cargo is not visible, 
there are no visual cues, and they claim to be fishermen. They may also claim to have 
been scared as their reason to refusing to stop. The officer decides whether to trust 
intelligence or to trust the ‘fishermen’. The boat is towed back to the Coast Guard base. 
A drill then becomes integral to the operation. An NCO pierces a section of the boat, 
and if nothing appears he pierces another section until something pops up along with 
the shavings: a white powder.  
 
Local enforcement authorities, already aware of the operation process the capture of 
the smugglers and the seizure of the boat and cargo. A press release is written and sent 
to local and national media. Here, however, the smugglers may evade again if 
weaknesses in the procedures carried out by the Coast Guard personnel can be used by 
the smugglers’ lawyers to successfully defend their clients and to reclaim their freedom 
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and that of their boat. For the Coast Guard personnel the presence of lawyers means 
only one thing: the need for proof of the involvement of captured artefacts or people 
in drug traffic activities despite the absence of illegal drugs or any other evidence. 
 
In a matter of hours, days, or weeks from the initial intelligence about the actions of 
smugglers to the capture and handling of the smuggler a complex socio-technical 
systems is deployed to demonstrate its suitability for the job it was assigned to. Coast 
Guard personnel then have the duty of preserving all the data corresponding to the 
MIO, as they need to produce and maintain records of all counter drug operations. The 
data produced is used by the attorney’s office in order to formalize penal charges. It is 
also used by the intelligence office in order to pursue new leads. This data is also used 
to produce standardized methods of inspection, early alarm systems, statistics, as well 
as an evaluation of the operations. This set of activities responds both to the day to day 
necessities, and the creation of long term plans and accountabilities, knowledge of the 
smugglers’ transport methods, Vessel types, (e.g. speed, camouflage, position, and/or 
route), suspected activities, risk assessment (number of people on board and suspicions 
of weapons or other sources of risk as well as the assessment of their own capacities, 
e.g. speed), and knowledge and experience of the crew. This information is used to 
develop ‘historic intelligence’, to view the changes in smuggling practices, to construct 
the image of the enemy, to assess the military’s own practices and training, to evaluate 









Comparing the early days of the Navy’s involvement in the WoD and how current 
MIOs are carried out, it is possible to detect important changes in the ways that 
operations are performed. Innovations may help reinforce the role of the Navy as an 
able player in the WoD, setting criteria for both success and failure.  
 
The first Coast Guard operations consisted of attempts to control maritime area 
‘corridors’ known as main transport routes for smuggling goods and illicit drugs. This 
approach was consistent with activities carried out by the Navy to control territorial 
waters by preventing the intrusion of unauthorized ships from other countries into 
Colombian waters, which was the traditional role of the Navy. However, after training 
from the U.S. Customs Agency67 and the U.S. Coast Guard,68 and improvements in 
‘human’ and ‘technical’ intelligence were made, the Colombian Coast Guard began a 
process of learning how to carry out MIOs.  
 
By 1997, previous practices were completely abandoned, such as the practice known 
as ‘to blend the sea’. A deputy commander explains the practice:  
 
To patrol the sea…and a week can go by…and you see nothing…but you’re 
there with the boat…patrolling…that’s what we called ‘to blend the sea’; this 
early tactic has been abandoned…well…‘to blend the sea’…that is something 
we don’t do anymore…because we need to focus our resources (Interview).  
In 1997 a new step was publicised by the Navy, ‘creating a unique form of interdiction, 
with the placement of interception units in focal points’, and also the development and 
acquisition of new boats to counter the perceived innovations of the smugglers. This 
                                                          
67 Interestingly, while the Colombian Coast Guard Unit was receiving training for field operations from 
the U.S. Government, the Colombian Elite Antinarcotic Tactical Group received training from the 
British S.A.S.  
68 It is also worth pointing out that while the U.S. Customs and U.S. Coast Guard are proper Law 
Enforcement Organisations, the Colombian Coast Guard is part of the Colombian Navy.   
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included the use of fast boats with speeds up to 50 knots. Those innovations, designed 
with the intention to deter smugglers from the use of the so called go-fast boats, 
appeared to be a success. In 1997 the Colombian Navy reported 26 successful special 
operations against go-fast boats (Revista Armada N 73, 1998). 
 
Go-fast boats were then the main target of the Coast Guard, as these boats were sailing 
from unpoliced areas of the Caribbean Coast and the Pacific Coast, although some 
smugglers attempted to hide in plain sight, launching their boats from small coastal 
towns. The realization that drug smugglers were using submersible and 
semisubmersible artefacts (Narcosubs) in order to transport illicit drugs is considered 
another step in the arms race between the smugglers and the Navy. While the idea of 
a MIO to catch a go-fast was already well established, and the competition 
concentrated on achieving speed, on both sides, the entry of the narcosubs implied 
further changes in the MIO.  
 
Although the speed of narcosubs is only up to 10 knots, the Colombian Navy 
considered that the best approach to catch these artefacts is to catch them while they 
are still on the shore, in the makeshift workshops where they are built (Chapter 5). 
This implied a further move, the Navy needed to strengthen their Intelligence Unit if 
they wanted to achieve successful ‘events’. Nevertheless, recent captures of narcosubs 
have taken place in the open sea, demonstrating that the Navy has developed the 
capacities for interdicting such vessels once they set sail. However, the fact that some 
smugglers are able to build narcosubs, does not mean that all smugglers do, and so the 
sea continues to be polluted with diverse smuggler artefacts. In the representations 
made by the Navy smugglers movements are reduced to linear ones, forwards or 
backwards. In absence of complete knowledge about the enemies’ actions, both sides 
need to continue to move, as in Lewis Carroll’s fable claims, to stand still, both sides 




Entanglements in the binary Interdiction/evasion 
 
As I mentioned, academic literature stresses on the differences between the two sides 
of the binary interdiction/evasion, making an emphasis on the organizational 
arrangements or each. Such studies underplay, first, the hidden reality of illicit flows, 
while illuminating their multiple representations (Gootenberg, 2009) and second, the 
emphasis put in the 'separation of legal and illegal trade (and by definition mobility) 
masks the entanglements between the two' (Martin, 2015, p. 80). I argue that there 
ways to achieve a critical account, signalling that despite the existence of different 
notions and meanings regarding borders and authority in each side of the binary, this 
concept foregrounds a set of dispersed, contingent and unbounded encounters between 
the two sides that does not reproduce the binary opposition. There are multiple points 
of encounter that dissolves the binary, and that entangle the two sides, further 
enhancing the symbiotic relationship. First, bribes offered to Navy personnel or their 
direct involvement in drug traffic, second, locality and local relationships, third, uses 
of artefacts (Chapter 7).  
 
As stated by Thoumi (1999) the Colombian institutions have been traditionally 
vulnerable to corruption, and the concentration of illicit drugs in Colombia have 
further enhanced corruption. Members of different LEAs and Military in Colombia 
have been captured for their involvement with drug smugglers. In the case of the 
Colombian Navy, members of the Navy, both Officers and NCOs have been caught 
because of providing drug smugglers with detailed information about Navy actions. 
Just as I was about to perform an interview to an officer, the officer, commander of a 
base pointed out he was arriving from an interview. In the interview with national 
media, he had to clarify, regarding recent capture of several NCOs, that the Navy was 
aware of the illicit behavior, and that he was quite conscious of the stigma on the 
members the Navy because of the behavior of some 'rotten apples.' Other members of 
the Navy have been captured because of his direct involvement in drug traffic even 
using the flagship to transport drugs (Semana, 2004). Finally, members of the Navy, 
retired or active have been captured because of the participation in the design and 
building of narcosubs (chapter 5), something that the anti-submersible’ law of 2009 
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took into consideration, as a Navy commander puts it when discussing the penalties 
imposed by the law:  
 
'And a third level...even harder...it is when the person... is... or has been public 
servant...because unfortunately...(he asked to himself) who are the ones who 
are...those who...are involved in the part of naval architecture?...well some 
Navy officers...those are the people who know how to sail in the sea’ (Interview 
Navy Commander).  
 
A second entanglement is given by the locality and the development of local 
relationships. I will mention two here. The first one is provided by the continued 
encounters between the members of the Navy and the local lawyers defending drug 
smugglers. As noted before, the involvement of solicitors is taken by the Navy 
personnel as proof that the people captured in counter-drug operations had indeed, 
involvement with drug trafficking networks. Furthermore, as part of their duties as 
witnesses, Navy officers routinely, they have to interact with such solicitors and as one 
officer stated 'You get to know which people is involved in drug smuggling, and they 
get to know who are you.' (Interview). As result of those encounters, and continued 
interactions, the distance between the two sides of the binary is further diminished, 
having an effect on the perceptions of effectivity of the Navy actions, first, by 
discouraging Navy personnel, 'You capture them...spend time and effort doing 
that...and then you see...you see them in the streets in a couple of days...' (Interview). 
Second, in regarding with personal safety and goals, 'You have to do your job, but 
you're job can't be too good because the smugglers will get an eye on you...but it has 
to be good enough, so your superiors are also happy.' 
Asymmetrical Views on Flexibility  
While the idea of ‘improvement’ and ‘evolution’ in regards to drug traffickers 
transport methods is present in the media, as shown earlier, some Navy officers’ 
describe drug smuggling technologies as moving in cycles, whereas others see a 
270 
 
process of constant improvement and development. Different accounts of the same 
process could lead to different decisions regarding the technical requirements of the 
boats and other needed equipment. Those narratives collude with continuous changes 
on the Navy’s side. The binary is continuously in flux and is highly unpredictable. In 
this circumstance flexibility and adaptability are key to the survival of the players 
(smugglers can be captured, smuggler rings thwarted, commanders removed if they do 
not achieve results).  
 
The Navy and smugglers have often been distinguished by the dichotomy between 
flexibility and inflexibility, which some see as explaining their relative competitive 
advantages (Chapter 1). The flexibility of smugglers is counter-posed to the 
bureaucracy of the state and the military and LEAs. This is considered a key element 
in describing the ‘lack of catching up’ of LEAs with drug traffickers (e.g. Kenney, 
2007). I argue that this dichotomy arises when the descriptions of the drug market are 
made from a focal/central point of view, where the metaphors used to describe the drug 
market are unidirectional, are attached to cause and causality, and define what it moves 
and what is moved. This dichotomy also adopts the view that organisational routines 
are a  source of inflexibility and inertia (Feldman & Pentland, 2003). I also argue that 
these descriptions only take into account the ‘advantages’ of the small institutions and 
not the advantages of big institutions. Bouchard and Ouellet (2011) argue that there is 
in fact little correlation between size and the failure of smugglers networks, and that 
smugglers rather than trying to ‘keep things small’ should ‘keep things as small as 
necessary’. 
 
Golden and Powel (2000) point out that the difficulties in defining the term flexibility, 
which is both multidimensional and polymorphous. Furthermore, the idea of flexibility 
has positive connotations (De Leeuw & Volberda, 1996). Smugglers have been 
consistently redefined as ‘networks’ (Chapter 1), and this conceptualization poses 
advantages over concepts such as cartels in providing nuanced interpretations of the 
phenomena and explaining some reasons for its endurance. In doing so,  traits of 
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network arrangements, especially the flexibility attached to ‘Network Flexibility’ - 
understood as the ease with which a network rearranges itself - replace nodes if they 
decline, while maintaining the logic of the network (Urry, 2003) is set to apply also to 
‘smugglers networks’.  
 
The ideas of flexibility also play a role in the discourse of the Colombian Navy 
(Chapter 6). It is necessary for them to adapt their organisational settings to what they 
perceive to be the evolution and dynamism of the drug traffickers. Openness to change 
has been promoted by Navy Officers as one of the key factors that will help them to 
win the WoD. The Commander of the Navy in 2006 stated: ‘All organisations are 
dynamic, including military organisations. This organisation should adapt to the 
strategy, therefore every time there is a strategic change, it is necessary to re-design 
the structures of the organisation’ (Revista Armada, 2006). 
 
Innovations in MIOs show that Navy personnel are able to respond and adapt to 
smugglers’ innovations. A good example of this adaptability is represented in the early 
days of the Coast Guard. Unable to match the speed produced by smugglers’ fast boats 
that easily out did the Dolphin, Coast Guard personnel quickly started to use captured 
smuggler artefacts in MIOs. A captain narrates such occurrences: ‘We catch those 
boats, brand new engines, the owner never showed up, we painted them grey (the 
colour of the Coast Guard Units) and we used [the boats] against them’ (Interview). 
The many possibilities opened up by collaboration with other LEAs and the military, 
may also be perceived as a way to increase flexibility.  
Another important element to take into account when comparing 
flexibility/inflexibility is the high degree of autonomy of Coast Guard Commanders in 
the open sea.69 Finally, in their day to day activities, Navy Officers transform, 
repurpose, and adapt the tools at hand with little regard for waiting for orders from 
their superiors. For example, they use for interdiction the boats seized from drug 
                                                          
69 A trait that is common in all navies around the world.  
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smugglers without permission from superiors; or change or ‘improve’ their boats with 
the tools they have at hand: ‘The ARA (a boat) started with a 100hp motor and it broke, 
so we said let’s put a 150hp on to see if runs and yes it did, but it also broke, so we 
said it started to run faster with the 150hp so let’s try with a 200hp and see what 
happens, and yes it worked and there you see it’ (Interview). As shown in this last 
excerpt, mechanics have a high degree of autonomy in tinkering with boats, changing 
parts to improve speed, as well as improving conditions on board boats.  
 
Time and resources are scarce and interdiction operations are high risk operations (let 
alone the fact that an interdiction operation can easily turn into a rescue operation). 
While the Colombian Coast Guard has been investing in the codification of knowledge 
of interdiction operations (e.g. through training courses at the Coast Guard School, 
different types of knowledge that can hardly be codified are put into work while 
carrying out such operations.  
 
The interdiction approach as pursued by the Coast Guard responds to a different set of 
pressures. In focusing on the capture of go-fast boats carrying ‘big amounts’ of illicit 
drugs and narcosubs in the open sea or on the shore, the Coast Guard reaffirms: 1.) 
That their visions about smuggler actions are correct, 2.) That the set of technologies 
and practices are appropriate, 3.) That the Coast Guard is an able and a reliable player 
in the WoD, and 4.) That they are capable of adapting to key technologies deployed 
by smugglers. Strategies that have resulted in promotions for older officers, can be 
perceived as good enough for new officers, and technologies or innovations that do 
not provide ‘success’ in the short term can be abandoned before reaching their 
potential. But, also, while most of what has been described in this chapter responds to 
‘day to day’ activities and learning by experience, it is necessary to take into account 
the importance of the broad Plans and Strategies, as well as policies of control and 




I have suggested that the use of metaphors that express causality may lead to an 
asymmetric view of the phenomena. I pointed out the contributions of academic 
literature on more nuanced explanations of drug traffic organisations, moving away 
from the concepts of centralized cartels to that of the flexibility of ‘networks’, 
counterpoised with the inflexibility and the bureaucracy of LEAs and the military, as 
suggested by my description of the practices of Navy personnel. This asymmetrical 
view highlights the many advantages of the small, ‘flexible illegal network’, usually 
leaving aside disadvantages of the small organisation, such as accumulation of 
knowledge and a lack of information. It is important to remember that still much of 
the transport of illicit drugs is carried out using custom built or off the shelf boats. This 
view takes the military as a whole, and overlook the many changes of personnel, 
alliances, etc, that the size (and obviously their legal status) allows them and how this 
impacts changes. The Coast Guard (and the Navy) is an interesting case in that officers 
have a high degree of autonomy that permits them to make decisions often without 
consulting with superiors, which, for example, led them during the mid to late 1990s 












Chapter 9. Revisiting the Binary Interdiction/Evasion 
 
In the previous chapters I have shown how the Colombian Navy, specifically the Coast 
Guard Unit, has innovated in order to create measures to match (or counter) smugglers’ 
transport methods through implementing new strategies and adapting various vessels. 
I have demonstrated how solutions and strategies are envisioned in the arena of 
command and how technological choices and practices are implemented in the arena 
of practices. Collaboration and competition among members of the Navy and between 
the Navy and other state agencies also play a role in shaping their choices and 
practices. The bureaucratic politics model is a useful template to understand these 
dynamics. I have also showed how the dynamic of dispersed peer innovation may 
explain how smugglers innovate. In short, both state players’ and smugglers’ actions 
imply a constant reassessment of the interdiction/evasion binary.  
 
The current organisational arrangement of the Colombian Navy is no doubt the result 
of decades of their involvement in counter drug operations. The specialization of the 
intelligence unit, the creation and strengthening of new units, the establishment of new 
bases and procurement of new technologies are all the result of a process of generating 
plausible futures as well as creating ‘facts’ about the present. These transformations, 
big and small alike, entail visions of both the enemy’s history and plausible trajectories 
as well as the assessments of their own resources and possibilities. The Colombian 
Navy creates visions of technological development based on several factors: 
interpretations of the development of others navies, technological fixes, histories of 
previous experiences, and interpretations of enemies capacities, which entails defining 
who the enemy is. Each of those factors enter into the picture with their own forces 
but they are necessarily bound together. These plans represent attempts to respond to 
the questions, how to patrol 928,660 km2 of territorial waters with the available 
resources, what other resources are needed to do the job, and what are the ultimate 
objectives by which we should measure the performance and effectivity of the plans. 
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In the process of replying to these questions the plans and strategies involve a series 
of interpretations about the technical capacities of drug smugglers.70 Interpretations 
are collected through different forums and they express the tensions between highly 
local and contingent knowledge and other forms of formalized knowledge and 
expectations.  
 
I argue that despite the state’s efforts to achieve global views and provide global 
responses to the illicit flows, the actions of the Coast Guard personnel are mostly the 
result of their localized views. During the short periods they are posted in the bases, 
the officers and NCOs need to learn about the local threats and to use local available 
resources to counter such threats. Learning is a key aspect of the role of local 
commanders. Nevertheless, learning is subject to limitations in which intra/inter 
competition and the culture of secrecy are prominent. Under these conditions, sharing 
knowledge even if stimulated and actively encouraged from above (by the central 
government and Navy commanders) it is often difficult to implement. Commanders 
(need to) conceal information from subordinates about the planning or outcomes of 
operations, due to fears of leaks and because of a culture of secrecy that surrounds a 
strong emphasis on seniority. On the other hand, knowledge about how to patrol the 
ocean, how to interdict, and specifically how to achieve events is also gained in 
informal forums, where subordinates can learn from the experience of senior officers 
and NCOs. Despite the best efforts of the Navy and Coast Guard to formalize and 
transfer knowledge to Coast Guard personnel, interdiction is still part ‘science’ and 
part ‘craft’ as an experienced Navy commander explained. This demonstrates what 
scholars from STS have stressed regarding the difficulties of capturing and 
disseminating ‘sticky knowledge’ (Pollock & Williams, 2008). Learning for the Coast 
Guard is, thus, a process of adapting their actions in order to thwart smugglers actions, 
                                                          
70 The Colombian Navy also has responsibility over 12,660 km2 of navigable rivers. In order to 
perform control this area the Navy possesses a riverine force that has its own specialized training 
centres and their own practices for the procurement of technology. Riverine forces also play an 
important role in the control of illicit drugs and they are involved in the Colombian conflict in a 
different way.   
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which demonstrates their value as an able counter drug unit. In this sense learning is 
political.  
 
The Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean waters serve as the canvas on which the 
complexities of the interdiction/evasion binary is played out, with multiple movements 
constantly tangling and untangling. This space is populated by a multitude of 
smuggling rings attempting to evade state control and a multitude of state agencies 
attempting to stop smugglers from departing or reaching their destination (in this I 
include not only the Colombian Navy, but the Colombian Police and other LEAs, and 
international LEAs such as the DEA). This can be seen as a Red Queen scenario in 
reference to reference to the paradoxical world of Lewis Carroll’s Red Queen in 
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, in which in order to even 
stay place both sides have to constantly move in order to remain in the same place. 
The metaphor suggests that facing intense direct competition organizations will 
attempt to gain competitive advantages, thus creating an imbalance in their 
environment. In turn, rival organizations will also develop theirs to match rivals and 
improve their performance, the process self-reinforces, and as a result, competitive 
advantages are only temporary (Barnett, 2008). For the WoD implies that there is a 
constant discontinuity created by both smugglers and LEAs innovations, in which both 
sides innovate to stay in the game. 
 
 
 In this sense it is possible to affirm that both smugglers and enforcement agencies co-
evolve. The two sides of the binary, nevertheless, respond to different motivations for 
innovating. For smugglers the promise of a high monetary rewards may be sufficient 
motivation (although this may not be the only motivation) to innovate or to attempt to 
evade state control. On the other hand, enforcement agencies need to constantly 
demonstrate their value as an able counter drug player, and individual commanders 
and NCOs may receive rewards in the form of decorations, promotions, etc. after 
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successful operations. While the academic literature on organised crime and drug 
studies have stressed the competitive advantages of smugglers inscribed in a general 
pattern of response and counter response, I argue that the metaphors and explanations 
in use are mostly asymmetric and do not fully capture the co-evolutionary antagonists 
relationship.   
 
At the centre of the Coast Guard’s actions as an able counter drug unit are learning and 
adaptation. Learning how to control illicit flows, learning how to procure technologies 
and learning how to practice interdiction. For both sides of the binary, being able to 
succeed in their goals implies using a combination of different forms of knowledge. 
Drug smugglers innovations are aimed at gaining stealth by innovating through 
concealing methods, generating more speed on their boats, and by designing and 
building artefacts. The Coast Guard has innovated in methods of interdiction and 
through the use of different technologies in order to thwart smuggler efforts.  
 
Smugglers and transporters of illicit drugs manage to combine different forms of 
knowledge in order to innovate smuggling transport methods. They do this through 
combining off-the-shelf technologies with local adaptations, and also combining 
traditional forms of local knowledge, such as dead reckoning sailing, and fishermen’s 
and goods smugglers’ information about unpoliced areas and maritime routes. The 
Coast Guard and the Navy, on the other hand, need to combine different forms of 
knowledge with broader organisational goals and visions. Local commanders and 
NCOs need to gain quick knowledge of the main threats (smuggling methods) in the 
areas where they are deployed, and at an institutional level the Coast Guard must 
attempt to consolidate such information, which will later be displayed (often in the 





The transformation of the Colombian Navy from a traditional blue waters navy into a 
military organisation with police functions implies the transformation of their 
practices. Their practices have changed from patrolling the sea in order to generate, 
albeit, temporary control of known or traditional smuggling routes (mostly historical 
good smuggling routes in the Caribbean), to carrying out interdiction operations based 
on intelligence, which includes even carrying out operations to capture smugglers on 
land and carrying out police duties in violent scenarios.71 The retention of successful 
adaptations plays an important role in the personal goals of both local and regional 
commanders. Carrying out intelligence based MIOs allows officers to launch 
operations only when they are able to attach a high degree of success to them, when 
according to their assessment of the operation, the risk of failure is low, guarantying 
the achievement of an event. This is held by the Navy as the best strategy, because it 
allows the maximization of scare resources. I argue that this is also a process of 
reducing uncertainty. By performing MIOs based on intelligence Coast Guard 
commanders are able to combine their knowledge of the local conditions of the sea 
and their experiences of previous smuggler actions in the area, with (more or less) 
accurate information about smugglers’ localization and plans. This permits the local 
commanders to generate an assessment of the enemy’s capacities and resources that 
need to be deployed in order to achieve an event.  
 
The Colombian Navy has been able to deploy a sophisticated network of both human 
and technical intel, specifically since 2006 due to the creation of the Navy Intelligence 
Unit, which became a separate office just one level below the general command of the 
Navy. This Unit holds the same level of importance as offices such as the Chief of 
Operations or Chief of Planning. These changes confirmed the importance of 
information gathering and intelligence in this new navy as referred to in the Strategic 
Plan of 2003, when information started to be considered a key element in the 
Colombian Navy’s role in defeating so-called narcoterrorist organisations. The 
information provided by this office has given the Navy the capacity to plan operations 
                                                          
71 For example during my fieldwork in Buenaventura, personnel from the nearby coast guard station 
was deployed in security duties in the city due to a recent wave of rival gang killings.  
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in order to capture highly valuable targets and to participate in dismantling or 
disrupting smuggler rings. The Colombian Navy is then able to present themselves as 
possessing knowledge about both the patterns and directions of illicit smuggling flows, 
as well as detailed tactical knowledge about how, when, and where specific smugglers 
are due to set sail or approximate coordinates of rendezvous points or makeshift 
shipyards. However, smugglers also make attempts to gain insights into Navy 
operations, often by trying to bribe officers and NCOs so as to have accurate 
information of Navy ship locals or advancements on investigations.  
 
Focusing their efforts and resources to produce events, rather than focusing on other 
forms of patrolling the sea, has helped the Navy, and specially the Coast Guard Unit, 
to disrupt several smuggler rings using maritime routes, such as when the Coast Guard 
captured two individuals responsible for the design and building of semisubmersible 
artefacts in 2008 (El Tiempo, 2008b), and also by seizing important quantities of drugs 
on the shore and en route to their destinations.  
 
The actions of Coast Guard personnel is subject to a constant trade-off between 
formalized knowledge acquired during training, personal experience, access to 
information, local and global views of the phenomena, and local and central goals. 
When transferred to a new base, officers receive a brief about recent and current 
threats, what the most likely methods of transport used by drug smugglers are, recent 
‘behaviours’ of illicit flows, and the current state of Coast Guard assets. These briefs 
are the result of recording smugglers’ actions in the area, as well as the minutes of 
meetings realized by staff after interdiction operations undertaken by the Coast Guard 
in the area. This information is complemented with information gathered through 
informal forums and experience. Being able to gather, handle, and deploy such 
information to perform MIOs and to make sense of smugglers’ movements is integral 
to the base commanders’ job and for how success is interpreted. Although there is no 
formal threshold over commanders’ performances expressed through the quantity of 
cocaine seized, recent experiences are used as informal baselines for gauging success.   
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Nevertheless, I argue that success in carrying out maritime operations, in seizing 
smugglers artefacts, in capturing smugglers, or the less tangible effects of Coast Guard 
actions such as discouraging smugglers, is a paradoxical action. This is because the 
Navy’s successful actions in stopping and discouraging smugglers creates a new 
unknown reality, and produces diverse interpretations of the results. By capturing a 
group of smugglers or smuggler artefacts, Navy personnel will inevitably be faced with 
new flows of illicit drugs that will occupy new spaces and often the same spaces as the 
one removed. Creating a paradoxical reality in which it is increasingly harder for both 
smugglers and the Coast Guard to differentiate between what it has created, what it 
has destroyed, and what remains.  
 
The above is key to understanding how the two sides of the binary co-evolve, and how 
these interactions further affect the ecosystem in which they act. When smugglers set 
sail they must confront the risk of already having been identified by state agencies, or 
that in the course of their journey the Navy will detect them. While for the Colombian 
Coast Guard the capture of smuggler artefacts leads to re-interpretations of what the 
capture means. Here the Navy makes attempts to reconcile the localized view of the 
Navy Commanders with that of the central views. This is visible when a new transport 
method is captured and in periods when a particular transport method disappears from 
the scene. Local commanders and central commanders should make decisions about 
how to understand those occurrences. Do they imply that resources should be spent on 
targeting this new transport method? A good example of this was the discovery of 
parasitic devices attached to cargo container boats in a port on the Caribbean, which 
led to questioning whether resources should be allocated to conducting underwater 
searches through the training and deployment of a scuba diving team. Does a reduction 
in capturing a particular method of transport mean an actual decrease in its use, as in 
the case of the narcosubs, or have they just become more difficult to detect? 
 
Both the success of smugglers and the success of the Coast Guard are temporary. In 
chapter eight, I demonstrated the capacities of Coast Guard personnel in facing 
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perceived changes in smuggler behaviour. Coast Guard personnel learning from their 
experience and from failed MIOs, particularly where the speed of smugglers’ boats 
made it difficult to capture them, were able to modify their boats and procurement 
practices in order to equal the capacities of smugglers. Even when designing and 
building their own boats, Navy personnel were able to produce a response in less than 
six months, and even quicker when they adopted smuggler boats into their own fleets. 
Here then, even with the further adaptations of smuggler artefacts in order to increase 
speed (through adding more engines or improving hydrodynamics or aerodynamics), 
the Coast Guard was easily able to match the skills of the smugglers through local 
commanders and mechanics tinkering with boats in order to acquire better capacities.  
 
The data presented in chapter seven about the history of patrol boats and in chapter 
eight about the changes in interdiction operations aimed at seizing narcosubs, indicates 
a similar pattern. In the first case, in order to achieve what is perceived to be the major 
advantage of smugglers, speed, local commanders and personnel, as well as central 
command, made improvements to their own fleet in order to achieve similar or superior 
speed. In the second case, the Navy changed their strategy and focused their attention 
on capturing submersible artefacts that were still on the shore. Also when facing the 
narcosubs, the Colombian Navy was able to establish contacts with members of the 
Senate to create the necessary legislation in thwarting those artefacts. I argue that, 
focusing solely on the temporal advantage of smugglers fails to provide a complete 
overview of the dynamic nature  interdiction/evasion scenarios. Such a view only 
produces snapshots of a broader picture. For example, by creating a strategy to capture 
narcosubs based on intelligence and before smugglers set sail, the Colombian Navy 
was able to stop several of these artefacts despite the vessel’s characteristics or 
improvements introduced to it by smugglers.  
 
Coast Guard personnel were also able to exploit the success of smuggler ventures in 
order to disrupt future endeavours. This is done by learning how to pick up cues from 
the areas where they are deployed, and learning from previous operations. Navy 
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personnel are able to distinguish signs that may contribute to the capture of a smuggler 
ring. In some poor areas simple details such as who bought a new refrigerator or had 
an expensive party, may serve as an initial lead. Another important factor about 
locality is displayed by references to a local form of knowing, Malicia indigena, which 
might be defined as a way to interpret one’s surroundings and to be aware of possible 
wrongdoings by being able to think as the other does.72 Details such as why a Lobster 
boat is carrying more gas than what is needed for a fishing run, or why a ‘transport 
boat’ is equipped with powerful engines and communication devices, or why suddenly 
a humble fishing boat is trying to comply with all regulations, are noticeable 
characteristics for those employing Malicia indigena as they recognize these details as 
connected to potential illicit intentions. In order to be able to disrupt smugglers actions, 
those in charge of information gathering and processing need to be able to make sense 
of smuggler slang, or be aware of different activities in the areas as smugglers attempt 
to disguise their conversations about planning or advancing smuggler runs as part of 
local activities, as demonstrated in these examples: ‘it’s a good fishing season’, or 
‘[there are] too many sharks on the ocean’. By knowing the regular behaviours of the 
locals, these local activities may provide the Coast Guard with an understanding to use 
such phrases as leads for operations.  
 
As pointed out, the malicia indigena have both negative and positive connotations. In 
the case of the Navy, having the traits of malicia indigena is seen as positive and serve 
to NCOs and Coast Guard Personnel, to both, understand the resources used by 
smugglers and shorten the distance between them and Officers. The tension between 
the use of malicia indigena and formal knowledge was during fieldwork, expressed 
several times. A civil servant from the Ministry of Justice stated 'we should not use 
that term, and we should teach the police and navy personnel not to use it, how are we 
going to go to an international meeting and say, we capture this because of malicia 
indigena, it doesn't make sense' (Interview). 
                                                          
72 This trait also appears in my fieldwork with Antinarcotic Police that I did not report on in this 
thesis. Policemen often interpret their success in discovering novelty smuggling methods as a result 
of deploying Malicia Indigena.  
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The Colombian Navy attempts to make sense of smuggler movements (or at least to 
make public displays of such knowledge), by creating images of what the enemy is, 
and by attaching temporal and geographical patterns to smugglers’ behaviours. Central 
discourses of who the enemy is (e.g. ‘Narcoterrorism’) are coupled with long term 
interpretation of smugglers’ ‘behaviour’ in the field and this is tied to geography. 
Although this is not necessarily the same as the view of Navy personnel in the field in 
which the localized view of commanders coupled with their experience may produce 
different versions of smuggler ‘behaviour’ such as ‘going for the basic’, ‘returns to 
earlier forms of transport’, or ‘innovating in forms unknown to the Navy’.  
 
Smugglers also benefit from local knowledge, as shown in chapters four and five. The 
process of building a narcosubs is often carried out by employing natives with 
knowledge of fibreglass handling, maritime engines, woodwork, etc. In doing so, they 
take advantage of knowledge acquired by such people when carrying out legal 
enterprises. In remote areas where access to workshops is highly difficult, and where 
off-the-shelf vessels and spare parts are difficult to obtain local fishermen routinely 
tinker with engines73 and build their own vessels. The crew is also recruited from 
among locals and experienced seamen, taking advantage of existing social ties, and it 
is not uncommon for there to be  kinsmen among the members of a crew.  
 
The way in which the dynamics of the interdiction/evasion binary have been 
traditionally narrated places the initiative on the side of the drug smugglers. The 
characteristics of drug smuggling organisations are presented as having a clear 
advantage. Their smallness, secrecy, flexibility, are all used as explanations of how the 
binary plays out in favour of smugglers. This set of explanations is also present when 
interpreting the evolution of smuggling technologies, in which smuggling vessels are, 
according to this account, constantly being improved, or a set of new artefacts replace 
                                                          
73 During fieldwork when conversing with a retired drug smuggler, he was tinkering with a rusted 




or become the preferred method of drug smuggling. I argue that this interpretation is 
the result of the collision of localized views and events with a unifying view of 
smuggling organisations, in which the actions of particular groups are held accountable 
for changes occurring in distant places and among independent groups.  
 
Several interrelated arguments are then brought to the fore in order to explain the 
‘competitive advantages’ of ‘organised crime groups’ within which drug traffickers 
are prominent. In short these explanations merge organisational flexibility, networked 
organisational strategies, and innovation. Already in 1994 the United Nations in the 
preliminary document introducing the World Ministerial Conference on Organised 
Transnational Crime held in Naples, Italy, from 21 to 23 November, affirmed that 
organised crime ‘can only be met if law enforcement authorities are able to display the 
same ingenuity and innovation, organisational flexibility and cooperation that 
characterise the criminal organisations themselves’ (United Nations, 1994). The 
Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2001 also affirmed that: ‘For 
a drug trafficking organisation, the network structure has distinct advantages over the 
traditional hierarchy: it has a well-protected, dense core of organisations or people 
connected to a looser periphery by a multiplicity of links’ (International Narcotics 
Control Board, 2001, p. 2). Concerning Colombian drug smugglers it has been argued 
that the new smugglers are often: ‘more educated than the former traffickers, and have 
developed several strategies, methods and techniques aimed at making the business 
more dynamic, sneaking away from law enforcement’ (López Restrepo & Camacho 
Guizado, 2007, p. 26). Finally, for Kenney (2007, p. 106) the ‘real advantage in 
competitive adaptation is informational, not temporal. Traffickers know when, where, 
and how they are going to carry out a crime, law enforcers do not’.  
 
Small, relatively flat organisations are said to produce more flexible actions and be 
highly adaptive. I argue that those interpretations underestimate the resources and 
capacities of big organisations. The Colombian Navy is able to produce fairly accurate 
information about rendezvous points, the size of the loads, smuggler artefact, etc., 
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carried out continued operations over long periods of time, and they have the ability 
to deploy a set of procedures and artefacts in order to thwart smugglers’ actions. For 
smugglers, even when performing evasive moves (such as in cases when ‘go-fast’ 
boats are able to out run Coast Guard boats or when narcosubs are able to disguise 
their heat signature) usually once they are detected the Coast Guard is able to carry out 
sustained operations until they are able to capture the suspected vessel. Even in 
conditions where a commander is not able to deploy all the resources available, 
Maritime Interdiction Operations are almost never a one to one affair. Once smugglers 
are detected, the asymmetry of resources favours the enforcement agencies. 
Furthermore, comparisons between decision making flows in which 
flexibility/inflexibility and a slower decision making pace is attributed to law 
enforcement due to their larger number of layers between upper command and people 
in the field do not take into account the high degree of autonomy of base commanders 
in making decisions about which operations to undertake and how to tackle them. The 
high degree of flexibility once an operation is set up and in day to day activities on the 
local bases (such as activities involving mechanics tinkering with vessels in order to 
improve their capacities), are often a result of their own initiative or a discussion with 
immediate superiors.  
 
The Colombian drug market is a highly complex scenario, where a multitude of groups 
alternatively compete or collaborate in order to get their share of earnings from inflated 
prices of a prohibited good. This is complemented by a long history of territorial 
disputes and violence. It has been assumed that since the early 1990s the preferred 
method of wholesale transport used by drug traffickers has been the sea. Traffickers 
use different routes and methods in order to transport drugs using cargo containers, 
trawlers, go-fast boats, and custom-made vessels such as narcosubs. It is also widely 
assumed that prices of the illicit cargo increase with transport, and transport often 
accounts for a high percentage of the cost for the owners of the illicit goods. The role 
of the Colombian Coast Guard is to detect and capture drug smugglers and drug 
smuggler artefacts that are using or attempting to use maritime routes to transport illicit 
drugs. In twenty years this Unit has been transformed from ‘some offices and four 
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boats’ to an array of stations (nine in the Caribbean and three in the Pacific), 
commands, patrol boats, interceptors, and radar systems. In twenty years, from 1994 
until 2014, the Coast Guard has been able to capture countless smugglers and artefacts. 
For example only in 2007 this Unit carried out 35 maritime interdiction operations 
leading to the capture of 40 smugglers and 21 vessels including one narcosub and nine 
tons of cocaine. The deployment of these resources has created obvious incentives for 
smugglers to adapt and innovate.  
 
Several policies have been put into place by the Colombian Government in order to 
disrupt the drug market, mainly aimed at reducing the supply of drugs. Reduction of 
the coca plant fields through aerial fumigation or manual eradication, incentives 
offered to farmers to replace coca fields, the capture of ring leaders, the destruction of 
laboratories, the interception and regulation of chemicals used in the production of 
cocaine, and the interdiction of cocaine en route to their destination. This in turn has 
implied that different state agencies must compete for the attention of the state in order 
to create policies and secure budgets to carry out their activities. For example, during 
the 1980s and early 1990s the Colombian Police carried out their policies by targeting 
top members of drug trafficking rings as a strategy to end drug traffic from Colombia.74 
Since the early 1990s the Colombian Navy has highly benefited from the process of 
the militarisation of the WoD, which has increased their budget and their participation 
in the WoD. 
 
The existence of many counter drug measures and different agencies, which display 
their achievements and demonstrate the effects of those achievements, have helped the 
government in accomplishing its goals in the WoD. The Colombian Navy 
continuously claims its success, as well as exploits the uncertainties that arises from 
those successes. On the one hand, The Navy displays figures accounting for their 
                                                          
74 An widely accepted interpretation affirms a couple of years after the death of Pablo Escobar and 
the end of the Cali ‘Cartel, around 300 smuggler groups existed in Colombia (López Restrepo & 
Camacho Guizado, 2007).  
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accomplishment, such as being the most successful state agency in terms of cocaine 
seized. As highlighted, the Navy presents their results in the form of body counts 
(Andreas & Greenhill, 2010). For example, the new article released during the 188th 
anniversary of the Colombia Navy presented a list of ‘outstanding operations’ listing 
the amount of cocaine captured, the capture of narcosubs, the number of smugglers 
captured, and the like. The same sort of indicators are found in the editorial of the 
Navy official magazine and reports to the Ministry of Defence and other relevant 
offices. On the other hand, the Colombian Navy has requested to continue ‘Closing 
the Gap’ that smugglers continue to use. In short, the many measurements presented 
by the Navy as proof of success are also mobilized as proof that more resources need 
to be deployed.  
 
The set of paradoxical results mentioned earlier also plays a part in the interpretation 
of results. If somehow the Navy manages to effectively close these gaps, this would 
put stress on the resources assigned to the Navy. The interdiction/evasion binary is, 
then, essentially a symbiotic relationship. As pointed out by Andreas there is a 
‘paradoxical, double-edged, and even interdependent relationship between the 
business of smuggling and the business of trying to thwart it’ (Andreas, 1999, p. 86). 
Smugglers benefit, not only from the prohibition of drug trafficking and the inflated 
price that it brings, but from interdiction operations carried out against other groups 
that allows for the further negotiation of prices. If controls are tougher it implies higher 
risks of capture, which can be negotiated to increase the prices of transporting the illicit 
cargo. The Navy benefits from the existence of smugglers and their innovations in 
order to reinforce its place as an able counter drug agency.  
 
While their participation in the WoD has enable the growth of the Navy and their 
continued importance in counter drug policies to be recognised by the central 
government, concerns about the ‘real’ role of the Navy persist. Those concerns were 
initially expressed in regards to the possibility that carrying out policing duties could 
lead to a loss of identity of the Navy, as well as what was considered by the older 
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generation to be the real purpose of the Navy, deterrence and/or defence against 
foreign countries. Indeed, despite possessing a unit whose main focus was conducting 
counter drug operations, until 2005 the Navy lacked strategic goals related to their role 
in the WoD. This transformations was led by admirals who, since their initial days as 
part of the Navy, have participated in counter drug operations, and who witnessed or 
assisted in the boosting of the Coast Guard Unit. Finally, the multiple roles of the Navy 
are stressed in the strategic plans and strategic concepts, where counter drug operations 
are articulated as targeting threats to territorial sovereignty, not necessarily as counter 
drug operations. As such, the official discourse of the Navy considers smugglers, not 
as law offenders, but as a threat to national security. Discourses about the role of the 
Navy in the WoD and its procurement of technology are articulated as a 
response/counter-response pattern, usually based on the interdiction/evasion binary, 
but sometimes with interwoven discourses about security and border control.  
 
Keeping the Coast Guard as part of the Navy has facilitated several aspects of counter 
drug operations, such as reducing the costs of infrastructure and training. This also 
means, however, that the Navy personnel that manage to acquire a high degree of 
dexterity in carrying out counter drug operations may be transferred to a different 
unrelated post, unable to transfer valuable lessons to newcomers.  
I argue that a more nuanced interpretation of the directionality of the 
interdiction/evasion binary is possible. As Wacquant puts it, ‘binary oppositions are 
prone to exaggerate differences, confound description and prescription, and set up 
overburdened dualisms that miss continuities, underplay contingency, and overstate 
the internal coherence of social forms.(1996, p. 124-125)’ A new interpretation would 
take into account both the way smugglers produce and deploy their artefacts and the 
way the Coast Guard personnel acquire and deploy theirs, but also the intersections 
between the two sides. I agree with Kenney when he affirms that enforcement cannot 
act upon smugglers that they do not know, but the same can be said about smugglers, 
who often attempt to perform their journeys without knowing that they are under 
surveillance. It has also been argued that smugglers often change their transport 
method when discovered by enforcement agencies, or that they move from one region 
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to other, or that smugglers can even attempt to change their methods before being 
detected in order to avoid detection. In chapter five I argued, that the process of 
innovation in the case of narcosubs demonstrates that pull/push explanations do not 
necessarily explain how outlaw innovation is produced, and I argued that a more 
appropriate account of the development of the narcosub and of smuggling technologies 























Based on interviews and documentary analysis this thesis presents a study of the 
artefacts and practices developed by Colombian drug smugglers and the Colombian 
Navy in the War on Drugs (WoD) between 1994 and 2014. Specifically it explores the 
dynamics of the interdiction/evasion binary. The research included a detailed analysis 
of the practices of the Colombian Coast Guard Unit since 1994 and how these were 
shaped by the concerns of the central government and multilateral agencies regarding 
the increasing use of maritime routes by smugglers of illicit drugs.  
 
The preliminary question focussed on the claim, frequently presented in the academic 
literature and media, that drug smugglers are somehow one step ahead of law 
enforcement. The thesis is mostly shaped, however, by a desire to correct the 
oversimplified accounts of the nature of the practices of both sides of the 
interdiction/evasion binary. One side of the binary is made up of the practices, 
artefacts, plans, and actions of the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) working to 
interrupt and impede the flow of illicit drugs, while the other side is dominated by 
smugglers’ plans, devices, actions, and strategies oriented to evade state control. The 
oversimplified versions of the dynamics of this binary present an account characterised 
by flexible, innovative, and highly adaptive organisations – smugglers – on the one 
hand, and the inflexible LEAs, with slow decision making pace and slow to change 
and adapt organisations, on the other.   
 
Evidence from the seizure of smugglers’ artefacts has been used as a means to 
demonstrate smugglers’ innovative capacities. However, when approaching the 
phenomena from a different perspective, it can be argued that a closer look at the 
practices of both sides of the binary provides a more balanced image of its dynamic. I 
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have argued that rather than a continuous process of improvement or evolution, the 
development of smugglers’ artefacts can be better understood as the outcome of 
dispersed peer innovation. On the other side of the binary, Navy practices, rather than 
being bounded by the inflexibility resulting from a hierarchical bureaucratic 
organisation, can be better understood as emerging from the interplay of the localized 
views within and between organisations, the experiences of officials and NCOs, and 
rewards and institutional goals. In other words, the shaping of military practices is the 
result of the interplay between the arenas of command and the arenas of practice, each 
having their own political, social, and technical visions.  
 
The War on Drugs, that is to say the efforts to curtail the production, distribution and 
consumption of various hallucinogenic and stimulant goods, through the prohibition 
of their consumption, has since the early 1980s been increasingly driven by law 
enforcement policies, and the control of the production and supply has increasingly 
involved the participation of military forces including the militarisation of policing 
practices. Interdiction efforts then play an important part in the control of illicit flows, 
and since local and multilateral agencies consider maritime routes to be the main 
transport method used by drug traffickers, maritime interdiction operations are a key 
moment in the WoD.  
 
The operational part of this interdiction/evasion binary in the sea involves on the 
smugglers’ side a wide array of artefacts including some fairly old technologies: 
fishing boats, trawlers, and bricolage artefacts, narcosubs and go-fast boats, which due 
to their cargo have the capacity of creating global effects. The deployment of the Navy 
and specifically of the Coast Guard is aimed at controlling illicit flows. In order to 
perform their job, the Coast Guard has increasingly relied on a combination of 
detection systems (radars) and human and technical intel, but their job is not fulfilled 
until smugglers’ artefacts are stopped and their cargo seized. The Coast Guard Unit, 
specifically, relies on a combination of different practices and boats. Far from the 
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sophistication of contemporary military technology, the WoD, as fought in the 
maritime environment, is a war fought with mundane and prosaic artefacts.  
 
Having presented an overview of the history of the prohibition of illicit drugs and the 
strategies put in place in the WoD, highlighting the increasing involvement and budget 
of the Colombian Navy in controlling illicit flows, I have presented a deeper analysis 
of two of the main maritime transport methods used by drug smugglers, go-fast boats 
and narcosubs. They are important for different reasons. While go-fast boats represent 
the main source of seizures made by the Colombian Navy and are a major feature of 
the routine practice of smugglers and Maritime Interdiction Operations, the narcosubs 
demonstrate the innovative character of some trafficker groups and create different 
challenges for the Navy, including the need for collaboration with law makers in order 
to promote legislation aimed at penalizing the design, building, and use of narcosubs.  
 
Then I turned to the description of Navy practices. Given the complexity of the 
problem, I focused my attention on two related issues: the responses made by the upper 
echelons of the Navy to the question on how to patrol the sea, and the practices of the 
Coast Guard Unit in catching smugglers in the sea (i.e. Maritime Interdiction 
Operations). These correspond to the different arenas in which the technological 
choices and practices of the Navy are shaped.  
 
In this chapter I bring together the empirical, theoretical, and practical findings that 
emerged as answers to the research questions posed at the beginning of this study. I 
begin by summarizing the main aspects of the empirical contributions made by this 
research. Then I present a concrete theoretical contribution to knowledge derived from 
this study, and discuss implications for policy and management. Finally, I present a 
series of considerations regarding limitations of this research and possible questions 





Colombia, as part of the Andean Region, has been involved in the illicit traffic of 
cocaine since the early years of prohibition. Under the influence of the U.S. 
Government policies to control illicit drugs, and specifically the policies developed 
since the 1980s which led to a militarisation of operations against drug smugglers, the 
Colombian Government established the Antinarcotic Police, provided the Air Force 
with resources to control smugglers using air methods, and promoted the use of the 
Navy in carrying out MIOs. The nexus between left wing guerrillas and illicit drug 
revenues, summarized under the umbrella of narcoterrorism, further pushed the 
development of policies leading to the deployment of military solutions to the problem 
of illicit drugs.  
 
Embracing this view, the Colombian and U.S. Governments established the Plan 
Colombia in 2000, which generated and widened gaps between military solutions to 
the problem of illicit flows and other possible responses. When adopted, the Plan 
Colombia guaranteed resources for the expansion of military forces, justified through 
the aim of containing narcoterrorism. The perception that smugglers were making 
intensive use of maritime routes had already led the Colombian Government to unite 
the role of the Navy with the allocation of resources leading to the establishment of 
the Coast Guard Unit in 1994 (a unit which on paper was created in 1979). Since then 
central attention has been given to the problem of the use of maritime routes for the 
purpose of trafficking illicit drugs. Data on the estimates and results of seizures was 
used as evidence of the need to control maritime routes. This allowed the Colombian 
Navy to increase their budget and to promote their role as an able counter drug agency.  
 
Two decisive events have been crucial to the short history of the Coast Guard Unit: 
the interdiction agreement with United States and the formulation of the strategic plan 
Closing the Gap in 2006. Even if these plans were not specifically focused on the role 
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of the Coast Guard, in practice more of the interdiction responsibilities were assigned 
to this unit. The strategic plan, Closing the Gap, consolidated the role of the Colombian 
Navy as the key player in the WoD. The Navy’s adoption of this new role was met 
with initial apprehension by the older generations of the Navy who considered that its 
role should be to focus on defence against foreign countries. This position started to 
shift as the capture of drug smugglers and the seizures of cocaine became the central 
role through the promotion and advancement of both institutional and personal goals 
within the Navy.  
 
The Colombian Navy adopted the State’s goals and methods of controlling illicit 
flows, and implemented in their strategic plans the control of these flows, which 
redefined the main goals of the Navy around the control of Narcoterrorist 
Organisations. At the same time this created the backdrop upon which to measure 
operational success using institutional measurements based on established indicators, 
such as the amount of cocaine seized, the number of persons captured, the number of 
smugglers artefacts thwarted, and some attempts to establish cost-benefit balances as 
results of MIOs. For local commanders, events - or the results of successful operations, 
in which contextually defined, important amounts of cocaine are seized or particular 
operations are transformed into important tokens - provide prestige and consolidation 
for particular officers’ roles within the Navy. After two decades of existence, the Coast 
Guard Unit was transformed from ‘some offices and four boats’ to a key role in the 
state policies to control drug smugglers.  
 
While the Colombian Navy appeared to define the resources needed to control the flow 
of illicit drugs in the 2006 strategic concept, Closing the Gap, the evidence suggests a 
divergence between those views expressed by the upper echelons of the Navy and the 
set of practices of Navy personnel in the field. While Navy personnel in the field are 
familiar with the larger promoted goals of the Navy, and I have no doubt they are 
committed to the goal of capturing drug traffickers, they are aware of the difficulties 
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of exerting permanent control over the sea. In this sense their narratives are aimed at 
explaining their results in terms of local events and transitory solutions.  
 
As already highlighted, from the Navy there has been a clear focus on strengthening 
maritime control using a combination of technical solutions (e.g. radars, ICTs, boats, 
aircraft support) interpreted as the procurement of the ‘right’ technology which is in 
line with law enforcement and militarised solutions to the problem of illicit drugs. 
There have also been attempts to exploit and transfer the knowledge of Navy and Coast 
Guard personnel as a result of their experience carrying out MIOs. The evidence 
suggests, that for Navy personnel in the field, the combination of different forms of 
knowledge, acquired both in formal and informal manners, is key to narratives about 
how to perform a MIO.  
 
Together with the promotion of military solutions to the problems of smuggling, there 
is a set of ideas about the enemy, the enemy’s capacities, and the aims and forms of 
drug traffickers’ organisations. The evidence presented shows that incentives to 
capture smugglers and the projection of images of the enemy’s practices/technologies 
are connected. I showed that there are attempts by the upper echelons of the Navy to 
centralize and promote visions of the enemy which are coupled with a set of solutions 
aimed at gaining control of the sea. On the other hand, for Navy personnel in the field, 
their images of the enemy, rather than being the result of the accumulation of 
formalised data or ‘factual’ evidence, are shaped by the knowledge and experience of 
local commanders and their perceptions of interdiction ‘events’. In short, while the 
arena of command promotes and designs strategic plans responding to border concerns 
and produces evidence of their capacities as an able counter drug agencies that 
responds to the state policy instruments, in the arena of practice, commanders, if aware 
of the global goals, shape their actions in relationship to their localized view of 




I found that there are two interrelated ways in which the Navy has reduced uncertainty 
arising from their actions. The first one is the aforementioned images of the enemies. 
Here Coast Guard and Navy personnel stress the innovativeness of smuggler 
organisations and the structural characteristics of smuggler organisations. By 
performing MIOs firmly based on intelligence, officers and the Navy place special 
emphasis on achieving a high degree of success. Second, the figures and numbers 
produced by the accumulation of events allows them to visualize both their results and 
to reinforce their role. These strategies help to shape the contours of the drug 
smugglers’ actions, which are in large degree, essentially unknown.  
 
In directing this study to both the practices of the Navy and illicit drug smugglers in 
order to generate a deeper understanding of the interdiction/evasion binary, I was 
surprised to encounter a high diversity of strategies used by drug smugglers in order 
to transport cocaine. I focused on what were apparently two key methods:  narcosubs 
and go-fast boats. Although both share some crucial elements, these two strategies 
differ in several others.  
 
I found evidence to challenge the descriptions presented in policy, academic, and 
journalistic documents regarding the development of narcosubs, and about smugglers 
artefacts more generally, in which these are portrayed as a logical progression both in 
the departure from other means of smuggling narcotics and in regards to incremental 
technical improvements in smuggler artefacts. Contrary to these accounts, the 
evidence suggests that the diversity of smuggler artefacts can be explained by the 
different combinations of local knowledge, formal knowledge, and off-the-shelf 
technologies. I found out that the significant differences that determine the diversity 
of artefacts is the result of the different approaches followed by a multitude of groups 
in order to solve the problems of how to evade state control and overcome barriers to 




Smugglers’ artefacts are the result of the knowledge of locals with experience in glass 
fibre handling, maritime engines, woodwork, etc. Smugglers often take advantage of 
knowledge acquired by these people when carrying out legal enterprises or in formal 
settings, such as technical school training. In remote areas where accessing workshops 
is very difficult and where off-the-shelf vessels and spare parts are not readily available 
and prohibitively expensive, local fishermen routinely tinker with engines and build 
their own vessels. Crews are also recruited from among locals and experienced 
seamen. Taking advantage of existing social ties, it is not uncommon for there to be 
kin ties among members of the crew.  
 
In the remainder of this section I will briefly review three key additional empirical 
findings: the importance of contingent local knowledge for the Navy practices; the 
fallacy of flexibility as a result of the organisational arrangements; and, the symbolic 
importance of the seizure of smugglers’ artefacts, especially of narcosubs.  
 
The need for knowledge and information is a clearly important for Navy personnel in 
carrying out their tasks. I identified several instances or informal forums in which 
knowledge was transmitted. A particular form of knowing stood out as a result of this 
research, the malicia indigena. This is a highly contextualized form of knowing that is 
based on personal experience and assists in the interpretation of enemies’ actions. 
Because of the manner in which malicia indigena is collected and stored - recorded in 
the minds of those who possess it - it is difficult to communicate and share, and is 
difficult to codify in documents. This difficulty also arises from it being the result of 
localized experiences - an individual’s trials and errors and the experience of others - 
that may be difficult to share, particularly in a context where there is little incentive to 
do so. Malicia indigena is not an infallible resource and is subjected to the fluid nature 
of the environment. Such fluidity limits the long term effectiveness of those who 
consider themselves, or are considered, to possess malicia indigena. On the other hand, 
the kind of skills encompassed under the term malicia indigena can also be recognized 
as local knowledge, and as Scott have pointed out, it is key in the functioning of highly 
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complex systems (Scott, 1998). Kenney has explained how the lack of local knowledge 
hampers the actions of terrorist groups (2010), while Bonelli and Ragazzi (Bonelli & 
Ragazzi, 2014)has stressed the need to study the production of practical knowledge in 
police activities, as they play a central role in the creation of anticipations.  
 
Much of the literature on drug trafficking has explained the success of smugglers as a 
result of their organisational structure. Flexibility is brought to the fore to explain the 
advantages of smugglers. The evidence found during this research shows that Navy 
and Coast Guard personnel can also possess a high degree of flexibility in relation to 
the ways in which operations are carried in the sea and in relation to artefacts. I found 
that even though Navy personnel have a strong sense of the real role of the Navy in 
which policing through interdiction play only a minor role, those operations play an 
important part of their day to day and one in which base commander possess a high 
degree of autonomy in regards to how to pursue smugglers, deciding how many and 
which boats and resources to deploy, and in determining which personnel will tackle 
particular issues. Furthermore, mechanics at the bases constantly tinker with boats to 
adapt them in order to face what are perceived to be the local needs to counter threats. 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Coast Guard personnel were also able to match 
smugglers’ capacities by making use of seized artefacts and by quickly producing their 
own go-fast boats. Therefore, while it can be argued that LEA personnel are subject to 
centrally designated modus operandi, that is to say, interdiction as the sanctioned form 
of controlling smugglers, in the field, officers and NCOs are able to quickly adapt and 
transform their practices and artefacts to meet operational demands.  
 
As described earlier, despite the demise of powerful early drug smuggling 
organisations, such as the so-called Medellin and Cali ‘cartels’, and the disruption of 
air transportation methods, the flow of illicit cocaine continued. The seizure of 
smuggler artefacts and cocaine demonstrate that the trends in the use of maritime 
routes, despite the efforts of the state, continue. The growth of the Coast Guard as a 
result of the particular reading of the transport of illicit drugs, deepened the quasi-
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symbiotic features of the security environment, in which the prosperity of the 
enforcement agency depends on the balance between their success and the existence 
of the threat they are set to control. The growth of the Navy, due to their involvement 
in the WoD, has also created a situation in which their own bureaucratic interests 
depend on the existence of the flows of illicit drugs. The budget of the Colombian 
Navy was greatly increased as a result of their involvement in the WoD. The WoD 
provides a constant reminder of the importance of their role, which is also 
demonstrated through public displays of their results, including guided visits to the 
Narcosub Museum and press releases pointing out previous trends and prospective 
ones.  
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
 
As pointed out in the introduction, this thesis brings together several strands of 
academic literature. My main aim has been to contribute to the growing literature on 
STS regarding the role of users in the process of technological innovation, and from 
this perspective to provide a different reading of the interdiction/evasion binary in the 
so-called War on Drugs. The literature on organised crime and drug smuggling is 
abundant and growing rapidly. On the one side, there are studies that offer descriptions 
of the drug smuggling enterprise and propose policy advice and intervention 
instruments to disrupt the drug market. On the other side, a complementary literature 
measures the impact of those policies. This literature places great stress on economic 
analysis, based on the reading that drug traffickers behave in a traditional economically 
rational manner. However, none of this literature symmetrically analyses the two sides 
involved in this antagonistic, yet paradoxically symbiotic, relationship.  
 
Confronting my empirical results with current theoretical concerns I suggest that the 
main contributions to knowledge of this research are: to provide evidence that 
traditional co-evolutionary explanations of threat and security agencies fall short in 
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explaining the antagonistic relationships in a context in which players confront a high 
degree of uncertainty regarding the results of their actions; to provide evidence that 
traditional accounts of drug trafficking that frequently attribute the success of 
smugglers to their structural organisations fall into what I call the fallacy of flexibility 
– the result of an asymmetrical view of the phenomena; and, finally, that a turn to the 
study of the practices of the military instead of an analysis of the technical capacities 
of security technologies provides a more accurate picture of these complex 
antagonistic relationships. As part of a concern with understanding the shaping of 
smuggling and interdiction technologies this thesis further explores the scope for and 
barriers to innovating in outlaw environments. Furthermore, I propose that the 
outcome should not be analysed in terms of the technical properties of the artefacts 
deployed by both sides, but needs to look at their incorporation into smuggling and 
interdiction practices.  
 
The ever-present antagonistic relationship between smugglers and LEAs can be 
reduced to the contrast between what the State considers to be the appropriate activities 
in a territory and the tactics of unruly users as they take advantage of perceived 
opportunities. There is a need to explain the dynamics of such antagonistic 
relationships. The process of technological innovation in the WoD offers such an 
opportunity. The concept of co-evolution is useful to explain how dynamic socio-
technical systems influence each other. It has proven useful to explain change when 
elements of a system are closely connected, and to explain the mutual relationship 
between heterogeneous elements and wider society. Mutual shaping or co-evolution 
arises in the cases where developers seek to create community of users, i.e. align goals. 
I argue that the concept of co-evolution is not particularly helpful as an explanatory 
tool to understand the nature of technological innovation in situations in which players 
only possess a sketchy, partial, and localized view such as that which exists in the 




One of the main goals of this thesis has been to present an overview of the evolution 
of smugglers’ and LEAs technologies. However, the identification of such evolution, 
- that is to say that smugglers’ innovative creation of new artefacts and LEAs’ creative 
responses to the challenges posed by smugglers - does not explain how this has 
happened. In the case of narcosubs, different smuggler groups have identified the 
possibility of exploiting local expertise in the construction of maritime artefacts and 
the weakness of the Navy in detecting underwater vessels. In doing this the various 
groups have been able to create their own working versions of the artefact. By 
exploiting go-fast boats, other smuggler groups continue to rely on a steady supply of 
traditional knowledge about maritime routes and readily available artefacts. This also 
involves adapting the go-fast boats to avoid detection. These various strategies, and 
the strategies of LEAs, can only be broadly covered by the concept of co-evolution, 
but it is possible to offer a more complex analytical framework.  
 
This thesis has found that an analysis of the role of users, and especially the concept 
of dispersed peer innovation, provide a very useful explanatory tool. This concept was 
explored as an alternative explanation of the process of the evolution of a complex 
artefact. In this model, as expored by Hyysalo and Usenyuk (2015) in their Karakat 
study, users retain control over the invention, modification, diversification, building, 
and maintenance  of an artefact. I have argued that this concept helps to account for 
the diversity of smuggler artefacts. Different groups adopted the narcosub meme, and 
combined different off-the-shelf components and different forms of knowledge, 
formal and local, in order to build these complex artefacts. The artefact arising from 
this process needed to fulfil two main characteristics: the safe transport of the illicit 
cargo and the evasion of state control. In this sense the concept of dispersed peer 
innovation is more helpful than other concepts because it accounts for the high 
diversity of artefacts in outlaw contexts. The concept of bricolage was also useful to 
describe the process of creating smuggler artefacts, in which outlaw users opt for a 
mix and match approach in order to produce a highly cost-efficient product – including 
highly complex technological configurations like narco-subs - in a manner suited to 
their needs which exploits locally available traditional knowledge/capacities and helps 
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them to avoid potentially expensive and detectable procurement from commercial 
suppliers.  
 
This led me to propose a more encompassing definition of outlaw innovation, not 
understood only as innovation that happens to be performed in outlaw environments, 
as initially proposed by Shulz and Wagner (2008), but to describe some of its features. 
As demonstrated in the case of smugglers’ innovation, the main characteristic of 
outlaw innovation is its open character. This means it is characterised by the highly 
dispersed effort of often markedly temporary forms of organisations and the self-
reliance of builders and designers in terms of the acquisition of knowledge and 
materials.    
 
I argued that any explanations that aim to account for the process of innovation in 
outlaw contexts in which antagonistic relationships shape the actions of actors must 
further take into account the paradoxical and symbiotic relationship between 
smugglers and LEAs. Diverging interpretations of success on each side of the binary, 
conditioned by asymmetries of information between them constantly unravel the 
perception of the reality that allowed both sides’ initial actions. In such circumstances 
it is increasingly difficult for actors to differentiate between what it is created, what is 
destroyed, what remains, and how to perform their actions under such circumstances.  
 
Several metaphors have been used to explain the dynamics between traffickers and 
law enforcement. Practitioners and media refer to a cat and mouse game of interaction, 
while the balloon effect has been used to explain the mobility of the drug market, 
farming sites, routes, and transport method as the result of enforcement efforts. I argue 
that the Red Queen metaphor is helpful to explain the dynamics of 
interdiction/evasion. Contrary to the previous metaphors that places agency only on 
one side of the binary, with the Red Queen metaphor it is possible to stress the 
symbiotic relationship between the two sides, and at the same time recognize that the 
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two sides of the binary are constantly updating their strategies, not only as a response 
to the other side’s actions but as a way to remain in the game.  
 
Literature on drug smuggling has adopted methodologies that, paradoxically, only 
provide asymmetric access to the interaction between traffickers and LEAs. Only a 
handful of studies concentrate on analysing the ways that both enforcement agencies 
and traffickers perform their actions and learn. An even smaller number present 
descriptions of or deal with the technologies and practices of smugglers and, to the 
best of my knowledge, although some researchers that have discussed the 
militarisation of the WoD, there are no studies on the practices and technologies 
deployed by the military to face drug traffickers. Given this, I argue that this thesis 
may contribute both to studies on drug trafficking and military studies, through 
stressing the need to provide a symmetric view on the phenomena, and by turning to 
the study of the practices and not solely the technical characteristics of the 
technologies.  
 
Studies of drug smugglers have, since the mid-1990s, stressed the unorganised 
character of illicit business, as a way to avoid the problems of previous descriptions of 
illegal enterprises that mostly focused on mafia and cartel type, in which bureaucracy 
models of organised crime, as defined by Kleemans (2014) were used to explain the 
success of these enterprises. Since the mid-1990s, it has become popular to use the 
concept of networks to explain the fluidity of traffickers. In doing so, drug studies 
concentrate their efforts on characterising the structure of these networks and on 
pointing out the competitive advantages that the network structure provides to such 
networks. In doing so, these studies counterpoise the flexibility and adaptability of 
drug trafficking with a traditional view of LEAs in which such traits are hampered by 
their imputed bureaucratic commitments and long command chains. This thesis 
demonstrates that studying the practices of LEA personnel in the field provides a 
different assessment to that previous stressed by academic literature. Turning to the 
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study of the practices of LEAs allows us to understand that flexibility is not an 
emerging property that results from a particular form of organisation.  
 
I argue that this turn to the study of the practices can also benefit military studies. 
Studies of innovation in the military have long recognized that traditional business 
models do not apply when analysing military technology. The implementation of 
military technology is often studied by putting stress on several factors, the technical 
characteristics of the technology, technological innovation as a result of doctrinal 
change, and intra and inter rivalry service. I argue, following the The Biography of 
Artefacts and Practices (BOAP) framework proposed by Williams, Pollock and 
Hyysalo  that local actions and outcomes should be explored as part of a context that 
provides resources - offering incentives and penalties for local players. Exploring 
practices offers a contrast to interpretations focusing on the technical aspects of the 
innovation process, and is particularly useful when study antagonistic environments 
and that have at their centre fairly mundane and prosaic artefacts.  
 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 
This thesis develops the premise that antagonist relationships in the WoD cannot be 
fully explained with the methods, theoretical lenses, and metaphors currently in use. 
The multiple narratives presented in this thesis have summarized the roles of the key 
players in the WoD and several key policies that have been put into place. One 
important issue recognized by policy and academic literature is that the drug market is 
constantly changing. Change is attributed either to the agency of smugglers, expressed 
as the result of their adaptability, or as the result of policy efforts. In this section I 




The first is the recognition that what is perceived as the innovative character of drug 
traffickers does not emerge merely as a result of their ingenuity, and that smuggler 
technologies do not arise as a result of organised innovation programmes –whether 
incremental or radical innovation. Rather they are the result of non-coordinated actions 
of many different groups pursuing a similar goal and applying different tactics. Further 
training of Navy personnel and the gathering of both human and technical intelligence 
would benefit from recognizing the uncoordinated patterns of smugglers’ actions.  
 
Even with their limited capacity to contribute to national or institutional policy, Navy 
personnel in the field are able to innovate, modify their practices and artefacts as a 
result of what they perceive to be local threats. Given the continuous mobility of 
personnel in the Navy, I consider that practitioners would benefit from establishing 
strategies to protect, promote, circulate the knowledge and tactics they have achieved, 
stressing the possibilities of transferring localized experiences to other personnel.  
 
One of the arguments advanced in this thesis relates to the critique of the 'fallacy of 
the flexibility,' which states the competitive advantages of drug smugglers as result of 
their organizational arrangements and their innovative capacities. I argued that the 
fallacy is the result of asymmetrical views on the capabilities of drug smugglers vs. 
state agents. Several possibilities emerge from this criticism for the manner in which 
Military and LEAs conceive their practices.   
 
Understanding that competitive advantages of smugglers are only temporary and the 
result of uncoordinated patterns may lead to escape the fallacy of flexibility. As 
recognized by several of the participants and Navy official documents, the Navy has 
specialized in reactive actions, that is to say, to develop new strategies to counter 
smugglers' innovations. As I pointed out in this thesis, this is the result of attaching a 
high degree of flexibility to smugglers. As a result, the Navy should concentrate on 
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exploring and exploiting strategies tending to exercise control of the sea instead of 
focusing on particular smuggler innovations.  
 
Understanding that the perceived innovative capacities on the smugglers' are the result 
of multiple groups attempting to escape state control, using both local resources and 
knowledge. Moreover, that as such the patterns of response-counter resulting is the 
result of acting upon those perceptions, should lead to a strong collaboration between 
the Coast Guard, in charge of maritime interdiction and the policing of the sea and the 
Maritime Authority dependent of the head of the Navy, in charge of issuing control 
permits.  
 
Finally, two resources are critical for smugglers actions, first, unpoliced areas in which 
they are able to hide for extended periods of time unmolested. Second, local 
knowledge in the form of artisanal skills and knowledge of sailing. Strategies of the 
Navy should strive to hamper the links between the use of those unpoliced areas and 
the availability of local knowledge. 
 
Limitations of this Study and Future Research Questions 
 
The conclusion of this thesis provides a special opportunity to reflect on the different 
choices made during my doctoral studies. At the beginning this research was proposed 
as an attempt to provide evidence about the ways smugglers transport their illicit cargo. 
During fieldwork it became evident that responses to any question would be 
constrained due to the very obvious issues of access to those involved. One major 
limitation of the current thesis was the asymmetrical access to data. As a result, the 
claims I made about smugglers practices and innovations are obtained from the reading 
LEAs agencies made of them, both in the press releases, interviews, guided visit to the 
places where smugglers artefacts are stored, official public documents, official 
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magazines and intelligence documents. However, in using those readings, I avoid 
enhancing the reading of a pattern response-counter-response further. Quantitative 
studies and the exploration of statistics have dominated the study of drug policy issues; 
I propose that more qualitative studies are needed. In my own research, nevertheless, 
I have identified several limitations of such. Access to key informants is difficult to 
secure, and the informant’s readily understood need for secrecy may limit data 
collection. More importantly there was the need to study not only the way smugglers 
produce their technologies, but also how LEAs produce theirs. Therefore, the first step 
was to distance myself from traditional accounts of the drug market and to retain a 
symmetric view of both smugglers and LEAs. I also sought to distance myself from 
traditional methodologies from STS and elsewhere revolving around localised and 
often snapshot studies of particular sites and moments of innovation. I was influenced 
by ideas from the BOAP framework, and especially the need to integrate different 
viewpoints (Kaniadakis, 2006) in order to explore the process of technological 
innovation. Here I was concerned with the possibilities offered by analysing the 
phenomena from multiple scales, as expressed by the BOAP, and comparing the 
concerns expressed by actors moving in the arena of command with those in the arena 
of practice.  
 
 
While I consider the Red Queen Hypothesis particularly rich to explain the dynamics 
in the interdiction/evasion binary, it has some limitations. First, I mentioned that the 
sort of dynamics of the WoD creates scenarios where both sides of the binary 
interdiction/evasion as expressed in the literature about innovation and the Red Queen 
Hypothesis, run 'a fast as (they) can' to stay in the same place, this needs further 
clarifying. Both smugglers and state agencies are forced by competition to improve 
their performance, increasing the pressure on both sides, thus creating a circle of 
learning and competition. As in Lewis Carroll, after all the running, there is no real 
change in the dynamic. Second, while I criticize previous metaphors because they 
entail a pattern action-reaction and coordinated action, it seems that once players are 
involved in the sort of competition that the Red Queen entails, the process is automatic, 
308 
 
and both sides fall into a spiral and incapable of avoiding the negative consequences 
of the dynamic. Third, the interpretation I put forward is based on the critique of 
previous metaphors and the empirical data they are based on, as they are focused on 
the measurable elements and the representations of the WoD. Measurement of 
performance is not easily identifiable in the WoD. The empirical data in this thesis 
corresponds to one side of the binary and only secondary data of the smugglers' side, 
and the Red Queen presupposes the consequences of the competitive spiral in which 
both sides are engaged. To continue advancing the metaphor, it is necessary to make 
possible the identification of both learning and imitation phenomena at the smugglers' 
side. 
 
In terms of future research, more detailed qualitative comparative research between 
different regions would allow for an understanding of the scope for transferring Navy 
personnel’s experiences. Qualitative studies are needed that explore the perceptions of 
Navy personnel regarding rewards and their perceptions of performance, success, and 
normative indicators. In order to understand the complex and uncertain symbiotic 
relationships between smugglers, LEAs, and the military it is necessary to examine 
and understand better the connections between the ways in which images of enemies 
are constructed and how this affects decision making in the field. That is to say, there 
is a need to explore how practitioners deal with the asymmetry of information and the 
uncertainty of the results and success, and explore the process of decision making in 
contexts of acute uncertainty.  
 
As discussed above, scholars of drugs have not delved into the way drug traffickers 
innovate, and less research has been conducted into the ways in which policies are 
implemented and practices elaborated. Further studies analysing other transport 
methods used by smugglers could help to support the claim concerning the dispersed 
character of smugglers innovation. Finally a turn to the sites in which technologies and 
players encounter and perform their actions would help to better understand the 
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